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ABSTRACT 
Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) have recently witnessed remarkable growth triggered by 
an increasing Islamic awareness, rising oil revenues in the Gulf and IFIs’ holistic business 
model. The key selling factor, however, is their Shari’a-based business proposition which 
often requires some financial sacrifices e.g. being ethical, responsible and philanthropic. It 
also requires them to refrain from investments in tobacco, alcohol, pornography or earning 
interest. On the other hand, for IFIs’ sponsors and managers, the key motivational factor of 
entrance into the Islamic financial market is not their desire for achieving Shari’a objectives 
through the holistic business model but rather the desire to tap this highly profitable market 
where customers are inclined to pay a premium for Shari’a compliance. In order for IFIs to be 
accepted  by  the  market,  they  need  to  be  certified  by  Shari’a  scholars,  known  for  their 
integrity and expertise in Shari’a. One can, therefore, expect potential tensions between IFIs’ 
managers and Shari’a scholars. The purpose of this research is, thus, to probe the struggle 
for  achieving  a  high  level  of  Shari’a  compliance  in  the  presence  of  a  desire  for  business 
objectives within Islamic banking.  
 
The research explores the following questions. Firstly, who determines and defines Shari’a 
compliance?  In  other  words,  is  it  the  Shari’a  scholars  who  dictate  Shari’a  compliance  or 
managers or an alliance between the two? Secondly, what are the various levels of Shari’a 
compliance within IFIs? Thirdly, what causal and intervening factors determine the level of 
Shari’a compliance within IFIs? Fourthly, what strategies are adopted by Shari’a scholars and 
managers  to  tackle  this  phenomenon?  Lastly,  what  is  the  prevailing  level  of  Shari’a 
compliance  in  IFIs  in  the  present  scenario?  The  study  explores  these  questions  using 
Grounded Theory (GT) as a methodological framework. The choice of GT for this research 
was triggered by two factors; i) non-availability of sufficient literature in this area and ii) the 
entwinement of the related hidden phenomena with deep social intricacies. Data, which was 
steered by theoretical sampling, consists mainly of in-depth interviews with a number of key 
stakeholders from three significant cases and a regulatory body.  
 
The findings reveal that Shari’a compliance is a complex process and is determined by a 
combination of religious, social, ideological, structural, regulatory and self-interest forces. 
Though  Shari’a  scholars  can  apparently  be  seen  as  the  supreme  authority  in  defining, 
dictating  and  implementing  Shari’a  compliance,  the  practical  phenomenon  is  opaque 
because  of  the  managers’  substantial  ‘invisible  hand’  in  the  whole  process.  While  many 
Shari’a scholars employ considerable efforts in making their respective institutions genuinely 
Shari’a-compliant, managers, on the other hand, try to tap the market with the tag of Shari’a 
certification  obtained  from  Shari’a  scholars.  This  involves  the  exercise  of  a  number  of 
strategies e.g. avoidance, controlling, coercion, compromising, confrontation and separation 
on the part of the two parties. As a result, the study illustrates that Shari’a compliance is not 
an absolute term. Rather it is constantly being positioned and repositioned- termed as fatwa 
repositioning  in  this  study-  by  the  combination  and  intensity  of  the  above-mentioned 
forces and strategies. It varies from ‘superficial’ to ‘reasonable’ levels on a continuum with 
two extremes; ‘deep’ and ‘no’ Shari’a compliance. 
 
The research has three main implications: theoretical, methodological and practical. On the 
theoretical side, the research contributes to the Islamic finance literature in particular and 
organizational control literature in general. The study claims that organizational control is 
much  more  complex  in  IFIs  because  of  the  struggle  for  achieving  divergent  objectives 
(pursued  by  different authorities) through the  same institution. There  is a latent struggle 
between the two parties to control each other. Interestingly, Shari’a scholars are generally 
not in control of what they are supposed to be controlling i.e. Shari’a compliance. On the 
methodological front, the study suggests some new analytical techniques e.g. a snapshot 
view of the coding framework and a combination of manual and computer-assisted analysis. 
From a practical standpoint, the study suggests that Islamic banking is currently in a critical 
stage.  It  can  either  become  a  viable  alternative  to  the  conventional  banking  system  by 
genuinely incorporating Shari’a objectives into its business model or pave its way to collapse 
by  its  existing  struggle  to  achieve  business  objectives  through  Shari’a  certification  from 
Shari’a scholars.    
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phenomenon?  Lastly,  what  is  the  prevailing  level  of  Shari’a  compliance  in  IFIs  in  the 
present scenario? 
1.3  Scope of the Study 
Even though data for this research has been collected from a wide range of respondents 
across three different cases and a regulator, the scope of the study is mainly limited to the 
struggle for Shari’a compliance between managers and Shari’a scholars within IFIs. For the 
purpose  of  this  study,  anyone  with  assigned  business  targets  and  direct/indirect 
involvement with Shari’a scholars is included in the category of ‘managers’. This includes 
the chief executive officer, heads of departments and branch managers. As the Board of 
Directors  (BoD)  is  also  engaged  with  Shari’a  scholars  on  various  matters,  the  term 
‘management’ as used in this thesis also encompasses BoD. Furthermore, many scholars 
put top  officers and BoD in the  management group (Berle and  Means, 1968,  Mizruchi, 
1983). Similarly, a Shari’a scholar is any person whose job is ensuring Shari’a compliance 
of the IFIs. This category includes members of the Shari’a board, Shari’a advisors, Shari’a 
auditors and anyone working under the direct command of Shari’a boards and advisors. 
The study makes frequent reference to these two groups. 
1.4  Importance of this Study 
Islamic finance has emerged as an important business sector within the financial industry 
over the past few decades with the very first institutions appearing in Egypt and Malaysia 
(Lee and Ullah, 2007). This industry was hardly visible to the international world at the 
time it was gearing up in the 1970s and 80s. Yet, after three decades, the industry has 
now become the focus of international attention from multinational financial corporations, 
researchers  and  governments.  Islamic  finance  came  into  the  spotlight  after  the  recent 
financial crises due to its resilience to the financial shocks. It is believed that the resilience 
of  Islamic  banking  to  the  financial  crisis  was  mainly  due  to  its  adherence  to  some 
fundamental  principles  (Yeates,  2008)  stemming  from  its  unique  Shari’a  governance 
system.  Though  the  bulk  of  academic  literature  on  Islamic  finance  addresses  its 
theoretical side, many areas of this embryonic industry are still awaiting further academic 
and  empirical  research  and  verification.  Especially  the  area  of  how  Shari’a  compliance 
actually works within IFIs has remained hardly touched upon in scholarly writings. Most of 
the work around this area is either comprised of guiding principles/standards (IFSB, 2009, 
IFSB,  2006,  Yaquby  et  al.,  2005,  AAOIFI,  2010)  or  of  theoretical  work  on  how  Shari’a 
compliance should be with highly normative overtones (Zaidi, 2008, Wislon, 2009, Sultan, 
2007,  Garas  and  Pierce,  2010,  Farah,  2008,  Al  Sharif,  2008,  Baali,  2008).  There, 
apparently,  are  no  empirical  documentations  or  academic  writings  on  how  Shari’a Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis  
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compliance  actually  works  within  IFIs  and  that  what  key  influencing  factors/variables 
strengthen or weaken Shari’a compliance.  
 
Therefore, the researcher felt it important to understand the structure and dynamics of 
IFIs in  practice  with  particular focus on  Shari’a  governance  system  and  the  position  of 
Shari’a scholars, who are presumed to be the guardians of Shari’a principles/objectives 
within their organizations. The researcher also realized the importance of fleshing out the 
factors  at  play  that  might  positively  or  negatively  affect  the  performance  and 
independence of the Shari’a scholars while working with managers. This study has tried to 
unfold  the phenomenon  of  the  hidden  struggle  for  Shari’a  compliance  between  Shari’a 
scholars and managers by collecting data from key stakeholders and thereby grounded 
the findings in the data. It has also investigated  whether IFIs really pursue the ‘holistic 
approach’ (Dusuki, 2008b p. 13) of doing business or just sell business objectives with 
holistic  brandings.  Therefore,  the  study  carries  significant  importance  by  empirically 
examining an important, previously untouched, area.  
1.5  Methodology 
The  methodology  adopted  in  this  study  is  Grounded  Theory  (GT)  (Glaser  and  Strauss, 
1967, Strauss and  Corbin, 1998, Strauss and  Corbin,  1990, Corbin and Strauss, 2008) 
which is best suited for exploring research areas with little literature and complex social 
phenomena. This methodology is based on three intermingled steps i.e. open, axial and 
selective coding. It does not require the formulation of a research framework based on 
rigorous  literature  review  at  the  beginning  of  the  research,  rather  it  starts  with  data 
collection and analysis after the broader area of research is identified. Data collection is 
guided by theoretical sampling where every next chunk of data is collected from sources 
identified in the light of the themes emerging from the analysis of the previous data.  
 
The research data consists mainly of interviews conducted face-to-face with respondents 
from three different cases and a regulatory body located in two different countries i.e. 
Pakistan and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Respondents include Shari’a scholars, managers, 
employees  and  customers  of  the  three  cases  and  top-level  officers  from  a  regulatory 
body. It is noteworthy that the selection of the three cases, the regulator and the different 
respondent groups within each case was guided by theoretical sampling. Furthermore, it is 
important to mention here that this research is not a case study. The collection of data 
from three different cases is not for the purpose of cross-case comparison but rather for 
capturing variations of the emerging phenomenon. A complete separate chapter (Chapter 
4) has been dedicated to the explanation and justification of using GT methodology in this 
research.  Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis  
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Chapter 8 positions the emergent theory in extant literature in the area of Islamic banking 
and  organizational  control.  This  is  where  the  bulk  of  literature  related  to  the  newly 
developed GT has been explored. The last chapter concludes the research by summarizing 
the key findings and providing specific practical recommendations. It also gives detailed 
theoretical  and  methodological  recommendations.  Suggestions  for  further  research  are 
also provided in this chapter.  
Summary 
Islamic finance has grown significantly over the past few decades. However, managers, 
Shari’a scholars, regulators and intellectuals still do not agree on the exact application of 
Shari’a principles to this industry. This thesis uncovers the struggle that managers and 
Shari’a scholars make to tilt Shari’a compliance in a way more favourable towards their 
objectives. This chapter introduces the research, its background, focus, scope, importance 
methodology and structure.  Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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2  Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic 
Banking 
2.1  Introduction 
The  modern  capitalist  world  view  has  separated  religion  from  political  and  economic 
spheres of life (Rice, 1999), however, some  literature has found a strong link between 
business  and  faith  in  many  countries  (Giacalone  and  Jurkiewicz,  2003,  Cavanagh  and 
Bandsuch,  2002,  Angelidis  and  Ibrahim,  2004).  The  recent  ascendancy  of  the  Islamic 
financial services industry- the application of Shari’a principles to financial practices- is 
an evident example of the practicality of this link. Some studies have been conducted on 
this association in Christianity (Jones, 1995, Lee et al., 2003) and Judaism (Pava, 1997, 
Pava,  1998)  although  there  is  no  practical  application  of  the  principles  of  these  two 
religions  to  modern  business  transactions  except  a  few  faith-based  funds  e.g.  Roman 
Catholics’ Ave Maria Rising Dividend. We have detected, nevertheless, a limited but rising 
awareness  regarding  Islamic  business  ethics  in  recent  scholarly  research  (Rice,  1999, 
Graafland et al., 2006, Beekun, 1997, Wilson, 2006, Wilson, 1997). 
 
Islam  is  a  religion  that  guides  every  aspect  of  life  including  spirituality,  business  and 
social justice by encompassing an entire socioeconomic system (Rice, 1999). Being based 
on  clear  ethical  principles,  it  restricts  a  number  of  business  transactions  e.g.  interest, 
pornography, gambling, speculation, and alcohol with the justification for such restraints 
anchored  in  considerations  of  social  justice,  equitable  distribution  of  wealth  and 
overcoming social evils (Usmani, 2002b). While the capitalist system is based on personal 
interests  and  stresses  that  every  possible  action  should  be  taken  for  achieving  the 
monetary interests of the owners of a particular business entity (Fama, 1980, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), there is a great emphasis on trusteeship (Amanah) in Islamic teachings and 
the business is considered as a sacred trust with the managers. Therefore, managers are 
expected to act in the owners’ best interests and not indulge in any activity that can harm 
the owners. But this does not mean that owners and managers are allowed to use every 
means in pursuit of profit maximization. Even though the right to personal property and 
profit-making is not negated in Islam, the Islamic religion does not allow these objectives 
to  be  achieved  at  the  expense  of  other  stakeholders  (Beekun  and  Badawi,  2005)  and 
unnecessary claims on resources are to be minimized (Chapra, 1992).  
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This chapter starts with a brief history of modern Islamic banking followed by a section on 
Shari’a objectives. Section 4 then explains the fundamental principles of Islamic finance 
that  lead  the  realization  of  Shari’a  objectives.  The  next  section  explains  some  of  the 
widely  used  Islamic  financial  instruments  that  are  based  on  the  principles  of  Islamic 
banking.  The  final  section  gives  details  of  the  current  regulatory  and  governance 
paradigms of IFIs. 
2.2  Historical Perspective 
The history of Islamic finance goes back 1400 years to the start of Islamic religion. There 
is evidence  of free  market economy and  mercantilism in the  medieval  ages  during the 
golden  period  of  the  Islamic  caliphate  (Postan  et  al.,  1987)  where  business  was  done 
according to Shari’a principles. Some researchers have termed this period as the age of 
“Islamic capitalism” when Baghdad was the “commercial metropolis” (Labib, 1969, p. 81) 
of the Islamic world. According to Labib (1969), this capitalist system grew to a sound  
monetary  economy  with  Dinar  as  the  trading  currency.  The  present  “institutionalized 
form” (Lee and Ullah, 2007, p. 1) of Islamic banking started in the mid-20
th century. There 
are varying views on the birth of the current Islamic banking system but  scholars agree 
on Egypt and Malaysia as the birthplaces of modern Islamic banking (Erol and El-Bdour, 
1989, Kahf et al., 2005). Concurrently started in 1963, the Mit-Ghamr Savings Bank of 
Egypt and the Tabung Haji of Malaysia were the early financial institutions that started 
working  according  to  Islamic  principles.  While  the  Mit-Ghamr  Savings  Bank  did  not 
publicly disclose its Islamic identity due fears of crackdown from the then secular Egyptian 
government,  Tabung  Haji  received  encouragement  and  support  from  the  Malaysian 
government (Kahf et al., 2005).  
 
This was followed by a number of milestone developments in 1970s triggering the double 
digit growth of the industry. These early developments include the foundation of Dubai 
Islamic Bank as the first full-fledged Islamic commercial bank and the formation of Islamic 
Development Bank (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Matching with the concurrent foundation 
of  the  earliest  institutions  in  Egypt  and  Malaysia,  these  two  institutions  were  both 
incorporated  in  1975  in  Dubai  and  Jeddah  respectively.  This  was  followed  by  the 
formation of Kuwait Finance House and Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan in 1977 and Dar Al-
Maall  Al-Islami in 1980 (Khan and Bhatti,  2008). Further developments were  seen in a 
number of Muslim majority countries like Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Malaysia, Kuwait etc. in 
terms of Islamization of the banking industry (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005, Khan and Bhatti, 
2008). Pakistan is believed to be the first country that formally started the Islamization 
process of its banking industry in the 1980s by transforming some of the government-
owned institutions, National Investment Trust (NIT), to operate according to profit-and-Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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loss system instead of interest-based system. However, this new Islamic financial system 
faced a lot of criticism from Shari’a scholars and academics in its first 10 years leading to 
a  comprehensive  decision  of  the  Shari’a  Appellate  Court  in  1991  (Zaher  and  Hassan, 
2001). Though this decision was a historical milestone in reformatting the banking system 
in  line  with  Shari’a  principles,  it  remained  un-implemented  due  to  frequent  political 
changes in 1990s. Islamic banking in Pakistan has witnessed noticeable growth only after 
the year 2000 with the emergence of private Islamic banks in the market. 
 
Being considered as a “wishful thinking” in its early years (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005, p. 
ix)  surrounding  the  worries  of  its  sustainability  in  the  presence  of  a  well-established 
conventional banking system, the Islamic finance industry has proved to be a practical 
alternative to the conventional system over the past 20 years. The total assets currently 
managed by institutions operating according to Shari’a principles range between US$ 700 
billion to US$ 1 trillion. These assets are expected to reach US$ 1.6 trillion by the year end 
2012 (Khan and Bhatti, 2008, Richter, 2009). Although the total assets of IFIs represent a 
very small percentage of the banking sector, the average annual growth rate of around 
fifteen  to  twenty  percent  is  promising  (Yeates,  2008).  Khan  and  Bhatti  (2008,  p.708) 
claimed that the recent developments in the industry  are  making it a  “truly viable and 
competitive alternative to the conventional system”. The key factors contributing to the 
growth of Islamic finance are the soaring oil prices and the resulting economic growth in 
the oil-rich Middle Eastern world, innovation and a favourable attitude towards Islamic 
banking from the regulators worldwide (El Qorchi, 2005, Khan and Bhatti, 2008). Some 
researchers  argue  that  a  major  reason  of  the  growth  of  this  sector  is  the  demand  for 
Shari’a compliant products (Abdullah and Kassim, 2009, El Qorchi, 2005, Lee and Ullah, 
2011).  Yet  some  others  claim  that  the  competitiveness,  itself,  of  some  of  the  Islamic 
financial  products  has  paved  the  way  for  the  industry’s  rapid  expansion  making  it 
attractive to both Muslim and non-Muslim investors alike (El Qorchi, 2005). 
2.3  Shari’a Objectives (Maqasid Al-Shari’a) 
Islam  is  a  versatile  religion  guiding  Muslims  private  spiritual  and  worldly  lives.  Shari’a 
embodies  the  Islam’s  worldview  defining  an  ethical  system  governing  all  facets  of  life 
including  personal,  political,  social,  economic  etc.  Therefore,  a  Muslim’s  dealings  with 
fellow  human  beings  are  deeply  intertwined  with  Islam’s  basic  beliefs,  values  and 
objectives. In fact it “reflects the holistic view of Islam, which is a complete and integrated 
code of life” (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007, p.30). It is thus imperative to understand what 
objectives Shari’a wants to achieve by regulating all aspects of life. 
 
Perhaps  Imam  Al-Ghazzali,  as  quoted  in  (Chapra,  2000,  p.118),  introduced  the  best Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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comprehensive definition of Shari’a objectives: 
 
“The  objective  of the  Shari`a  is to  promote the  well-being  of  all  mankind, 
which  lies  in  safeguarding  their  faith  (din),  their  human  self  (nafs),  their 
intellect  (`aql),  their  posterity  (nasl)  and  their  wealth  (mal).  Whatever 
ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable.” 
It is clear from the definition that Shari’a objectives give key prominence to human dignity 
and prosperity. Shari’a is thus a set of rules designed to protect humanity and expedite 
the thriving of human life in this world and a reward for good acts in the hereafter. The 
Shari’a objectives could be achieved through a transparent system of fairness and justice, 
elimination  of  prejudice  and  promotion  of  cooperation  of  support  across  families  and 
societies  (Dusuki  and  Abdullah,  2007).  Shari’a  objectives  could  be  achieved  through 
Maslahah- a juristic tool for promoting public good and preventing harm. Most Islamic 
jurists allow Maslahah to be used as a source of Shari’a when issuing fatwa’s on emerging 
issues  (Dusuki  and  Abdullah,  2007).  The  use  of  Maslahah  is  allowed  to  promote  only 
public  good.  It  should  not  be  used  for  individual  benefit.  On  the  contrary,  Maslahah 
should be exercised to stop a personal gain in order to prevent public harm. For example, 
a company should not be allowed to benefit from an environmentally disastrous project 
because of its public harm. However, it is possible that some Shari’a scholars may use 
Maslahah to give a benefit to Islamic banks while ignoring a wider public good. Therefore, 
some jurists, like Imam Al-Ghazzali, do not consider it as a source of Shari’a rulings. He 
also restricts its use to necessary public good only. Al-Raysuni (1992) quoted Imam Al-
Ghazzali as saying:  
 
“Maslahah is essentially an expression for the acquisition of benefit or the 
repulsion of injury or harm, but that is not what we mean by it, because 
acquisition of benefits and the repulsion of harm represent human goals…… 
What  we  mean  by  Maslahah,  however,  is  the  preservation  of  the  Shari’a 
objectives.” 
The  recent  attention  in  the western  world  towards  making  corporations  responsible  to 
society  partly  resemble  to  what  we  call  Shari’a  objectives.  However,  Shari’a  objectives 
address the issue of responsibility of not only businesses but also individuals in a rather 
wider and holistic way (Dusuki, 2008b). In contrast to western corporations where social 
responsibility is undertaken as a result of governments’ and stakeholders’ pressure, IFIs 
derive this urge from the very principles of Shari’a which establishes that a responsible 
behaviour would attract reward and irresponsible behaviour would attract punishment in 
the hereafter. Islam considers an individual as the vicegerent (Halifax)  of Allah on this Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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earth who is supposed to prioritize public good against personal gains in order to attain 
Shari’a  objectives.  One’s  wealth  is  considered  as  a  trust  from  Allah  and  therefore,  it 
should  be  used  to  relieve  fellow  human  beings  from  the  troubles  let  alone  damaging 
others for personal gains. 
 
Emphasis on justice and balance (referred to as adl and qist in Qur’an) in every aspect of 
life are explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an
1 e.g. the Qur’an says “…. Be fair for God loves 
those who are fair (and just)”. The Qur’anic verse “Be just! For justice is the nearest to 
piety” (Qur’an, 5: 80) can be interpreted in this context. On another occasion the Qur’an 
says  “Dealt  not  unjustly  and  ye shall  not  be  dealt  with  unjustly”  (Qur’an,  2:  279).  The 
above  verses  also  imply  that  all  other  stakeholders  get  what  is  just  for  them  e.g. 
customers are entitled to fair prices, quality goods, information disclosure and employees 
are  entitled  to  salaries,  health  benefits,  education,  share  in  the  profits.  Similarly,  the 
environment is a natural resource that belongs to all inhabitants and therefore, companies 
are not allowed to exploit it for their private monetary benefits because doing so is an 
injustice to other claimants including animals. 
2.4  The Role of IFIs in Realizing Shari’a Objectives 
As discussed above, Shari’a objectives prioritize public good over personal or corporate 
goals.  Thus  one  might  expect  that  IFIs  should  not  only  achieve  Shari’a  objectives 
themselves  but  also  seek  them  with  other  companies  through  their  investments.  In 
contrast,  capitalist  economists  argue  that  the  sole  reason  for  corporate  existence  is 
maximization  of  shareholders’  wealth  (Friedman,  1970,  Friedman,  1967).  They  further 
argue  that  market  forces  should  decide  the  optimal  allocation  of  scarce  economic 
resources. According to the free market view of modern business, corporations can even 
deal with drugs, weapons, pornography if that increases their profits despite their server 
consequences  on societies.  On the other hand,  IFIs are not allowed to indulge even in 
tobacco, alcohol, weapons, pornography gambling, hoarding and speculations because of 
their harmful effects on societies. Thus an IFI would straightaway turn down an investment 
proposal in, say, a tobacco company even if its return is comparatively much higher than 
other available options. Thus the “ethical principles of Islam do influence the decision-
making process in a business situation where such decisions may not be in conformity 
with decisions made in the economic interests of the firm” (Uddin, 2003 p. 26) and thus 
Islam advocates “overall human well-being through socioeconomic justice”. Beekun and 
Badawi (2005 p. 135) argue that the “corporation as a fictitious entity does not diminish 
the  responsibility  of  its  owners  and  managers  for  its  actions”.  IFIs  are  discouraged  to 
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invest in a company that goes against Shari’a objectives. In such circumstances, where the 
company is involved in activities violating Shari’a objectives, IFIs have two options; i) force 
the  company  to  align  its  activities  with  the  broader  stakeholder  criteria  or  ii)  sell  the 
shares of this particular company and invest in firms that are more socially responsible 
and are meeting Islamic securitization criteria. 
2.5  Fundamental Principles of Islamic Finance 
Shari’a  not  only  gives  a  list  of  Shari’a  objectives  but  it  also  furnishes  a  number  of 
principles for IFIs to adhere to which could help them achieve those objectives. Islamic 
finance is a subset of Islamic economic system whose goal is public welfare and social 
justice (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). Islam allows capitalism in the form of recognizing 
market forces of demand and supply, access to private property and the profit motive but 
these  are  subject  to  some  restrictions  namely  the  prohibition  of  interest,  gambling, 
speculations, hoarding,  dealing with alcohol, arms, tobacco, pornography etc. (Usmani, 
2002b).  Usmani  also  argues  that  the  very  purpose  of  these  restrictions  is  to  maintain 
justice and equality within societies. The products developed by IFIs are scrutinized based 
on a set of principles that restricts the free hand of entities in pursuing the profit motive. 
These principles are briefly discussed below.  
 
Firstly, prohibition of Riba (interest) is the most prominent and widely discussed principle 
of Islamic finance distinguishing it from conventional finance. The literal meaning of Riba 
is  ‘excess’  which  technically  means  any  excess  amount  paid/received  for  the 
borrowed/lent  money  (Obaidullah,  2005,  Khan  and  Ahmed,  2001).  Though  Islamic 
scholars unanimously agree that any predetermined interest rate on loan constitutes Riba, 
the subject is still subject to debate. Islamic finance researchers argue that Riba leads to 
unequal distribution of wealth by rewarding the lender by keeping him/her intact from the 
associated risks of investments and oppressing the borrower by shifting all risks on to 
him/her (Sultan, 2007, Usmani, 2002b). Chong and Liu (2009) assert that Riba refers to 
the doubling of debt after failure to pay on its due date in Medieval Arabic practices which 
could lead to the slavery of the debtors. They, however, argue that prohibition of Riba is 
not  relevant  in  the  existence  of  bankruptcy  laws  in  modern  societies,  which  protect 
debtors from slavery. This goes against Shari’a objectives and is, therefore, not allowed to 
IFIs to deal with. The strict prohibition of Riba is derived from a number of Qur’anic verses 
(2:275-280,  3:130,  4:161,  and  30:39)  that  condemn  its  receipt  and  payment  in  very 
strong words. Therefore, Shari’a scholars do not allow IFIs to deal in any interest-based 
transaction.  
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The argument put forth against interest is that it imbalances the distribution of wealth 
within societies (Usmani, 2002b) and concentrating it in the hands of a few. This view has 
also been endorsed by western economist like Robertson (1998, p.54) who said that  
 
“Would  it  be  desirable  and  possible  to  limit  the  role  of  interest  more 
drastically than that, for example by converting debt into equity throughout 
the  economy?  This  will  be  in  line  with  Islamic  teachings  and  with  earlier 
Christian teachings, that usury is sin.” 
In  fact,  the key  emphasis  in  developing  Islamic financial  instruments,  discussed  in the 
next section, is to engineer them in such a way as to avoid interest. It is however difficult 
to develop Islamic financial products purely based on Shari’a principles and yet meeting 
the banking needs of the bankers and managers. Therefore, some researchers strongly 
criticise Islamic financial products for being overburdened with unnecessary contracts and 
away from Shari’a objectives (El-Gamal, 2006). 
 
Secondly,  Islam  prohibits  Qimar  (gambling),  Gharrar  (excessive  risk)  and  Maysir 
(speculation).  Transactions  involving  gambling  and  speculations  are  banned  for  similar 
reasons  discussed  in  the  above  paragraph  i.e.  these  mechanisms  “tend  to  concentrate 
wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few”  (Usmani,  2002b).  Business  transactions  that  exclude 
Gharrar are “designed to prevent the weak from being exploited and, thus, a zero-sum 
game in which one gains at the expense of another is not sanctioned” (Chong and Liu, 
2009, p.128). One reason for this prohibition is that Islam insists on investments in real 
assets while gambling locks capital in hypothetical assets that do not lead to economic 
development. Furthermore, they lead to so social problems. Modern research has proved 
that addictive gambling leads to “financial breakdown, impaired relations with family and 
friends” in addition to alcoholism and physical harm (Bergh and Kühlhorn, 1994, p.275). 
Gambling also includes elements of Gharrar in the sense that the potential outcome is 
uncertain. Gharrar excludes transactions like options and forwards. Similarly, speculations 
lead to hoarding and bubble markets that collapse leading to financial crises. Thus, IFIs 
are required to avoid investments in any business or transaction involved gambling and 
excessive risk/uncertainty and speculations. 
 
Third, certain business sectors are considered to be naturally harmful to the society and 
therefore  categorized  as  Haram  (prohibited).  Such  business  sectors  include  alcohol, 
tobacco,  pornography,  pork,  arms  etc.  (Usmani,  1998,  Usmani,  2002b).  This  is  not  an 
exhaustive  list;  any  business  sector  that  leads  to  potential  damage  to  public/social 
interest is not allowed to be undertaken by IFIs. Again, the reasons for avoiding these Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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business sectors are their associated contributions towards social problems (Caetano et 
al., 2001). 
 
These are the fundamental principles that each financial institution has to observe. The 
pliability  of  IFIs  to  the  recent  financial  crisis  is  partly  due  to  their  adherence  to  these 
fundamental  principles.  The  recent  Moody’s  report  claims  that  the  reason  for  Islamic 
banks’ strong resilience to the recent global financial debacle was their adherence to a 
rather conservative  investment  policy based  on  the  above  principles  (Hassoune,  2008). 
The ability of IFIs to weather the storm is embedded within the core principles of Islamic 
banking: both speculation (Maysir) and interest rates (Riba) are prohibited. The sub-prime 
crisis was driven by a number of factors leading to the accumulation of risks, which were 
again magnified through the use of complex, often highly structured financial products. 
Such  products  are  ruled  out  from  the  portfolio  of  IFIs  based  on  their  tussle  with  the 
above-mentioned principles. Some other reports have also supported the claim that IFIs 
have  remained  intact  from  the  severe  impacts  of  the  financial  crisis  (Yeates,  2008)  in 
which world’s financial giants collapsed. 
2.6  A Brief Overview of Islamic Financial Instruments 
The fundamental principles of Islamic finance are transformed into a number of distinct 
Islamic  finance  products  that  are  said  to  be  based  on  these  principles.  As  against 
conventional banks that have no restrictions on their operations, the products of Islamic 
banks need to be developed in conformity with the Shari’a principles for achieving Shari’a 
objectives. In order to comply with Shari’a principles, IFIs’ products need to be clear from 
interest,  gambling,  speculations,  alcohol,  weaponry  etc.  Some  of  these  products  are 
discussed in this section.  
 
Musharakah  and  Mudharabah:  Musharakah  is  a  financial  instrument  based  on  Shari’a 
rules whereby two or more partners invest in a business on profit-and-loss basis (Khan 
and Ahmed, 2001). The venture is financed and managed by all the partners together. 
However,  it  is  also  possible  that  one  partner  is  appointed  as  manager  who  receives 
compensation for his/her services. Although the ideal profit sharing ratio is the one based 
on the ratio of investment, it is not a strict Shari’a requirement and the profit sharing 
ration  can  be  decided  on  mutual  consent  (Usmani,  2002b).  This  element  of  mutual 
consent is  subject  debates as Islamic banks normally set their returns  in a way that it 
always  equals  conventional  interest  (Chong  and  Liu,  2009).  However,  loss  sharing  is 
strictly based on the ratio of investment. One important aspect of Musharakah is that the 
money  should  be  materialized  into  real  assets  having  intrinsic  utility  (Usmani,  2002b). 
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partner. If any partner decides to leave the Musharakah after giving a due notice to all 
patterns,  it  should  lead  to  its  termination.  These  termination  patterns  of  Musharakah 
ventures, especially those involving long-term investments, are the serious loopholes in 
the  structure.  However,  Usmani  suggests  that  some  conditions  could  be  introduced  in 
Musharakah to avoid these drawbacks. 
 
Mudharabah instrument is a financing arrangement whereby one party, rabb-ul-mal or the 
capital provider, invests his/her capital whiles the other party, Mudharib or manager, runs 
the  concerned  business.  It  is  distinct  from  Musharakah  in  a  number  of  ways  (Usmani, 
2002b). Firstly, the capital provider does not have any managerial role in Mudharabah. 
This enhances the agency problem as compared to Musharakah where both partners can 
take on managerial roles. Secondly, the manager is not entitled to any compensation for 
his/her  managerial  services.  Thirdly,  any  business  loss  is  completely  borne  (Khan  and 
Ahmed,  2001)  which  further  amplifies  the  agency  problem.  The  basic  concept  of  loss 
sharing is the same in Musharakah and Mudharabah i.e. the capital bears the loss not the 
individuals. Even though the Mudharib does not go unpunished in case of losses, his/her 
liability  is  limited  only  to  his/her  time  and  efforts  (Sundararajan  and  Errico,  2002). 
Fourthly,  the  liability  of  the  capital  provider  is  limited  only  to  the  amount  of  invested 
capital while that of the manager is either limited or unlimited depending on the nature of 
the business. Sixthly, the assets of the business are owned by the capital provider so the 
manager cannot benefit from any appreciation in asset values. 
 
Some  other  instruments  derived  from  Musharakah  and  Mudharabah  are  also  available. 
These include Diminishing Musharakah, a kind of Islamic financial lease, and Musharakah-
Mudharabah which is a combination of different features of the two instruments (Usmani, 
1998, Usmani, 2002b). As discussed earlier, the risk-sharing conception is inherent in the 
Islamic  finance  system  which  exposes  IFIs  to  additional  risks  and  challenges.  These 
challenges are intensified when the different Islamic modes of financing are combined to 
develop new products nature (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). 
 
 
Musharakah and Mudharabah instruments constitute both sides of the balance sheet of 
IFIs.  The  liability  side  of  the  IFI  consists  of  a  special  form  of  Mudharabah
2  called  un-
restricted Mudharabah which gives it the right to invest the money wherever and however 
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it  wants.  If  the  deposits  are  accepted  on  Musharakah
3,  the  right  of  management  is 
transferred to the bank in the account opening form. The banks further invest the money 
in a number of instruments including Musharakah and Mudharabah which constitute the 
left-hand  side  of  the  balance  sheet.  Even  though  the  bank  may  invest  their  funds  in 
Restricted Mudharabah, where the funds are used in a specified business by a specified 
entrepreneur, it still does not have to representation on the board exposing the bank to 
moral  hazards  of  the  entrepreneur.  This  is  one  reason  Mudharabah  constitutes  a 
negligible  percentage  of  the  left-hand-side  of  IFIs’  balance  sheets.  As  against 
Mudharabah,  Musharakah  gives  the  bank  the  right  to  actively  participate  in  the 
management of the enterprise and influence its decisions. 
 
Despite the proximity of these two financial instruments to the Islamic economic system, 
one can hardly find institutions offering them. This is probably due to risk-averse nature 
of the banking institutions and lack of trust and honesty in the general. Also, as the bank 
is required to be an active managing partner in Musharakah, it is hard for it to manage a 
large  number  of  businesses.  However,  some  large-scale  projects  have  been  financed 
using Musharakah and Mudharabah instruments. Diminishing Musharakah is also widely 
practiced. 
 
The  ideal  products  in  the  very  proximity  of  Shari’a  principles  are  Musharakah  and 
Mudharabah. Some researchers argue that Musharakah and Mudharabah are “the real and 
ideal instruments of financing in Shari’a” (Usmani, 2002b) because of the ultimate risk-
sharing nature and purity from Riba of these products.  
 
Murabahah:  Murabahah  is  the  widely  practiced  Islamic  financial  instrument.  It  literally 
refers to a sale agreement with a known profit (Usmani, 1998, Usmani, 2002b, Khan and 
Ahmed, 2001). Thus, the purchase price of the commodity is disclosed to the buyer at the 
time of sale. For a Murabahah transaction to be Shari’a compliant, it has to meet certain 
requirements. Firstly, the subject of sale must be legal and Shari’a compliant. Secondly, it 
must be in the ownership of the seller at the time the Murabahah agreement is signed. 
Banks, however, do not deal in trading of real commodities. Therefore, banks manufacture 
a Murabahah transaction, at least in the documents, after a request is received from a 
customer.  Thus,  they  reengineer  the  Murabahah  into  a  debt-like  banking  product  by 
imposing unnecessary and costly contractual steps (El-Gamal, 2006). Originally, a sales 
transaction,  Murabahah  is  used  by  IFIs  as  an  instrument  for  financing  where  the 
underlying asset is sold to the buyer on deferred payments with known profit margin. The 
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financier appoints the buyer as its agent who buys the underlying asset on the financier’s 
behalf and the ownership is then transferred to the buyer in a separate agreement. The 
banks  usually  calculate  their  profit  margin  using  the  inter-bank  interest  rate  as  the 
benchmark.  Thus,  their  return  is  pretty  much  the  same  as  conventional  interest  rate 
charged  by  other  banks.  Additionally,  the  bank  is  not  involved  in  the  actual  purchase 
process and the purchase and transfer of ownership from the supplier to the bank and 
then to the ultimate buyer is limited to paper. 
 
Ijarah:  Ijarah  is  an  operating  lease  arrangement  between  two  parties  (Usmani,  1998, 
Usmani,  2002b,  Khan  and  Ahmed,  2001,  Lee  and  Ullah,  2007)  compliant  with  Shari’a 
principles. The prominent feature of Ijarah is that the underlying asset remains in the sole 
ownership of the financier who is taking the potential ownership related risk (El Qorchi, 
2005) e.g. theft, natural damage and major repairs. However, the Ijarah contract can be 
modified to include the gradual or one-off-payment sale of the underlying asset by the 
financier to the other party.  
 
Salam and Istisna: These are the two Islamic financial instruments that allow the deferred 
delivery  of  the  underlying  asset.  The  price  and  quality  are  negotiated  at  the  time  of 
agreement  and  the  full  payment  is  made  (Usmani,  2002b,  Usmani,  1998,  Iqbal  and 
Mirakhor,  1987,  Sundararajan  and  Errico,  2002).  Salam  is  used  to  finance  agricultural 
products while Istisna is suitable for manufacturing commodities. 
2.7  Regulatory and Governance Paradigms of IFIs 
Conventional Governance Paradigms 
Islamic banks perform the same functions as conventional banks. Thus, they are regulated 
by  the  same  broader  set  of  governmental  regulations  that  confine  banks  to  certain 
requirements, guidelines and restrictions. In fact banks are subject to rather more strict 
regulations as compared to other corporations because any failure in the banking sector 
can have a drastic spill over effect on the whole economy. Banking regulations serve a 
number of purposes (Santos, 2001). Firstly, banking regulations are prudential in nature 
targeted  at  reducing  the  banks'  risk  and  protecting  depositors.  Secondly,  they  reduce 
banks’ systematic risk to avoid bank runs. Thirdly, regulations are targeted at minimizing 
and stopping the misuse of banks, for example, for criminal purposes. Lastly, banking 
regulations direct the flow of credit to desired  sectors. In order to do  routine banking 
businesses, Islamic banks are subject to governmental regulations to achieve the above-
mentioned  purposes.  The  specific  banking  regulations  applicable  to  Islamic  banks  are 
regarding capital, reserve and governance, reporting and  disclosure  (Khan and Ahmed, 
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In order to comply with the regulatory requirements and carry out the normal banking 
business, Islamic banks should have, just like their conventional counterparts, a sound 
governance  system  in  place  (IFSB,  2006)  as  endorsed  by  Basel  Committee  of  Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). Islamic banks are required to “establish a comprehensive governance 
policy  framework  which  sets  out  the  strategic  roles  and  functions  of  each  organ  of 
governance  and  mechanisms  for  balancing  the  IIFS’s  accountabilities  to  various 
stakeholders” (IFSB, 2006, Part 1, Principles 1.1). Therefore, Islamic banks have boards of 
directions, appointed by the shareholders, governance committees, audit systems, chief 
operating  officers and  top  managerial  positions.  The responsibility  of the  conventional 
governance  paradigm  is  to  ensure  the  banks  remain  financially  viable  and  profitable 
business entities within the regulatory boundaries. 
 
Shari’a Governance Paradigms 
IFIs are financial entities, which are required to comply with Shari’a principles in addition 
to  having  conventional  governance  mechanisms  in  place.  Such  mechanisms  include 
compliance  with  standards  set  out  by  international  bodies  and  local  Shari’a  regulatory 
frameworks prepared and enforced in different countries. In fact the first few IFIs did not 
have Shari’a scholars on board but some later on started to consult Shari’a scholar for 
guidance on Shari’a issues (Kahf et al., 2005). However, the existence of a formal Shari’a 
supervision  later  on  became  a  necessary  legitimization  tool  for  IFIs.  Without  any  such 
formal system these days, IFIs would have little legitimacy and credibility. Rammal (2006, 
p.205) mentioned that “the presence of a Shari’a board in Islamic banks was determined 
as a pre-requisite for admission into the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) 
which compelled IFIs to have a formal Shari’a supervision system in place. Modern IFIs are 
also  required/expected  to  have  Shari’a  audit  and  compliance  divisions  in  addition  to 
having Shari’a boards/advisors within the banks. These mechanisms are discussed below. 
 
International Standard Setting Bodies 
Three  main  international  bodies  set  Shari’a  compliance  standards  for  IFIs.  Perhaps  the 
most  prominent  of  these  bodies  is  the  industry  sponsored  AAOIFI,  based  in  Manama 
Bahrain. The standards issued by this body are called AAOIFI standards. One such set of 
standards  issued  by  AAOIFI  is  the  Accounting,  Auditing  and  Governance  Standards 
containing  twenty-three  Accounting  Standards,  5  Auditing  Standards,  6  Governance 
Standards and two codes of ethics. Another set of AAOIFI standards is Shari’a standards 
that  contain  forty-one  standards  on  Shari’a  compliance.  The  fresh  versions  of  these 
standards were released in 2010. Though AAOIFI standards are comprehensive, they are 
not  mandatory  in  all  jurisdictions  (Wislon,  2009).  For  example,  they  are  mandatory  in 
Bahrain, enforced  by  the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) after some amendments and not Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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mandatory  in  UAE.  However,  Islamic  banks  are  increasingly  adopting  AAOIFI  standards 
because of their impact on the banks’ credibility and legitimacy.   
 
IFSB is another such body that sets standards and guidelines for IFIs. This body is based in 
Kuala  Lumpur  and  is  sponsored  by  Bank  Negara-  the  central  bank  of  Malaysia.  It  has 
issued a number of standards/guidelines related to governance, Shari’a governance and 
ethical practices of IFIs. Again, these standards are not mandatory on IFIs but different 
countries  and  banks  have  adopted  them  voluntarily  (Wislon,  2009).  The  third  and  last 
credible standard setting body for IFIs is the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) 
sponsored Fiqh Academy based in Saudi Arabia. Though the objective of this academy is 
to issue fatwa’s on all Shari’a issues, most of its fatwa’s so far are related to the Islamic 
finance industry.  
 
Local Regulatory Frameworks 
Local  regulatory  frameworks  refer  to  the  country-wise  regulatory  control  mechanism 
specifically designed for IFIs. Wislon (2009) had drawn a comprehensive comparison of 
such frameworks across countries. These frameworks vary across countries. For example 
Malaysia, Sudan and Pakistan have Shari’a boards of the central banks that issue fatwa’s 
related  to  emerging  issues.  They  make  amendments  in  AAOIFI  and  IFSB 
standards/guidelines, if necessary, and then enforce them on Islamic banks within their 
jurisdictions. Central Shari’a boards not only facilitate Shari’a compliance across Islamic 
banks in their countries, they also work a stage for the settlement of disputes between 
Islamic bank managers and Shari’a scholars. Bahrain, on the other hand, does not have 
any central Shari’a governance mechanism. However, it is mandatory for Islamic banks in 
the country to adhere to AAOIFI standards. On the other extreme, UAE neither has central 
Shari’a  governance  mechanisms  nor  makes  AAOIFI  and  IFSB  standards  mandatory  for 
Islamic banks within the country. Islamic banks are free to determine their own Shari’a 
governance mechanisms. Such frameworks give enough space for some Islamic banks to 
shop for fatwa’s that give them more and easy financial gain rather than better Shari’a 
compliance. 
   
Organizational Level Shari’a Governance Systems 
Shari’a  governance  normally  refers  to,  within  the  communities  of  academics  and 
practitioners,  all  the  mechanisms  and  systems  within  organizations  that  ensures  the 
organization’s compliance with Shari’a principles. IFSB (2009) defines Shari’a governance 
system as “the set of institutional and organizational arrangements through which [IFI] 
ensures that there is effective independent oversight of Shari’a compliance..........” This 
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international levels. An organizational level Shari’a compliance system consists of a Shari’a 
board or Shari’a advisor, Shari’a compliance unit and Shari’a Control and Audit Unit. These 
are discussed below. 
 
Shari’a Board/Advisor 
The  Shari’a  board  /  advisor  is  the  first  and  most  important  pillar  in  an  IFIs’  Shari’a 
governance system. It has a number of duties but the most important of all is to issue 
relevant Shari’a resolutions/fatwa’s on Shari’a related issues of IFIs. Though such fatwa’s 
are issued at the request of the banks’ management, Shari’a boards/advisors can issue 
resolutions on matters they realize are important and related to Shari’a (Lahsasna, 2010). 
Shari’a board is a highly recommended vehicle for Shari’a governance (IFSB, 2006, AAOIFI, 
2010)  which  consists  of  three  or  more  Shari’a  scholars.  The  board  issues  Shari’a 
pronouncements  based  on  a  consensus  which  reduces  the  chances  of  management 
pressure. However, a recent publication of IFSB says the establishment of a full Shari’a 
board depends on the size and complexity of the organization (IFSB, 2009). It also leaves 
it  to  the  discretion  of  local  regulatory  authorities  to  decide  on  weather  Islamic  banks 
should set up full-fledged Shari’a boards or appoint single Shari’a advisors as part of their 
Shari’a  governance  system.  In  Pakistan,  for  example,  the  central  bank  requires  IFIs  to 
appoint at least one Shari’a advisor while the matter of setting up a Shari’a board is left to 
the discretion of individual banks. Shari’a boards/advisors have the authority to access 
confidential information of the banks. Management is also obliged not only to provide all 
the relevant  details to Shari’a board/advisor but also to assist them in seeking further 
clarifications/information  if  needed  (Lahsasna,  2010,  IFSB,  2009).  This  body  has  the 
authority to reject any proposed structure if found not compliant with Shari’a. It can also 
nullify transactions after their execution and allocate the corresponding profits to charity. 
The pronouncements of Shari’a board/advisor are considered unchallengeable; however, 
exceptional  disputes  with  managers  could  be  referred  to  regulators  or  central  Shari’a 
board.  
 
Internal Shari’a Compliance Unit (ISCU) 
Obtaining Shari’a pronouncements from the Shari’a board/advisor is the first part of the 
Shari’a  governance  system.  Proper  implementation  of  such  pronouncements  should 
ultimately follow. Therefore, part of the Shari’a governance system role is to disseminate 
the pronouncements to all relevant parties for implementation. IFSB (2009) recommends 
the appointment of an ISCU or a Shari’a compliance officer to carry out this task. Though 
ISCU is part of management, it also has to report to Shari’a board/advisor to ensure the 
pronouncements are properly implemented. 
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Internal Shari’a Audit Unit (ISAU) 
This is probably the last but yet very important pillar in the Shari’a governance system. Its 
purpose is to look at the transaction after being implemented and identify any breach of 
the Shari’a pronouncements during implementation. The functions performed by ISAU are 
similar to that of internal auditor. However, the difference is that ISAU identifies loopholes 
in Shari’a compliance and report them to the Shari’a board/advisor instead of the audit 
committee (IFSB, 2009). 
 
External Shari’a Audit 
In addition to internal Shari’a compliance and audit units, discussed above, IFSB (2009) 
recommends  an  annual  Shari’a  to  verify  Shari’a  compliance  has  been  properly 
implemented and audited. This audit is ideally carried out by the Shari’a board/advisor 
that issued the initial Shari’a pronouncements/fatwas. It could be facilitated by the central 
bank. Alternatively, the IFI can appoint an external Shari’a audit firm to carry out this task. 
 
In summary, IFIs are subject to dual governance systems i.e. the traditional governance 
and Shari’a governance as illustrated in Table 2.1 below. 
Table   2.1: Dual Governance System of IFIs 
Functions  Traditional Governance Tools  Shari’a Governance Tools 
Governance  BoD  Shari’a Board/Advisor 
Control  Internal Auditor 
External Auditor 
International Shari’a Audit Unit 
External Shari’a Audit 
Compliance  Regulatory  financial  compliance 
officer/unit/department 
ISCU 
 Source: Adapted from IFSB (2009) 
2.8  Summary 
Islam is more than a religion that guides every aspect of life and so the IFIs are expected 
to  consider  the  Islamic  ethical  values  in  their  investment  decisions.  As  Islam  seeks  to 
protect  the  rights  of  both  primary  and  derivative  stakeholders,  IFIs  have  to  seek 
investments in companies that respect the due rights of all the stakeholders and are not 
involved  in  any  kind  of  exploitation.  IFIs  are  bound  to  observe  the  principles  of  trust 
(Amanah), equity, balance and fairness (adl and qist), benevolence and excellence (Ihsan) 
in their own operations but also scrutinize the operations of their portfolio companies on 
the basis of these criteria. It is argued in turn that these Islamic ethical principles have a 
great  affinity  to  the  concept  of  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR).  Although  IFIs 
currently  manage  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  world’s  wealth,  this  sector  has Shakir Ullah                                   Chapter 2: A Contextual Overview of Islamic Banking 
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experienced steady growth in the past few years and is thereby attracting more attention 
from the global financial community. Therefore  the article argues that IFIs can make a 
difference  in  the  long  run  by  catalysing  and  mainstreaming  the  CSR  agenda.Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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3  Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
3.1  Introduction 
Given  that  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  unfold  the  hidden  struggle  between  Shari’a 
scholars  and  managers  for  positioning  Shari’a  compliance  within  Islamic  banks,  the 
researcher selected three Islamic banks- guided by theoretical sampling- as cases for the 
study. Though GT research can be conducted on a single case, the nature of this study 
was  such  that  it  required  data  from  slightly  different  cases  in  order  to  capture  the 
variations and dynamism of the phenomenon. One case was initially selected for the study 
with the expectations that a whole grip on the phenomenon would be obtained from in-
depth  interviews  with  this  case.  However,  it  was  soon  realized  that  one  case  was  not 
sufficient  for  capturing  all  the  dynamics  of  the  phenomenon  because  of  the  particular 
organizational  structure  (discussed  below)  of  the  case  and  its  regulatory  environment. 
Thus the sampling was then extended to include another case (Case II) with a different 
organizational structure and regulatory framework. The theoretical sampling was later on 
extended to include a third case for the same reason of capturing more variations in the 
phenomenon.  
 
It however is important to mention at this point that this is not a case study. Therefore, 
the analysis is not based on cross-case comparisons (Yin, 2008). It is a pure GT study that 
explores  a  hidden  social  phenomenon  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008).  While  reading  the 
thesis, one should keep in mind that the three cases have been selected for capturing 
variations only. There would be minor references to the different cases during analysis. 
However,  that  should  not  be  taken  as  any  kind  of  cross-case  analysis.  This  chapter 
primarily focuses on the ownership and governance structures-these were found to be 
relevant to the phenomenon under study- in the three cases. Furthermore, the identity of 
the three cases and all interviewees has been kept completely anonymous at the request 
of the respondents. Section 3.2, below, summarizes Case I followed by a summary of Case 
II and Case III in sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. 
3.2  Case I 
This case was the first to be selected for data collection. The purpose selection of this 
case was based on its long and successful history in the field of Islamic banking. It was 
the first private commercial Islamic bank where the sponsors and key managers are said 
to be keenly interested in Shari’a compliance themselves (Kahf et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
the  bank’s  Shari’a  scholars  have  significant  authority  in  formulating  its  strategic Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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objectives.  Therefore,  this  case  was  thought  to  be  the  best  place  for  investigating  the 
struggle for Shari’a compliance. 
3.2.1 Introduction: 
Case I was the first private commercial bank in the world launched in Dubai in 1975, the 
same  year  when  the  foundation  stone  of  Islamic  Development  Bank  was  laid  down. 
Currently, Case I is listed on Dubai Financial Market (DFM) as a public joint company and 
is the largest Islamic bank in the UAE in terms of market capitalization. Its operations are 
not limited to UAE market; it owns wholly owned subsidiaries in Pakistan and Jordan. In 
addition, it has a representative office in Turkey and possesses stakes in an Islamic bank 
in Sudan. 
 
Since its inception, CASE I has been keenly committed to the implementation of Shari’a 
principles in its operations. Its commitment has been evident from the fact that the Fatwa 
and Shari’a Supervisory Board of Case I is ranked above the BoD in terms of authority in 
Shari’a matters. The bank claims to be a pioneering institution in terms of adherence to 
Shari’a principles, technology and innovation. It is the largest Islamic bank in UAE and 
claims itself, according to its website, as the leader in the field of Islamic banking. 
 
CASE I has grown significantly since its launch in terms of branching network and financial 
strength. In addition to the cross-border operations,  CASE I has  established  sixty-four 
branches in UAE. The extensive branching network reveals the banks focus on customer 
satisfaction through access. Its good performance is evident from the fact that it has won 
a number of awards from national and international bodies. It won thirty-four awards in 
2008 alone reaffirming its sound performance in different areas of banking operations. It 
was given the “Best Islamic Bank” award by the Banker Middle East magazine for the fourth 
consecutive year in 2008 (AMEInfo, 2008a). The Banker (Financial Times) gave it the “Bank 
of the Year” award in 2006 (AMEInfo, 2006). These awards indicate CASE I’s adherence to 
conventional banking standards in addition to compliance with Shari’a principles. 
3.2.2 Ownership Summary 
Case I is a joint public company with two majority stockholders i.e. The Ruler of Dubai and 
Saleh Saeed Ahmad Lootah. These two owners collectively own more than one third of the 
bank’s  stock.  Some  other  prominent  shareholders  are  Paramount  Portfolio  Associates, 
Frankfurt-Trust  Investment-Gesellschaft  and  Batterymarch  Financial  Management  Inc.  A 
number of mutual funds have also got ownership interests in this case. It is clear that the 
majority of its ownership is diffused in which case its policies are mainly steered by the 
top two shareholders, the Ruler of Dubai being the most powerful. Though the bank is a Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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joint  stock  company,  the  Ruler  of  Dubai  with  controlling  stakes  makes  it  somewhat 
government-owned company which might be considered as a plus point for the bank as 
the government would be there to rescue it  in case of financial distress. 
3.2.3 Governance Structure: 
Being  an  Islamic  Financial  Institution,  the  governance  structure  of  the  case  is  slightly 
different  from  conventional  organizations.  In  addition  to  the  BoD,  the  bank  has  an 
additional board called the Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board (FSSB). While the BoD is 
responsible  for  dictating  business  objectives  to  the  bank,  the  FSSB  is  responsible  for 
Shari’a compliance of the banking operations. 
 
The reporting requirements of IFSB for  the Shari’a boards  mention  that it “shall report 
administratively  to  the  BoD”  evidently  enhancing  the  independence  of  Shari’a  scholars 
from executive management (IFSB, 2009, p. 24). However, the FSSB of Case I is one step 
ahead of this requirement as it reports to the general body and is considered above the 
BoD in terms of powers and authority. According to the bank’s website, the decisions of 
FSSB are binding on the BoD and management. This obviously makes FSSB an independent 
governance body in terms of its working and reporting. A detailed discussion on FSSB is 
provided in the following subsection. 
3.2.3.1 Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board 
The  board  that  governs  the  Shari’a  aspects  of  Case  I  is  called  Fatwa  and  Shari’a 
Supervisory Board (FSSB) which consists of five prominent Shari’ Case I aims to recruit high 
calibre Shari’a scholars having good reputation in the market. This is evident from the fact 
that the Chairman of the FSSB of Case I holds twenty-nine Shari’a board positions across 
different institutions and countries (Unal, 2009). Though this may be reflects Dr. Hassan’s 
good reputation in the market, occupying so many positions raises serious questions on 
the amount of time such board members can actually give each institution. 
 
The IFSB (IFSB, 2009, p. 24, footnote. 28) gives the BoD the authority to appoint Shari`a  
board members in which case one may question Shari’a board’s independence. Case I, 
however, has adopted a further scrutiny step in the appointment of its FSSB members by 
making  it  mandatory  to  seek  shareholders’  approval  for  the  nominated  Shari’a  board 
members at the general meeting. This is to ensure FSSB’s independence, especially from 
the  influence  of  executive  management.  The  BoD  may,  however,  wish  to  delegate  the 
power to another party – for example, the Nomination Committee or the CEO to appoint 
FSSB members.  
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The role of the FSSB is to make sure all transactions are compliant with Shari’a principles 
and to declare certain transactions void, even after their execution, if found contradictory 
to  Shari’a  principles.  IFSB  strongly  recommends  the  independence  of  Shari’a  board  by 
saying that “no individual or group of individuals shall be allowed to dominate the Shari`a 
board’s decision-making” (IFSB, 2009 p. 15). In line with this recommendation, clause 78 
of the CASE I’s Memorandum and Article of Association holds the BoD obliged to obey the 
decisions of the FSSB whether secured unanimously or by majority consensus.  
 
According  to  the  bank’s  website  FSSB  is  responsible  for  supervising  transactions  for 
Shari’a compliance, development of new products Shari’a compliance analysis of existing 
situation  before  launching  new  products,  Shari’a  compliance  of  products/proposals 
submitted by management, identification of breaches of Shari’a compliance before and 
after transactions, analysis of administrative decisions that may require FSSB’s approval, 
training of bank’s staff, preparation of annual Shari’a compliance report for BoD and for 
the annual report. 
 
The BoD also appoints a Shari’a supervisor who is present full-time at the bank and is 
responsible for ensuring Shari’a compliance on a daily basis. Also, a Shari’a auditor checks 
Shari’a compliance under the supervision of the Shari’a scholars. IFSB recommends the 
appointment of both Shari’a supervisor and Shari’a auditor (IFSB, 2009) 
3.2.3.2 Board of Directors 
The  BoD  of  Dubai  Islamic  Bank  consists  of  eight  members.  Al  Shaibani  is  the  present 
chairperson of the BoD who was appointed to this office on March 2008 at the annual 
general meeting of the bank (AMEInfo, 2008b). Sheikh Khaled Bin Zayed Al Nehayan was 
named as the vice chairperson of the BoD at the same meeting. Both the chairperson and 
the vice chairperson belong to the royal family, which is not astonishing given the majority 
stake of the Ruler of Dubai in the bank. 
3.3  Case II 
As discussed above, the organizational structure and regulatory environment of Case I is 
unique.  That  became  a  hurdle  in  the  search  for  variations.  The  theoretical  sampling 
revealed that data should be collected from another case which is partly conventional and 
party Islamic and where Islamic banking is a subsidiary of the overall conventional bank. 
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framework  for  Islamic  banking.  Case  II  was  the  best  place  for  seeking  such  further 
variations and saturation of the existing codes. Details of Case II are discussed below. 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Case  II  was  set  up  in  1991  as  a  conventional  public  sector  banking  institution  by  the 
government of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, Pakistan. The bank is headquartered in the city of 
Peshawar  and  currently  operates  forty-one  branches  across  the  country.  It  is  a 
predominantly  a  government-owned  bank  where  the  chief  secretary  of  the  provincial 
government is always the chairperson of the BoD. Most of the board members and key 
managers are appointed by the provincial government.  
Case  II  started  Islamic  banking  operations  in  November  2003  by  fully  Islamizing  one 
branch. The then provincial ruling party, Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal, initiated the launch of 
the Islamic banking operations in this bank. Though the bank’s website reported to fully 
convert to an Islamic bank by the year 2006, it, still, is predominantly a conventional bank 
with  Islamic  banking  as  a  subsidiary  business.  Only  eighteen  out  of  the  forty-one 
branches are currently operating as dedicated Islamic banking branches, the remaining 
twenty-three  branches  are  still  conventional.  Even  though  about  half  of  the  bank’s 
branches  are  dedicated  to  Islamic  banking  operations,  there  is  no  mention  of  any 
commitment to Islamic banking in the mission statement of the bank. The bank’s mission 
is “to increase shareholders' value and provide excellent service and innovative products 
to  customers  through  effective  corporate  governance,  friendly  work  environment,  and 
contributing towards an equitable sub-economic growth”. This mission statement is very 
old  and  has  not  been  changed  after  the  introduction  of  Islamic  banking  into  its 
operations.  However,  the  vision  of  the  bank  is  “to  become  a  leading  bank  providing 
efficient  and  Dynamic  Banking  Services  in  both  Islamic  and  Conventional  Sectors”.  The 
bank’s focus on ‘equitable and sub-economic growth’ is, in fact, an important element of 
Shari’a objectives. In addition to the overall organizational vision and mission statements, 
the bank has separate visions and missions for Islamic banking operations on its website. 
The Islamic banking mission is “to translate true Islamic economic principles into practice, 
with firm beliefs to establish an economic system based on the Final Revelation [Quran]. 
By partnering with [our] customers in Halal earnings by employing best business practices, 
the latest financial services technologies and placing [our] trust in Allah we are confident 
of our success in achieving constant economic growth, creation of job opportunities and 
poverty  alleviation”.  Carefully  analysing  this  mission  reveals  that  the  bank’s  Islamic 
banking is keenly interested in Shari’a objectives. However, this mission is conflicting with 
the overall organizational mission. Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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3.3.2 Ownership: 
Case II was established as a public sector bank owned by the government of North West 
Frontier  Province  (NWFP),  now  called  Khyber  Pakhtoonkhwa  but  was  later  on  listed  in 
Karachi Stock exchange in 2006 but offering less than 50% of its shares to the public (Ali, 
2006). The provincial government is still the majority shareholder. 
3.3.3 Governance Structure 
It is a regulatory requirement on IFIs in Pakistan to have a Shari’a governance mechanism 
in  place  in  addition  to  the  tradition  governance  system.  Case  II,  being  a  financial 
institution in Pakistan, is therefore subject to this dual governance mechanism discussed 
below. 
3.3.3.1 Board of Directors: 
The  bank  has  nine  board  members  out  of  which  four  members  are  nominated  by  the 
provincial  government,  3  members  are  elected  by  the  shareholders,  one  director  is 
nominated by the foreign equity holders and the ninth member is the Managing Director 
of the bank. The provincial chief secretary is the chairperson of the BoD.  
3.3.3.2 Sharia Supervisory Committee 
The Shari’a board in Case II is called Sharia Supervisory Committee (SSC) bearing the same 
status as the FSSB of Case I. It is comprised of five members nominated by the BoD and 
verified  by  the  shareholders.  They  are  paid  by  the  bank except  for  one  member,  Syed 
Muhammad Abbas, who is not claiming compensation for his services due to his concerns 
about  the  bank’s  potential  divergence  from  Shari’a  principles  in  some  areas.  He  is  a 
religiously committed person who still feels that the bank’s operations are not free from 
interest.  
In addition to the SSC, the bank employs four full-time Shari’a experts who oversee the 
banks  day-to-day  compliance  with  Shari’a  principles,  conducting  Shari’a  audits  and 
training the bank’s staff on Shari’a matters. 
3.4  Case III 
It  was  after  the  analysis  of  the  second  round  of  interviews  that  the  researcher  was 
convinced, through theoretical sampling, to seek further data from yet another case with a 
different  organizational  set-up.  This  time  a  case  was  selected  which  was  initially Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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incorporated as a conventional bank and later on fully converted to an Islamic bank. Case 
III was the perfect match to meet these requirements. Details of Case III are given below. 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Case III was founded in 1975 by the ruler of the State of Sharjah in the UAE. It was initially 
a  conventional  bank  and  served  as  the  central  bank  of  Sharjah. The  bank  was  fully 
converted from a conventional bank to an Islamic bank in 2002 and it still enjoys the 
status of the central bank of Sharjah. The branching network of the bank is spread across 
the country. 
Case III claims to be playing a ‘social and economic role in the community’ by supporting 
a number of social organizations. It further claims that its role in social development is 
proactive as it identifies venues for social development and then supports those venues 
either in the form of charity or investment. It also claims strict adherence to the “moral, 
social and religious beliefs [of Islam] to meet the needs and requirements of a wide and 
diversified customer base”. 
Two  of  the  bank’s  core  values  are  ‘Fairness’  and  ‘Trust’  which  are  amongst  the  core 
elements  of  Shari’a  objectives  (Wilson,  2006,  Graafland  et  al.,  2006,  Dusuki,  2005, 
Dusuki, 2008b). However the definition of ‘fairness’ found in the Islamic finance literature 
is wider than what the bank claims this term stands for. The website of the bank reports 
that its core focus is “to be the bank of choice, delivering creative solutions based on the 
Islamic principles of partnership, trust and fairness for all”. However, most of the bank’s 
investments are not partnership [Musharakah/Mudarabah] based (SIB, 2012a). 
 
Case III is a prominent player in the UAE’s banking sector. It has won a number of awards 
from  national  and  international  bodies  including  the  Wachovia  ‘Best  Bank  in  the  UAE’ 
award (Phillips, 2010) for two consecutive years in 2005 and 2006.  
3.4.2 Governance Structure 
Like Case I and II, this case also has dual governance structure. A traditional governance 
system consisting of the BoD and top management governs strategic business aspects of 
the bank while Shari’a aspects are governed by the Shari’a governance system consisting 
of a Shari’a board and a related Shari’a department. Details of are given below. 
3.4.2.1 Board of Directors 
The BoD of Case III consists of eight members. In addition to other governance functions, 
the BoD works to “balance the interests of… shareholders, customers, employees and the Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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community[ies]” (SIB, 2012b). This function of the BoD is in line with the bank’s mission 
statement and core values. 
3.4.2.2 Fatwa and Shari’a Control Board  
The Shari’a board of Case II is called Fatwa and Shari’a Control Board (FSCB) synonymous 
to the FSSB of Case I and the SSC of the Case II. It consists of three members. The FSCB is 
nominated by the BoD  and then verified by the general assembly of the bank. It is an 
independent body and its members do not have any kind of ownership stake in the bank. 
However, just like the Shari’a boards of Case I and II, members of FSCB are paid by the 
bank  for  their  services.  The  rulings  issued  by  FSCB  are  claimed  to  be  binding  on  the 
management. 
FSCB is responsible for giving Shari’a opinion on new products, answering Shari’a related 
questions,  Shari’a  supervision  of  transactions,  new  product  development,  nullifying 
Shari’a-repugnant  transactions,  training  the  bank’s  staff  on  Shari’a  matters,  writing  a 
Shari’a report on annual bases to be included in the bank’s annual report and reviewing 
Shari’a audit reports (SIB, 2012c). 
3.4.2.3 Shari’a Control and Audit Division  
The Shari’a Control and Audit Division (SCAD) is an independent department within the 
bank responsible for the day-to-day Shari’a supervision of the bank’s transactions. It is a 
link  between  the  management  and  the  FSCB.  This  department  is  independent  of  the 
bank’s management and reports to the Shari’a board. The compensations and promotions 
of  its  employees  are  determined  by  the  Shari’a  board.  These  measures  insure  the 
independence  of  this  department.  SCAD  is  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the 
rulings  issued  by  FSCB,  conducting  Shari’a  audit  of  the  bank’s  operations,  submitting 
quarterly reports to FSCB and training the bank’s staff on Shari’a matters (SIB, 2012d). 
3.5  Comparison between the Three Cases 
The selected units of analysis make an interesting combination with two extreme cases 
and  one  case  can  be  categorized  as  lying  in  the  middle  position  in  terms  of  their 
organizational structures and the authority of their Shari’a scholars. On the one hand, 
Case I was established as a fully Islamic bank in 1975 with the motivation to provide 
Shari’a  compliant  services.  The  establishment  of  this  entity  was  possible  due  to  the 
founding sponsors’ commitment to the cause of Shari’a compliance (Kahf et al., 2005). It 
is still regarded as the best Islamic bank not only in the UAE but also across the globe (as 
reported by most interviewees) for its strict adherence to Shari’a principles. The bank’s 
commitment to Shari’a compliance is apparent from the fact that its FSSB is elected by Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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the  general  assembly  and  is  ranked  above  the  BoD  in  terms  of  powers.  It  is  also 
independent from the management and BoD in case of reporting as FSSB reports directly 
to the general assembly. 
 
On the other hand we have the Case II which was established in 1991 by a provincial 
government  with  the  ultimate  mission  of  value  maximization  for  shareholders.  It  was 
partially converted to Islamic banking in 2003 with the aim to fully transform into Islamic 
banking by the year 2006 which did not happen until 2012. Rather more than 50% of the 
branches  are  still  conventional.  The  mission  statement  still  focuses  on  value 
maximization  for  shareholders  and  there  is  no  mention  of  Islamic  banking  in  this 
statement. Furthermore, the bank’s SSC is nominated by the BoD and then verified by the 
general assembly. In terms of the line of authority, the SSC reports to the BoD in the first 
place.  Even  though  this  makes  the  SSC  independent  from  the  ultimate  executive 
management,  it  is  still  working  under  the  BoD  whose  mission  is  shareholders’  value 
maximization. This situation raises questions on the SSC’s true independence. Given the 
fact that the Managing Director of Case II is also a member of the BoD, one can even 
question the independence of the SSC from the executive management. One member of 
SSC refused to claim compensation from the bank for his services due to his concerns on 
the bank’s Shari’a compliance.  
 
The third case, categorized as lying between the two extremes, is Case III. It was founded 
in 1975 as a conventional bank with the mission to increase shareholders’ value but it 
was then fully converted to an Islamic bank in 2002 by the same chairman of the BoD 
who founded it as a conventional entity. The banks new vision and mission statements 
frequently refers to Shari’a objectives. 
 
Furthermore,  Case  I  and  III  are  located  in  a  country  where  there  is  not  a  separate 
regulatory  framework  for  Islamic  banking.  In  other  words,  Islamic  banks  are  free  in 
establishing Shari’a governance mechanisms of their liking. One may expect that these 
two cases have a lose Shari’a governance system because of this freedom. However, their 
systems are amongst the most sophisticated in the industry. This is probably because of 
the  sponsors’  commitment  to  Islamic  banking  and  also  because  they  need  stronger 
legitimacy in a country where there are no central controls for Shari’a governance. Case 
II, on the other hand, is located in a country with a separate regulatory framework for 
Islamic banking. This case has to meet all regulatory requirements set out by the central 
bank. One might expect its Shari’a governance mechanism to be very strong but in fact it 
is  not  because  it  needs  to  meet  only  minimum  regulatory  requirements  to  obtain 
legitimacy. Shakir Ullah                                          Chapter 3: Overview of the Three Cases 
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Table   3.1: Overview the Three Cases 
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3.6  Summary 
The  selection  of  three  different  cases  for  this  study  was  guided  by  theoretical 
sampling which is an important aspect of GT. The three cases are located in two 
different countries. One is subject to meeting minimum regulatory requirements 
for Shari’a compliance certification while the other two are free to determine their 
own Shari’a compliance mechanisms. Case I and II, have adopted AAOIFI standards 
on  voluntary  bases  while  Case  II  is  legally  required  to  do  so  because  of  the 
regulatory framework of the country of its operations. Furthermore, there seems to 
be sponsors’ interest in Islamic banking in Case I and II while the sponsors of Case 
II do not seem to be much bothered by it. 
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4   Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1  Introduction: 
This research falls under the canons of qualitative research more inclined towards 
the interpretative paradigm (Greener, 2008). Qualitative research is defined as “any 
kind  of  research  that  produces  findings  not  arrived  at  by  means  of  statistical 
procedures  or  other  means  of  quantification”  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  p.  1). 
Greener  also  explains  that  there  are  a  number  of  research  methodologies  like 
“discourse  analysis,  unstructured  interviews  to  investigate  perceptions  and 
construction of reality by “actors” in organizations” (Greener, 2008, p. 35)  that 
can  be  used  to  conduct  interpretative  research.  The  selection  of  a  particular 
research  methodology  is  mainly  driven  by  the  research  question  and  research 
philosophy (Greener, 2008, Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
that a researcher adheres to. 
 
Given  the  qualitative  and  relatively  un-investigated  nature  of  the  research  area 
addressed in this study, the researcher adopted GT (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as 
methodology. This chapter, later on, explains GT procedures and justifies its use 
for this particular investigation. However, repeated reference will also be given to 
the  GT  methodology  throughout  the  analysis  section  because  the  write-up  of 
analysis is itself, very interactive with the methodology. The next section of the 
chapter will restate the background and objectives of the research to refresh the 
reader. The GT procedures are then discussed  after that. The discussion on GT 
procedures is rather short in this chapter as there will be frequent explanations 
and  discussions  on  the  methodology  in  the  analysis.  Following  this  is  a  brief 
historical background of GT followed by a critical review of the methodology. The 
last section justifies the use of GT in this particular research. 
4.2  Background of this Research 
The  concept  of  Islamic  banking  and  its  unique  organizational  structure  has 
become  an  imperative  research  area  for  scholars.  Though,  the  field  of  Islamic 
banking, itself, has recently attracted researchers’ attention. An increasing volume 
of  research  has  focused  on  Shari’a  compliant  banking  products  and  services. 
However, there is little research on how Shari’a compliance is actually developed 
and  maintained  within  and  outside  Islamic  banks.  Given  the  basic  objectives 
(eradication of the disparities in wealth distribution, exploitation and other kinds 
of social injustice) of Islamic finance, one can argue that it has a greater propensity 
to  go  beyond  the  conventional  boundaries  of  profit  maximization  towards  the 
broader well-being of the society (Ullah and Jamali, 2010).  Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 4: Methodology 
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Due  to  their  role  as  Shari’a-compliance  monitors,  the  Shari’a  advisors  and 
members of the Shari’a Supervisory Boards (SSB) are the primary actors responsible 
for ensuring the achievement of Shari’a objectives through Islamic banking. One 
the other hand, managers’ job is to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Thus, there 
are  in  a  struggle  to  achieve  business  objectives  through  Islamic  banking.  The 
purpose of this study is to investigate the hidden struggle of Shari’a scholars and 
managers  for  the  achievement  of  their  respective  objectives.  The  dearth  of 
literature in this particular area is the reason for addressing it through GT without 
any research framework and theoretical positioning.  
Research Philosophy and Paradigm 
This study is exploratory in nature interpreting and understanding complex social 
actions  (Weber,  1947)  and  thereby  adding  to  the  existing  knowledge  base.  The 
research is not based on a theoretical framework, rather it has been led by the 
data (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005) to develop a new theory. As the findings are a 
product of what the respondents thought of the reality, GT research is based the 
subjective  ontological  position  of  phenomenology  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008). 
Being defined as a set of beliefs (Kuhn et al., 1970) that directs the researcher’s 
methodology, a research paradigm is important in formulating a methodological 
background  for  a  study.  Although  realistic  research  paradigm  is  widely  used  in 
scientific research, it is not equally applicable to social science research where the 
social reality cannot be easily separated from the researcher (Kant, 1990). This is 
why  the  “qualitative  methods  are  increasingly  accepted  in  social  sciences  and 
business research as this branch of enquiry differentiates itself from a scientific 
positivistic paradigm” (Greener, 2008). The struggle for Shari’a compliance within 
Islamic  banks  is  associated  with  the  players  involved,  Shari’a  scholars  and 
managers,  and  cannot  be  separated  from  them;  therefore,  the  most  suitable 
research paradigm for this study is the interpretative paradigm. Using qualitative 
research  method  (Greener,  2008),  the  interpretative  paradigm  produces  rich 
qualitative data by using small samples (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Research Approach 
Using the research onion developed by Saunders et al. (2007), the researcher has 
followed the inductive approach in interpretivistic research philosophy where the 
existing Shari’a compliance processes in IFIs have been explored with particular 
focus  on  the  role  of  the  Shari’a  scholars  and  managers  in  this  process.  This 
involved a ‘digging into data’ approach to find out what was going on (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) in that particular setup. Thus the whole study is based on what the 
data revealed. The themes collected during the initial data collection were followed 
until saturation. Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 4: Methodology 
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4.3  Overview of GT 
GT (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Strauss and Corbin, 1990) is a qualitative research 
methodology which basically answers the question, “What is going on?”. Developed 
by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), this methodology generates a 
theory systematically from data through inductive and deductive thinking. It is a 
research method used for the “investigation of what is said or written (inductive) 
and  produces  codes  of  data”  (Greener,  2008)  to  build  a  new  theory  using 
qualitative data (Glaser, 2001, Glaser, 2003).  
The core of GT lies in the very importance given to detailed qualitative analysis of 
data.  Therefore,  it  is  important  for  the  researcher  to  listen  to  the  minute  fine 
points in the data which is possible when the data is investigated in great detail 
using micro analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the concepts are developed and 
linked  together  to  form  codes  and  which  ultimately  lead  to  the  final  theory 
generation.  The  micro  analysis  needs  the  systematic  analysis  of  data  through 
open, axial and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Strauss and Corbin, 
1990, Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Unlike the other research methodologies which 
involve a research framework followed by data collection and then the analysis, GT 
starts with data collection and analysis and finally framing the research to form a 
theory.  The  stages  of  data  collection  and  analysis  are  “tightly  interwoven 
processes”  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998,  p.  59)  that  occur  side  by  side  with  each 
other. The analysis starts as soon as the first interview data is collected. The first 
analysis  then  steers  the  rest  of  the  data  collection  and  analysis  referred  to  as 
‘theoretical  sampling’  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990, 
Strauss, 1987, Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
The first step in GT analysis is the open coding of the first few interviews involving 
either  word-by-word  or  line-by-line  analysis  of  the  transcripts.  This  detailed 
analysis has been referred to as micro analysis by Strauss and Corbin (1998). The 
whole coding process plays a vital role in theory development. Strauss and Corbin 
(1998)  define  coding  as  “the  operations  by  which  data  are  broken  down, 
conceptualized and  put  back together in new ways. It is  the central  process  by 
which theories are built from data” .  
Historical Perspective of GT 
Founded  by  two  sociologists  Barney  Glaser  and  Anselm  Strauss  (Glaser  and 
Strauss,  1967),  GT  has  undergone  numerous  developments  throughout  its  four 
decades history. Even though the founding authors belonged to different research 
backgrounds, they decided to present GT as a new research methodology in the 
field of social sciences after their research on dying patients where they used it to 
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research  due  to  his  affiliation  with  the  University  of  Chicago  where  he  was 
influenced  by  the  work  of  symbolic  interactionists  like  George  Herbert  Mead 
(1934), Charles Cooley (1918) and Herbert Blumer (1969). The concept of symbolic 
interactionism means that human beings react to social phenomena according to 
the meanings they attach to it and that “persons are actors who take an active role 
in responding to problematic situations” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 9). Thus 
social really is not something which can be separated from the players rather it is 
imbedded in them. This influence of symbolic interactionism may be one of the 
reasons the founders of GT attached high importance to the respondents’ views 
where they felt the “ need to get out into the field to discover what is [was] really 
going on” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 9). Glaser, in contrast, belonged to the 
quantitative research background from Columbia University where the tradition of 
empirical  research  in  theory  development  was  common.  Working  together  with 
Strauss,  Glaser  felt  the  need  for  continuous  comparison  of  data  to  identify 
concepts  and  find  relationships  between  them  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990).  This 
combined the interests of the two founders of GT to give prime importance to data 
and wrote a book on their methodology later on. 
After writing their first book on GT the two authors started to write independently 
or in collaboration with other authors on the methodology. The first independent 
writing that appeared after the original 1967 book was by Glaser (1978) which was 
primarily based in the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity to the hidden meanings 
in the data. This was followed by Strauss (1987) who wrote on qualitative analysis 
focusing  on  GT  as  a  methodology.  Strauss  then  started  to  work  together  with 
Corbin to write a new book on GT outlining a step-by-step process for new users 
of grounded theory. The title of this book was ‘Basics of qualitative research: GT 
procedures  and  techniques’  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990).  It  was  from  this  point 
onward that differences between the two founding authors started to emerge in 
the use of GT. Glaser seemed to be unhappy with the rather rigid instructions on 
the methodology stipulated by  Corbin and Strauss (1990) and wrote a  book in 
1992  (Glaser,  1992)  in  response  to  Strauss  and  Corbin  (1990).  Glaser  rebuked 
Strauss and Corbin in this book and termed their work as forcing theory while he 
himself adhered to the emergence of theory rather than forcing it through rigid 
step-by-step  process.  This  rift  on  the  GT  methodology  between  the  founding 
authors has shattered researchers’ confidence a bit but still it is one of the main 
research methodologies used in social science research. Some researchers  have 
termed this split between Glaser and Strauss as an evolutionary divergence due to 
independent  work  for  a  prolonged  period  after  their  first  publication  (Harwood, 
2001, p. 67). Strauss and Corbin published the second edition of their 1990 book 
in 1998 (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and third edition in 2008 (Corbin and Strauss, 
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"benefits  from  the  prior  development  of  theoretical  propositions  to  guide  data 
collection and analysis” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Even though the selection of a particular 
research methodology is influenced by a number factors including the researcher’s 
background  and  experience,  one  important  factor  that  steers  the  choice  of  a 
particular methodology is the nature of the research question (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). “Some areas of study naturally lend themselves more to the qualitative type 
of  research”  because  they  are  intended  to  “uncover  and  understand  what  lies 
behind any phenomena about which little is yet known” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
p. 19). Given that GT is a research methodology where the researcher goes to the 
field with no research framework in hand (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), it came out 
as  the  best  suitable  methodology  for  this  research  topic  because  of  non-
availability of literature in this area which could otherwise be used to develop a 
research framework. The researcher could not find a single study addressing the 
struggle for Shari’a compliance between managers and Shari’a scholars in Islamic 
banks. Given this scenario, it was hard to set up a hypothesis for testing. It is also 
worth mentioning that after doing some initial analysis the first few interviews, the 
researcher realized he had to extend the theoretical sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Glaser  and  Strauss,  1967)  to  managers, 
employees,  customers  and  regulators.  Thus  asking  the  same  questions  from 
different sets of respondents, having completely different views and understanding 
of the same issue, would have not made any sense. To put it another way, Shari’a 
scholars  who  are  well-equipped  with  religious  knowledge  and  are  supposed  to 
oversee  the  religious  aspects  of  the  organization,  would  have  a  completely 
different  stand  on  Shari’a  compliance  than  managers  who  were  trained  in 
conventional profit maximization aspects of business operations.  
 
Therefore, the  researcher was confident  that quantitative research  methods and 
even some qualitative research methods could not be appropriately used in this 
research area. It was felt that GT, which is a qualitative research methodology, was 
the  most  appropriate  method  in  this  case  because  it  developed  a  research 
framework from analysing field data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
4.5  A Critical View of GT 
A  number  of  authors  argue  in  favour  of  GT  presenting  it  as  a  sound  research 
methodology for qualitative research. For example Greener (2008) writes that GT is 
useful “to probe deeper levels of values and social definitions” because it “looks 
for theory through a structured method of investigation”. This argument suggests 
that  GT  is  a  favourable  methodology  where  delicate  information  on  social 
phenomena is needed. This deeper investigation can later be used to develop a 
framework for future researches. George Allen, who conducted a study using GT, 
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collect  and  analyse  data  and  draw  meaningful  conclusions”.  Strauss  and  Corbin 
(1990)  argue  that  “GT  is  a  scientific  method”  which  meets  the  criteria  of 
“significance,  theory  observation  compatibility,  generalizability,  reproducibility, 
precision, rigor and verification” . These criteria make the foundation of scientific 
research  methods  and  hence  they  classify  GT  methodology  as  scientific.  One 
founder  of  the  GT  claimed  in  his  later  publication  that  it  is  a  comprehensive 
research methodology covering all aspects of scientific research (Glaser, 1998).  
 
In  spite  of  significant  support  from  the  academic  community,  GT  has  been 
criticised by a number of authors. Even though some authors criticise it because of 
the associated limitations of the methodology (Allan, 2003), many others rebuke it 
just  because  of  their  pure  quantitative  orientation.  In  many  cases  “the  disputes 
among grounded theorists and critiques result from where various authors stand 
between interpretive and positivist traditions” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 129). Those who 
are on the positivist end of the continuum are more critical of GT while those at 
the other end of the continuum are supportive of GT. Some authors rebuke GT 
claiming that it ignores some research aspects they are best suited for quantitative 
methods.  For  example  Layder  (1998)  writes  that  GT  is  “committed 
epistemologically (the validity of knowledge) and ontologically (its view on social 
reality)  to  denying  the  existence  of  phenomena  that  are  not  only  and  simply 
behavioural” . This objection does not seem to be very logical because GT is used 
to uncover social phenomena which are always behavioural in nature. Layder also 
claims that GT is weak in ‘theory-testing’  but this claim also does not look to be 
convincing given the fact that the aim of GT is not to test existing theories but 
rather to generate new theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
The conclusion is that GT may not be a good choice in some areas of research but 
it is the best choice in other situations. The whole choice in the selection of GT 
depends on the nature of the research question and existing literature in that area. 
The researcher believes that GT is the best methodology for the research question 
addressed in this study. Although criticised by some authors, this methodology is 
useful  where  the  researcher  knows  little  about  the  situation  and  extracts 
everything from the data without any preconceived hypothesis (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  
4.6  Summary 
Given the fact that this particular research topic was to investigate a phenomenon 
deeply entwined with social intricacies and that it had remained almost untouched 
so  far,  deemed  this  topic  an  appropriate  area  to  be  examined  using  GT  as  the 
research  methodology.  GT  is  a  qualitative  social  science  research  methodology 
relying on subjective research philosophy and interpretative paradigm. Though the Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 4: Methodology 
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research process could be divided into three stages i.e. open, axial and selective 
coding, the actual analysis is deeply iterative between the stages where the last 
stages  with  the  first  one  and  the  first  practically  end  after  the  last  stage  is 
completed. This methodology mainly replies interviews as the main source of data 
by other sources e.g. internal memos, minutes of meetings; annual reports and 
other  organization  communications  can  be  used  as  data.  Furthermore,  data 
collection  is  guided  by  theoretical  sampling.  Despite  being  criticised  by  some 
quantitative researchers, the methodology is one of the widely used techniques for 
examining the social sciences phenomenon. Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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5  Chapter 5: Open Coding 
5.1  Introduction 
Open coding is the first stage in GT analysis and the first chapter in writing the 
analysis  section  where  the  qualitative  data  are  broken  down  into  identifiable 
concepts  which  are  “labels  placed  on  discrete  happenings,  events  and  other 
instances of phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.61). Each concept is then 
constantly “compared with other concepts for similarities and differences” in order 
to  develop  higher-level  descriptive  concepts  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  p.73) 
called  open  codes.  During  the  analysis,  310  open  codes  were  identified  and 
labelled. However, the subsequent phases of analysis i.e. the axial and selective 
coding  revealed  that  only  forty  open  codes  were  relevant  to  the  emerging  core 
phenomenon. Therefore, this chapter explains only those relevant open codes. 
 
One important step at this stage of the analysis is to explain open codes in terms 
of  their  properties  and  dimensions.  Properties  are  the  characteristics  of  open 
codes that explain and position them across a dimensional range. They are used 
for axial comparison of open codes in the next stages of analysis in order to reach 
higher  levels  of  abstractions.  For  the  purpose  of  ease  of  understanding  and 
bringing smoothness into the flow of writing, the properties and dimensions have 
been presented in tabular form before each open category. A complete list of the 
forty codes and their properties and dimensions is given in Appendix IV. A detailed 
discussion of the forty codes now follows. 
5.2  Description of the Open Codes 
A detailed description an analysis of the open codes is given below. 
5.2.1 Social Welfare 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Social Welfare 
Relevance  High/Low 
Importance  High/Low 
Profitability Trade-off  High/Low 
Feeling Responsibility  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
 
This open code was developed by constantly comparing concepts for similarities 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The similar concepts that gave rise to this open code 
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for  community  welfare’  and  ‘social  well-being’.  These  concepts  were  gathered 
under one open code i.e. ‘Social Welfare’. 
 
Social welfare represents the health and happiness of the society as a whole. This 
is a key concept in Islamic banking which advocates trade-off of personal benefit, 
theoretically,  for  the  greater  good  of  the  society.  It  is  an  outcome  of  social 
‘Fairness  and  Justice’-  the  building  blocks  of  the  Islamic  economic  system. 
Therefore, one might expect Islamic banks to promote social welfare at all levels in 
their  practices.  However,  this  scenario  does  not  represent  the  ground  reality  in 
Islamic banking. PLS mechanisms are not extended to customers generously. 
 
“The concept of Islamic banking is not only to benefit those directly 
involved but also the community and the whole society…....In spite of 
the problems and less profits; we made an investment because of its 
benefit to the society.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Shari’a scholars consider social well-being as highly relevant to Islamic banking 
and thus accord it a significant importance in Islamic banking practices. As Shari’a 
scholars’ duty is to align the banks’ practices with Shari’a objectives, they have an 
extensive  sense  of  responsibility  for  delivering  social  welfare.  They  also  have  a 
considerable tendency to forgo banks’ profits for social welfare purposes by taking 
on  projects  having  a  high  social  impact.  There  have  been  instances  where  the 
Shari’a  scholars  convinced  the  banks’  management  to  take  on  projects  with 
positive social impacts despite their risky cash flows.  
 
 “From an Islamic perspective and from my point of view it is part of 
the  corporate  role  to  ensure  that  society  is  looked  after.”  (Shari’a 
Advisor, Case I) 
Managers, on the other hand, believe that social welfare is only slightly relevant to 
their business and thus allocates it a minimal importance. However, they do not 
feel themselves responsible for delivering social welfare through Islamic banking. 
Thus,  they  are  not  in  favour  of  sacrificing  banks’  profits  and  other  business 
objectives  for  this  purpose.  For  example,  management  in  one  of  the  cases 
opposed  a  risky  but  high  social  impact  investment  proposal  put  forth  by  the 
Shari’a  scholars  until  a  third  party,  a  group  of  affluent  individuals,  agreed  to 
guarantee the principal amount. 
 
“People  may  call  it  non-profit  but  we  are  indeed  profit-making 
entities. So we have to be competitive.” (Head of Investments, Case III) Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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“The  management  did  not  agree  on  this  so  we  made  some 
arrangements;  we  asked  some  rich  individuals  to  become  a  third 
party guarantee….they agreed to guarantee the principal amount in 
case  there  was  loss  in  this  transaction.”  (Shari’a  Research  Officer, 
Case II) 
Thus, there is a clear gap between the two parties’ approaches to social welfare. 
This gap is narrower in terms of overall importance allocated by the parties to this 
concept  but  it  widens  when  it  comes  to  a  sense  of  responsibility  to  deliver  it. 
Because  Shari’a  scholars  do  not  have  authority  to  promote  Shari’a  objectives 
beyond the minimum Shari’a-compliance level i.e. Halal and Haram limits, they 
are  unable  to  advocate  social  well-being  as  an  essential  element  to  achieve 
ultimate  Shari’a  objectives.  Therefore,  Shari’a  scholars  try  to  shift  the 
responsibility of social well-being from corporate shoulders to other entities such 
as government. 
“IFIs play their own role in social well-being but it’s not the job of IFIs 
alone; governments have to play their role.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case I)  
The result is that social well-being receives only slight consideration in terms of its 
implementation in the banks’ practices. Management has more power to influence 
Shari’a  scholars,  who  yield  to  management-promoted  business  objectives. 
However,  management  would  not  have  any  objection  to  promoting  and 
implementing social welfare measures if they do not hinder ‘Business Objectives’.  
5.2.2 Ethical Investments (EI) 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Ethical Investments (EI) 
Relevance  High/Low 
Coverage  Wide/Narrow 
Sense of Responsibility  High/Low 
Trading-off Profitability  High/Low 
Authority  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
 
This code emerged through constant comparison of incidents that were much in 
line with the ethical investment literature (Beekun and Badawi, 2005, Hussein and 
Omran, 2005, Siddiqi, 2008). The similar concepts identified and grouped to form 
this  open  code  were  refraining  from  investing  in  ‘tobacco’,  ‘alcohol’,  ‘arms’, 
‘pornography’ etc. Therefore, the name of the code was adapted from literature. 
However,  some  differences  with  the  western  EI  concept  were  also  noted.  For 
example, environment is not considered as an important EI aspect by our cases.  
Though Friedman’s (Friedman, 1970, Friedman, 1967) free market theory strongly 
insists on pure self-interest, companies these days are yielding to pressure groups Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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have limited authority and confined involvement, which makes it difficult for them 
to deliver F&J to the best possible extent. 
 
“Depositors have great expectations from us.… [Therefore] it is our 
responsibility…to  give  them  Halal  [permitted]  profit  and  to  protect 
their rights. We are doing our best to give them Halal profits but we 
do not have the powers and involvement to protect their rights e.g. 
their  due  share  in  the  profits.  We  do  feel  ourselves  responsible  to 
protect their rights because they trust us. ” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
For  the  management,  on  the  contrary,  ‘fairness  and  justice’  has  moderate 
relevance  because  their  assignment  is  realizing  ‘Business  Objectives’.  Thus,  the 
delivery of ‘fairness and justice’ is not of utmost importance for them. They feel it 
carries intermediate importance. However, they do not feel it is their responsibility 
to  deliver  ‘fairness  and  justice’  to  weaker  parties  beyond  the  minimum  legal 
transparency requirements.  
 
“Our system is fair and just… we have set criteria of 40% return on 
equity and we transfer the excess to the depositors”. (Head of Islamic 
Banking Dept., Case II) 
However,  the  term  ‘fairness  and  justice’  has  no  clearly  defined  boundaries  and 
thus management can use their powers to redefine the term by exerting influence 
on Shari’a scholars. Thus, Shari’a scholars may give up their stance on the concept 
and its ending practical implementation in Islamic banks’ practices is limited and is 
a representative of mainly management’s stance. 
5.2.4 Philanthropy 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Philanthropy 
Relevance  High/Low 
Importance  High/Low 
Sense of Responsibility  High/Low 
Profitability Trade-off  High/Low 
Authority  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
Philanthropic Use  High/Low 
Instrumental Use  High/Low 
 
This  code  emerged  through  constantly  comparing  incidents  with  each  other 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
The  term  ‘philanthropy’  has  been  used  to  describe  the  phenomenon  more 
abstractly and concisely. The incidents and events respondents referred to were Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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‘Zakat’, ‘Charity’ and ‘default obligation amount’. Unlike conventional banks and 
other corporations where charitable contribution to the society is voluntary and 
often  used  for  instrumental  purposes,  there  is  at  least  one  type  of  mandatory 
charity, Zakat [a fixed percentage of one’s accumulated wealth] on Islamic banks. 
A  second  major  source  of  charity  is  forfeited  profit,  which  is  the  profit  from 
accidental or deliberate Shari’a-repugnant transactions. In addition, Islamic banks 
are  not  allowed  (restricted  by  Shari’  scholars)  to  refinance  advances  with 
customers  so  they  punish  late-paying  customers  by  charging  them  a  default 
obligation amount as a penalty, which cannot be taken as profit by the banks but 
is rather allocated to charity funds. Shari’a scholars essentially prescribe the rules 
for  philanthropic  contributions.  However,  management  is  not  bound  to  make 
charitable contributions other than those discussed above. 
 
Shari’a  scholars  consider  charitable  contributions  as  highly  relevant  to  the 
prescribed levels and thus they give it a very high importance because they believe 
it  is  their  utmost  responsibility  to  ensure  banks  collect  and  pay  the  required 
charities. Shari’a scholars are stringent in allocating profits from Shari’a-repugnant 
transactions to charity as it will make the whole profit Haram if it is not taken out. 
They are also ready to sacrifice any amount of banks’ profits and pool it into the 
charity  funds  in  case  the  transactions  are  identified  to  be  against  Shari’a 
principles. They can do so because their authority is full and final in this case. 
 
“Zakat  allocation  and  disbursements  are  restricted  to  divine 
guidance….nobody  can  add  or  subtract  anything  in  this…...Shari’a 
board  decides  where  the  Zakat  fund  goes.”  (Head  of  Shari’a  Dept., 
Case III) 
“As  far  as  Shari’a  compliance  is  concerned,  I  think  that  is  fine 
because  no  one  can  interfere  with  it.  Recently,  we  gave  a  huge 
amount  of  profit  in  charity  due  to  a  minor  Shari’a  issue  in  that 
transaction.” (Manager Operations, Case I) 
Managers accord moderate relevance and importance to charitable contributions in 
Islamic banking. They feel a slight responsibility to comply with Shari’a principles 
in giving away profits to charity. However, management’s authority is very low in 
this regard and they have to submit to Shari’a scholars’ decisions in the case of the 
above-mentioned sources of charity. Any other charitable contribution  is at the 
sole discretion of management where Shari’a scholars have no influence. Managers 
also resort to a number of coercive strategies to influence Shari’a scholars because 
they do not want profits to be given to charity. Some Shari’a scholars may yield to 
this pressure and become lenient with management while others strictly adhere to 
what they feel is right. Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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“Management also sometimes asks us not to give profits to charity. In 
some  cases,  when  the  management  really  insists  on  us  not  to  do 
something, we become lenient because there are only two options in 
that case; either to quit or to obey.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case 
III) 
Managers have to comply if Shari’a scholars stick with their stance on the above 
charity  sources.  Thus,  the  overall  observance  of  charitable  contributions  is 
significantly  high.  Though  the  beneficiaries  of  the  Zakat  fund  are  prescribed  in 
Shari’a  and  are  predominantly  consumed  in  philanthropic  causes,  management 
might  use  the  forfeited  profits  and  default  obligation  amounts  for  instrumental 
purposes. 
 
It however, is interesting to note that some Shari’a scholars yield to managerial 
pressure and refrain from allocating large sums of money to charity especially in 
the case of Shari’a-repugnant transactions. 
 
“I met a scholar or two who do not tend to allocate big amounts of 
non-Sharia-complaint transactions to charity” (Shari’a Advisor, Case 
III) 
5.2.5 Unity Principle 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Unity Principle 
Relevance  High/Low 
Importance  High/Low 
Coverage  Wide/Narrow 
Feeling Responsibility  High/Low 
Trading-off Profitability  High/Low 
Authority  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
 
It took a bit of thinking to struggle to name this code as there was a chain of 
similar incidents but the researcher found it a little hard to name it. Therefore, an 
analytical  tool  named  by  Corbin  and  Strauss  (2008,  p.80)  as  “drawing  upon 
personal  experience”  was  used  coupled  with  seeking  guidance  from  existence 
literature (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). A Red flag (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) was 
constantly  waved  at  this  time  because  the  use  of  personal  experience  and 
literature can introduce bias to GT. Luckily, the code is well-grounded in data and 
the chances of bias are minimal.  
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The unity principle proclaims that everything in the universe belongs to God who is 
the  ultimate  owner  of  any  property.  The  use  of  wealth  and  property  has  been 
granted to humankind in different proportions. The unity principle says that God’s 
property should never be used for the exploitation of fellow human beings rather 
it should be used for the benefit of humankind to earn the will of God. It dictates 
that ‘fairness and justice’, ‘social well-being’ and ‘philanthropy’ must be observed 
even  at  one’s  own  expense.  Thus,  the  overall  public  good  gets  priority  over 
personal objectives of wealth maximization. Islamic banks are expected to comply 
with this principle to safeguard public interests and to promote equality. 
 
“He  [God]  sent  Adam  and  his  wife  as  carers/guardians  of  this 
earth……to  populate  it…..take  care  of  it  and  whatever  lives  on  it, 
whether  plants  or  the  animals  or  the  mountains  and  all  creatures 
that Allah has created……..we have been given a hand on them to 
utilize them but there are rules of utilizing…..” (Head of Shari’a Dept., 
Case I) 
“Zakat is paid to earn the  will of God… The implementation of the 
Islamic economics system will balance the distribution of wealth. … 
As Islamic banking system is a part of the Islamic economics system, 
therefore,  the  first  objective  is  to  earn  the  will  of  God.”  (Shari’a 
Research Officer, Case II) 
According  to  Shari’a  scholars,  the  unity  principle  is  extremely  relevant  and 
important  in  the  Islamic  banking  industry  as  it  is  a  means  of  realizing  the 
objectives of Islamic economics, also known as Shari’a objectives. They believe the 
unity  principle  is  partly  covered  by  the  proper  implementation  of  the 
aforementioned codes i.e. ‘Social Welfare’, ‘Ethical Investments (EI)’,  ’Fairness and 
Justice’ and doing some ‘Philanthropy’. However, Shari’a scholars feel a sense of 
responsibility to convince managers on sacrificing parts of ‘Business Objectives’ to 
go one step further for the greater good of the society e.g. offering interest-free 
loans  to  needy  people.  However,  they  do  not  have  any  authority  to  force 
management  on  taking  on  further  actions  in  this  regard.  In  one  of  our  cases, 
Shari’a scholars have  been able to convince managers on granting interest-free 
loans to needy customers. 
 
“Qardh  Hassan  [interest-free  loan]  is  paid  in  small  amounts  to 
depositors for personal genuine needs…...we give up to 10,000 [local 
currency]  to  needy  account  holders  for  their  education,  marriages, 
treatment etc.”(Shari’a Research Officer, Case I) 
Managers  assign  moderate  relevance  and  importance  to  the  unity  principle  but 
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and mentality of the sponsors. Thus, we check the past record of the 
sponsors and ask them questions to evaluate their commitment to the 
industry. ” (Director and Joint Director, Regulator) 
“……..we  require  Islamic  banks  to  have  a  Shari’a  compliance  and 
Shari’a review mechanism both of which have a dotted reporting line 
to the  Shari’a  advisor……..our  Shari’a  board  also  conducts  Shari’a 
compliance  inspections  of  Islamic  banks  as  part  of  our  regulatory 
inspections.” (Additional Director, Regulator)  
These  measures  control  managers’  thirst  of  profit  maximization  at  the  cost  of 
Shari’a compliance. Still, profit maximization is actively pursued in Islamic banks. 
Shari’a scholars are struggling with implementing the minimum Shari’a compliance 
level  but  that  also  becomes  difficult  at  times.  Therefore,  they  sometimes 
compromise on the minimum Shari’a compliance standards. This greed for profit 
is a potential existential threat to the essence of Islamic banking industry in the 
long run, which is strongly realized by Shari’a scholars and regulators.  
 
A Shari’a scholar, who read the whole analysis of this study, commented on the 
issue of compromising on minimum Shari’a compliance in the following words. 
 
“This is true and happening at times.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.2.7 Secured Investments 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Secured Investments 
Relevance  High/Low 
Importance  High/Low 
Feeling Responsibility  High/Low 
Trade-off of Shari'a  High/Low 
Frustration  High/Low 
Regulatory Controls  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
 
This  is  an  “in-vivo”  code  (Strauss,  1987,  p.33)  taken  from  interviews  with 
managers.  It  was  then  saturated  through  constantly  comparing  it  with  other 
incidents. The prohibition of payment and receipt of interest leaves Islamic banks 
with the recommended option of risk-return sharing mechanisms i.e. Musharakah 
and Mudharabah. Islamic banks are expected to share risk and return on deposits 
and investing sides. However, like other financial institutions, Islamic banks need 
steady  cash  flows.  Thus,  risk-return  sharing  instruments  are  not  managers’ 
favourite. 
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Islamic banks’ management believes that secured investment is a highly relevant 
and important feature of banking. One of managers’ responsibilities is to make 
sure that minimum possible risk is undertaken by the banks. Secured investments 
are thus very important for management’s business objectives that they pursue 
even  at  the  expense  of  Shari’a  objectives.  Managers  are  not  frustrated  in  this 
regard because Shari’a scholars do not impose significant restrictions in this case.  
 
“Shari’a insists on profit sharing instruments such  as Musharakah, 
Mudharabah but you don’t see them much practiced by the Islamic 
banks. Rather what you see are asset-backed instruments like Ijarah 
and Murabahah, which I think, have been picked up for convenience, 
security and fixed returns. Therefore, the real essence of risk-sharing 
has largely been diluted. I feel that has posed the real divergence in 
the sense that how we pursue the business from a Shari’a perspective 
and  from  a  profit  and  management  perspective…”  (Head  of 
Investments, Case III) 
On  the  contrary,  Shari’a  scholars  believe  that  real  risk-sharing  Islamic  financial 
instruments e.g. Musharakah and Mudharabah are essential for achieving Shari’a 
objectives. However, they also feel themselves somewhat responsible for making 
sure  banks’  investments  are  secured  to  ensure  the  continuity  of  business. 
Therefore, Shari’a scholars agree to some extent to sacrifice Shari’a objectives and 
allow  the  banks  to  pursue  only  secured  Islamic  financial  instruments  Like 
Murabahah  and  Ijarah.  Regulators  also  believe  that  Shari’a  objectives  cannot  be 
achieved  without  proper  implementation  of  risk-sharing  instruments.  However, 
both  regulators  and  Shari’a  scholars  agree  with  management’s  stance  that  the 
societal environment is not conducive for Musharakah and Mudharabah because 
of the widespread  mistrust. Still, the situation is frustrating for Shari’a scholars 
and  regulators  to  a  significant  extent  because  they  are  trading-off  Shari’a 
objectives. 
 
“Islamic banks cannot go towards the real essence of Islamic banking 
i.e.  Musharakah  and  Mudharabah  because  our  society  is  not 
conducive for this. There is a complete trend of cheating amongst the 
public. So Islamic banks cannot do anything alone, there needs to be 
a complete Islamic system in place. See, a profitable business does 
not want to share its profits with an Islamic bank.” (Joint Director, 
Regulator) 
As a result, the bulk of Islamic financial transactions is carried out through secured 
instruments.  Managers,  Shari’a  scholars  and  regulators  believe  that  only  risk-
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Ijarah meet only the minimum Shari’a requirements. The main hurdle in this case 
is the absence of a conducive societal structure based on honesty and integrity. 
Thus, banks are reluctant to indulge in risk-sharing ventures with customers who 
may  not  show  the  actual  profit-and-loss  positions  of  their  businesses. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks use the same pricing tools of the conventional banking 
even  in  risk-sharing  products.  No  matter  which  product  is  applied,  the  cost  of 
funds is calculated on conventional basis and according to the prevailing interest 
rates in the market.  
 
“Islamic  banks  are  not  ready  to  take  business  risk  [based  on 
Musharakah and Mudharabah]; they need known cash flows in order 
to compete with conventional banks. However, there are some people 
who think out of the box and want to serve the industry.” (Director, 
Regulator) 
A  respondent,  who  kindly  agreed  to  read  the  analysis  after  it  was  completed, 
commented  that  “Sharia  Board  members  should  impose  limits  for  the  secured 
investment  portfolios.  I  came  to  know  the  Tawarruq  [an  Islamic  banking 
instrument] portfolio in a bank in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) reaches 70% of 
the  entire  business  pool  of  the  bank,  which  is  unacceptable  and  unjustifiable. 
However,  even  in  PLS  sharing  products,  the  Islamic  bank  takes  securities  that 
mitigate any risk which is against the principles of those products. In PLS products, 
the bank may take security to cover its share only in case the client failed in the 
management due to its misconduct and gross negligence. Whilst, the bank takes 
security that covers the entire value of the project” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.2.8 Islamization of Conventional Products 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Islamization  of 
Conventional Products 
Relevance  High/Low 
Importance  High/Low 
Feeling Responsibility  High/Low 
Trade-off of Shari'a  High/Low 
Use of Covert Means  High/Low 
Frustration  High/Low 
Regulatory Controls  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
 
This code also emerged though constant comparison of incidents. Mainly Shari’a 
scholars  and  regulators  describe  managers’  ultimate  pursuit  of  Islamization  of 
conventional  products  as  a  potential  risk  for  the  Islamic  banks.  Like  their 
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same  economic  purpose,  thus  facing  strict  competition  from  seasoned 
conventional  banks.  Therefore,  it  is  very  important  for  the  managers  of  Islamic 
banks to pursue a competitive strategy and come up with products very similar to 
conventional banks to stay competitive in the market.  
 
The managers’ job is to achieve ‘Business Objectives’ of the banks and thus they 
believe  it  is  extremely  relevant  and  important  for  Islamic  banks  to  remain 
competitive with conventional banks in terms of products, services and returns. 
They  are  responsible  for  coming  up  with  products  very  similar  to  those  of 
conventional  banks  to  meet  customers’  banking  needs.  They  also  have  a 
significant tendency to sacrifice Shari’a objectives and, sometimes, the minimum 
Shari’a  compliance  requirements  to  develop  competitive  products.  The 
dissatisfaction  of  management  increases  when  Shari’a  scholars  reject  such 
products  and  proposals.  Therefore,  they  resort  to  coercive  means,  including  ‘ 
Firing Threat’ and ‘Closure Threat’, to force Shari’a scholars to give concessions on 
the minimum Shari’a compliance levels.  
 
“The  main  issue  in  Islamic  banking  is  the  desire  for  Islamic 
alternatives  of  conventional  products.  For  example  if  conventional 
banks offer car financing, the management of Islamic banks wants to 
do  the  same  thing  in  an  Islamic  way.  Thus  the  Shari’a  advisor  is 
asked to Islamize the car financing. Also, you cannot ask for down 
payment in Islamic banking. Thus the banks have changed the name 
from  down  payment  to  security  deposit.  Thus  Islamic  banks  try  to 
offer exactly the same products as the conventional banks do. This is 
a  kind  of  Shari’a  engineering  which  is  done  through  juristic  ruses 
(Hila’s).” (Credit Administration Office, Case I) 
Shari’a scholars also feel the relevance and importance of providing all banking 
services  offered  by  conventional  banks.  However,  they  believe  they  are  not 
responsible  to  find  alternatives  for  all  conventional  banking  practices  and  are, 
thus,  not  willing  to  sacrifice  the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  levels.  Therefore, 
they  can  also  resort  to  exerting  minor  levels  of  pressures  to  counter 
management’s  pressure.  Shari’a  scholars  are  willing  to  sacrifice  broader  Shari’a 
objectives; however, the situation is highly frustrating for them when management 
seeks  Islamic  alternatives  of  conventional  products  that  require  concessions  in 
minimum Shari’a compliance levels.  
 
“…..they  [management]  sometimes  push  us  to  approve  certain 
structures. They even threaten our jobs and even the Islamic banking 
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qualifications  in  the  relevant  fields  to  make  sure  a  smooth  and  professional 
functioning  of  organizations.  As  Islamic  banks  are  business  entities  based  on 
religious principles, their Human Resource needs to be sufficiently versed in two 
types of education- religious and business. However, not all those affiliated with 
Islamic banks are versed with the two educational types at the same time. Rather 
there is a prevailing split in educational types of two important Human Resource 
groups, managers and Shari’a scholars, within Islamic banks.  
 
The  majority  of  the  Shari’a  scholars  working  in  Islamic  banks  are  Mufti’s, 
possessing  PhD  equivalent  degrees  in  religious  education.  Some  also  have  a 
background  in  conventional  business  education  however,  a  vast  majority  lack 
sound  business  educational  background  necessary  to  run  financial  institutions. 
They  also  are  well  versed  in  the  Arabic  language,  which  is  the  medium  of 
instruction in religious schools and the language of Shari’a law. Still their fluency 
in English, the business language of Islamic banks, is low. Thus, Shari’a scholars 
have problems understanding the business intricacies written and communicated 
in the English language. 
 
“Second  is  education.  The  majority  of  the  Shari’a  scholars  has  the 
knowledge of Shari’a but when it comes to business and legal issues, 
they  tend  to  have  a  lesser  understanding.  They  also  lack  the 
understanding of time-value, risk management, the urgency of how 
the business world works and so and so forth. So these again have 
caused  a  bit  of  divergence…...language  is  also  a  problem.  All  our 
transactions  are  in  English  but  the  Shari’a  scholars  will  have  to 
translate all the proposals into Arabic and then comment. Even there 
are issues with translations. They come back with lots of questions 
and then we try to clarify them. So it takes lots of time which makes 
us frustrated.” (Head of Investments, Case III) 
The discrepancy widens when it comes to management's background in religious 
education.  A  vast  majority  of  managers  does  not  have  any  formal  degrees  in 
religious  education  but  possess  sound  backgrounds  in  business  education. 
Managers are fluent in English but are unfamiliar with Arabic except where Arabic 
is their mother language. Thus, management understands the business world but 
lacks proficiency in Shari’a law, which leads to a lack of their understanding of 
Shari’a principles and their proper implementation.  
 
 “…managers of the Islamic banks come from conventional business 
schools where they don’t have much of a Shari’a background.” (Head 
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The  diverging  educational  backgrounds  of  the  two  parties  instil  diverging 
mentalities  and  approaches  in  the  two  parties.  Thus,  Shari’a  scholars  have 
predominantly  religious  mentalities  while  management  have  secular  attitudes; 
some even deem Shari’a as obsolete. This situation increases the frustration of the 
two parties. Shari’a scholars complain that managers do not understand the tacit 
logic  and  mechanisms  of  Shari’a  while  managers  think  Shari’a  scholars  hardly 
understand  their  business  proposals  taking  a  long  time  in  reading  and 
understanding  them.  Thus,  managers  view  Islamic  bank  as  a  new  market  for 
achieving ‘Business Objectives’ while Shari’a scholars view it from a holistic point 
of view as a tool for realizing ‘Shari’a Objectives’.  
 
“The mind-set of the Islamic management is not supportive of Islamic 
banking  because  most  of  their  Human  Resource  has  conventional 
education and experience ……. there is a need to change their mind-
set…….secondly, the problem is with the Shari’a scholars; they often 
don’t know about banking practices so this creates a gap. This gap 
can be bridged by training those Shari’a scholars that come from the 
Madrasas [Religious schools].” (Joint Director, Regulator) 
5.2.10  Experience Disparity 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Experience Disparity 
Religious Exposure  High/Low 
Business Exposure  High/Low 
Mentality-Secular  High/Low 
Mentality-Religious  High/Low 
 
This open code came out as a result of constant comparison of incidents (Corbin 
and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998). 
Managers,  Shari’a  scholars  and  regulators  constantly  talked  about  different 
backgrounds of managers and Shari’a scholars. 
  
Analogous to ‘Educational Disparity’, Shari’a scholars and management also come 
from different types of practical backgrounds. Islamic banks hire managers who 
have  extensive  exposure  to  conventional  banking  practices  in  order  to  ensure 
smooth and competitive running of the banks. Therefore, managers are very good 
in understanding and running the banking business however, they do not have any 
exposure  to  the  environment  Shari’a  scholars  have  dealt  with  throughout  their 
lives.  On  the  other  hand,  Shari’a  scholars  have  no  exposure  to  conventional 
banking because they believe working for a conventional bank is Haram but they 
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majority of the Shari’a scholars working in Islamic banks has been affiliated with 
religious schools and other religious organizations for an extended period of time, 
which has moulded their thinking patterns.  
 
“Islamic banks' management is composed of people who have more 
than 20 years of experience in the conventional banks and it is very 
difficult  to  convince  them  of  the  concept  of  Islamic  banking.  I  was 
personally not convinced when I first joined this department but when 
I went deeper and deeper into the nature of the Islamic transactions; I 
realized that they were different.” (Deputy Director, Regulator) 
The work backgrounds of management and Shari’a scholars nurture two diverging 
mentalities- secular and business. Thus, it becomes difficult for Shari’a scholars to 
convince  management  of  the  long-term  benefits  and  social  effects  of  Islamic 
contracts  and  vice  versa.  However,  Shari’a  scholars  understand  and  realize  the 
importance of ‘Business Objectives’ largely and are inclined to give concessions. 
Largely, managers view Islamic banks as a means of realizing ‘Business Objectives’ 
and Shari’a scholars see it as a way to achieve ‘Shari’a Objectives’. 
 
“…most  of them  [management]  come  from  conventional  background. 
They try to work and run their business and achieve their targets. So 
their  conventional  background  and  behaviour  is  a  big  problem.” 
(Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
5.2.11  Self-interest  
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Self-interest 
Monetary  Incentives  for  Joining 
Islamic bank 
High/Low 
Value of Incentives  Big/Small 
Based on Business Targets  High/Low 
Determines Behaviour  High/Low 
 
This code was important but hard to conceptualize because respondents did not 
explicitly admit the role of self-interest in affecting their behaviour and strategies. 
It was through a close look at the language and emotions (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008) of the respondents that gave rise to this code.  
 
Shari’a scholars and management are attracted to Islamic banks for a number of 
reasons. One main reason for joining Islamic banks is personal incentive, which 
moulds the behaviour of the beneficiaries. One Shari’a scholar called management 
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and  disconnect  from  Shari’a  objectives.  Most  of  the  top  and  middle  level 
management  of  Islamic  banks  is  attracted  from  conventional  banks  (also  see  ‘ 
Experience  Disparity’)  by  offering  them  higher  pay  and  perks.  Because  they  are 
expert  in  the  banking  business,  they  are  given  business  targets  to  meet  while 
working  in  consultation  with  Shari’a  scholars.  The  financial  and  non-financial 
incentives  of  management  are  based  on  their  achievement  of  business  targets. 
Therefore, they have a high level of commitment to business objectives and strive 
to achieve them even at the expense of Shari’a compliance.  
 
“The mind-set of the Islamic management is not supportive of Islamic 
banking because most of the human resources for Islamic banks come 
from conventional banks for better pay and perks. Thus there is a need 
to change their mind-set.” (Joint Director, regulator) 
“The management of Islamic banks are economic migrants; they do not 
come  for  religious  reasons…………but  for  better  salaries.”  (Shari’a 
Advisor, Case II) 
For Shari’a scholars, monetary incentives play a moderate role in attracting them 
to work in the banks. They get lucrative compensations for a nominal role but still 
they do not consider themselves as economic migrants because they would not 
opt to work for a conventional interest-based  bank. Furthermore, the  values of 
their monetary and non-monetary incentives are not based on business targets. 
However,  their  financial  and  non-financial  incentives  are  attractive  enough  to 
affect their behaviour to some extent. It is also notable that the prominent Shari’a 
scholars are heads and members of a multitude of Sharia Boards which is beyond 
their  capability.  This  questions  the  notion  that  Shari’a  scholars  are  not  much 
attracted towards monetary incentives. Therefore, Shari’a scholars might, at times, 
yield  to  management’s  pressure  and  show  some  sort  of  leniency  in  relation  to 
Shari’a objectives, as they want to stay in the job and earn their living.  
 
“The Shari’a board does not get any benefit for approving or declining 
the structure; they just give their fair opinion about it from a Shari’a 
perspective.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
“One reason some Shari’a advisors are tempted to be lenient is their 
job, compensation, promotion and other perks which are determined by 
the  management.  If  they  become  very  strict,  there  are  chances  that 
they will not get good benefits.” (Shari’a Research Officer, CASE III)) 
However, there are minor chances that Shari’a scholars would actually compromise 
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sensitivity to eternal pressure. The majority of the Shari’a scholars are committed 
to  the  development  of  the  industry  and  presenting  it  as  an  alternative  to  the 
conventional banking system so some of them work for Islamic banks even without 
compensation. 
 
“Shari’a scholars are not concerned with the business and profitability 
of  the  bank;  some  of  them  don’t  even  take  their  salaries.  They  just 
want  to  make  the  system  successful.  Therefore,  their  decisions 
regarding Shari’a issues are fair and not taken under management’s 
pressure.” (Manager Operations, Case I) 
5.2.12   Eternal Reward/Punishment 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Eternal Sensitivity 
Reason for Joining the Bank  High/Low 
Level of Spiritual Commitment  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Adherence  High/Low 
 
Incidents  like  ‘hell’,  ‘haven’,  ‘sin’  and  ‘responsibility’  were  abstracted  into  this 
code through constant comparison (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 
1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998).  The  prime  motivation  for  Shari’a  scholars,  as 
proclaimed  by  them,  is  to  discharge  a  religious  responsibility  by  serving  the 
Islamic  finance  industry.  They  believe  their  work  equals  religious  rituals  if 
performed properly. They are highly sensitive to the eternal consequences of their 
actions because they believe their verdicts are considered as signing on behalf of 
Allah [God]. A right verdict can earn them reward [heaven] and a deliberate wrong 
verdict  will  result  in  punishment  [hell].  Therefore,  there  is  a  strong  connection 
between their job and religious fidelity and they try to adhere to the letter and 
spirit  of  Shari’a  principles.  There  is  a  dotted  line  of  authority  between  Shari’a 
scholars and Allah. This line of authority is the prime self-regulatory mechanism 
imposed  on  Shari’a  scholars.  Furthermore,  their  religious  verdicts  are  highly 
regarded by all stakeholders who have a blind trust in Shari’a scholars. It gives 
them  an  additional  pressure  to  keep  their  integrity  and  maintain  public's 
confidence in their verdicts. Therefore, spiritual commitment is a strong corrective 
force  on  Shari’a  scholars  to  make  decisions  that  are  compliant  with  Shari’a 
principles even if they are at the cost of lower profits for the banks or are against 
their own material interests. However, the eternal rewards and punishments are 
expected  to  be  in  the  unforeseen  future  and  might  be  subject  to  trade-off  to 
worldly reward and punishment.  
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The  Shari’a  scholars’  community  has  long  been  opposing  the  western  banking 
system introduced during colonial periods; they prohibited Muslims from any kind 
of  dealings  with  banks  including  employment  and  safekeeping  of  deposits  with 
interest-based  banks.  However,  modern  business  transactions  were  impractical 
without banking services and thus Shari’a scholars came under intense pressure to 
present an alternative to the western banking system. This triggered a move to 
Islamize the  banking system in the early  1940s, which was  supported  by  some 
Shari’a  scholars  that  resulted  in  the  present  form  of  Islamic  banking.  However, 
some Shari’a scholars were and are still not convinced by the concept of banking 
in Islam. These scholars have not opted to join and support the Islamic banking 
industry in its current form. This study refers to such Shari’a scholars as external. 
They are posing a constant pressure on Islamic banks’ management and especially 
those  Shari’a  scholars  that  are  supporting  the  industry  i.e.  the  internal  Shari’a 
scholars. 
 
The intensity of this pressure is very high on internal Shari’a scholars who have a 
significant  exposure  to  it  because  only  Shari’a  scholars  can  comment  on  other 
Shari’a scholars verdicts. This exposes the internal Shari’a scholars and the whole 
Islamic banking industry to a very high reputation risk in case the external Shari’a 
scholars  come  up  with  verdicts  against  the  Islamic  banking  system  currently  in 
place. Therefore, Shari’a scholars are highly sensitive to this pressure, which has a 
positive  impact  in  the  sense  that  it  forces  them  to  be  more  careful  in  issuing 
verdicts and realizing wider ‘Shari’a Objectives’. However, it has a medium range 
negative impact because it restricts innovation and research in the Islamic banking 
industry.  
 
“Indeed, external Shari’a scholars exert a greater pressure on internal 
Shari’a scholars. …..there are two types of external Shari’a scholars; 1) 
those that understand and agree with Islamic banks and 2) those that 
do not agree with it or have some reservations. The pressure of non-
agreeing external Shari’a scholars is much higher than the agreeing. 
Therefore, internal Shari’a scholars are extremely careful because they 
do not want to provide them further reasons for objections. Many of 
their  objections  are  regarding  making  the  system  ideal  and  we  are 
working on that. The current system is being continuously modified due 
the  pressure  of  those  external  Shari’a  scholars.  Internal  Shari’a 
scholars are trying to make this system more acceptable to the external 
Shari’a  scholars  in  order  to  build  consensus.  We  are  more  careful 
because  we  suspect  the  documents  can  reach  the  external  Shari’a 
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Officer, Case II) 
Managers,  on  the  other  hand,  face  very  little  pressure  from  external  Shari’a 
scholars because they do not belong to the concerned party. Their exposure to 
such  pressures  is  also  very  low  and  that  is  why  this  pressure  does  not  affect 
management’  reputation  considerably  because  they  are  not  the  ones  issuing 
Shari’a compliance certifications. However, they are fairly sensitive to this pressure 
because it can greatly affect the whole industry. This pressure has a fairly positive 
impact  on  management’  behaviour  and  consequently  they  are  inclined  to 
cooperate with international Shari’a scholars. 
5.2.14  Regulatory Controls 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Regulatory Pressure 
Intensity  High/Low 
Exposure  High/Low 
Reputation Risk  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Positive Impact  High/Low 
Negative Impact  High/Low 
 
Existence of regulatory pressure and a need for such pressure in cases where it did 
not exist was evident from the very first few interviews. The code was saturated 
through constant comparison of incidents (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998) in the following interviews.  
 
The  Islamic  finance  industry  has  seen  increasing  regulations  with  its  rapid 
developments. A number of countries have set up separate regulatory departments 
for IFIs in their central banks. The purpose of the regulatory bodies is to promote 
Islamic  banking  in  a  sustainable  way  and  ensure  better  Shari’a  compliance. 
Therefore,  the  intensity  of  the  regulatory  pressure  is  mainly  against  the 
management.  The  exposure  of  management  to  this  pressure  is  also  very  high 
because regulators have access to all their details. Noncompliance with regulations 
is  obviously  a  high  reputation  threat  to  the  banks  and  therefore  management 
abides by the regulatory requirements. Therefore, Islamic banks’ management is 
highly sensitive to regulatory pressure, which results in a positive impact towards 
better Shari’a compliance.  
 
 “We  have  our  own  Shari’a  board  which  has the  power  to  determine 
Shari’a compliance of products and its decision cannot be challenged. 
At the institutional level, we require all the institutions to appoint, with 
the approval of the SBP, a Shari’a advisor based on our ‘proper and fit’ Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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criteria……..  Our  Shari’a  board  also  conducts  Shari’a  compliance 
inspections  of  Islamic  banks  as  part  of  our  regulatory 
inspections……..we  have  ensured  the  independence  of  Shari’a 
advisor……So  we  provide  proper  protection  to  the  Shari’a  advisors 
otherwise they can be subject to management’s pressure.” (Additional 
Director, Regulator) 
However, the development of the industry is also a key priority of regulators so 
they  restrict  Shari’a  scholars’  involvement  in  the  banks,  which  has  a  slightly 
negative impact on Shari’a compliance. Shari’a scholars also complain about this 
restrictive  role  of  regulators  and  consider  it  as  a  hindrance  towards  Shari’a 
compliance. 
 
“Regulator’s  role  in  the  financial  system  is  dual;  i)  to  facilitate  the 
development  of  the  industry  and  ii)  consider  its  impact  on  the 
sustainability  of  the  whole  economy.  Therefore,  we  have  adopted  a 
balanced  approach…...we  cannot  authorize  Shari’a  advisors  to  get 
involved  in  all  issues  of  bank  including  employees  and  customers’ 
rights.” (Director, Regulator) 
On the other hand, the intensity of regulatory pressure is not very high on Shari’a 
scholars as compared to management. However, they are still fully exposed to it 
and  consider  it  as  the  second  strongest  pressure  after  ‘Eternal  ’.  Furthermore, 
Shari’a scholars are also exposed to serious reputation risk if their behaviour is not 
in  conformity  with  regulations.  However,  there  are  minor  chances  that  Shari’a 
scholars would compromise on Shari’a compliance below the minimum regulatory 
requirements and therefore they are only slightly sensitive to regulatory pressure. 
Because the regulations are mostly in favour of Shari’a scholars, it gives them an 
edge that has a positive impact towards better Shari’a compliance. 
  
“Still, I can say that many people in the management are interested in 
fatwa shopping but the chances are very limited in Pakistan because 
the  regulations  of  SBP  are  very  stringent  in  this  matter.”  (Shari’a 
Research Officer, Case II) 
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5.2.15 Depositors’ Expectations 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Depositors’ 
Expectations 
Intensity  High/Low 
Exposure  High/Low 
Reputation Risk  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Positive Impact  High/Low 
Negative Impact  High/Low 
 
Incidents like ‘blind trust’, ‘responsibility to provide Halal profits for depositors’ 
etc. triggered the emergence of this code. The code was saturated by constantly 
comparing incidents (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998).  
 
Religion’s influence in Muslim communities is so strong that it has mingled into 
the  cultural  norms.  Therefore,  Shari’a  scholars  are  highly  respected  in  those 
communities and their views, whether on spiritual or worldly matters, are highly 
regarded because of their religious knowledge and devotion to it. Thus, Islamic 
banks’  depositors  have  a  blind  trust  in  the  integrity  of  Shari’a  scholars.  They 
expect Shari’a scholars’ presence in Islamic banks ensures Shari’a compliance and 
the  achievement  of  ‘Shari’a  Objectives’.  Thus,  the  presence  of  a  high-market-
stature Shari’a scholar in Islamic banks boosts depositors’ confidence. This blind 
trust  of  depositors  builds  a  potential  pressure  on  Shari’a  scholars  to  be  more 
meticulous on Shari’a matters. 
 
Shari’a scholars’ are exposed to a medium-level intensity of depositors’ pressure 
because depositors as common folk are not aware of the intricacies of banking 
operations and the corresponding Shari’a principles. They, rather, have a strong 
belief or faith that Shari’a scholars’ presence in Islamic banks makes them Shari’a 
compliant. If depositors become aware of any Shari’a-repugnant decisions issued 
by Shari’a scholars, it can have grave consequences on Shari’a scholars and banks’ 
reputations. Another reason for Shari’a scholars’ sensitivity to depositors’ pressure 
is the fact that they take responsibility of providing Halal banking services to all 
customers. Any carelessness in this regard will lead to their accountability in the 
hereafter according to the Hadith that, “he who introduces some evil practice in 
Islam which is subsequently followed (by others) would be required to bear the 
burden of those who followed this (evil practice) without theirs’ being diminished 
in  any  respect”  (Sahih  Muslim:  6466).  Therefore,  Shari’a  scholars  are  highly 
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issue  and  would  step  up  to  resolve  employees’  grievances  brought  to  their 
attention.  Still,  they  refrain  from  proactive  involvement  in  administrative  issues. 
When  any  dispute  is  brought  to  the  notice  of  Shari’a  scholars,  they  would 
recommend  a  course  of  action  to  the  top  management  if  they  feel  a  certain 
employee has been dealt with unfairly. In most cases, management respects this 
recommendation  and  the  grievances  are  resolved  accordingly.  However, 
management can reject the recommendation because of its non-binding nature. 
Thus, some Shari’a scholars would prefer avoiding proactive involvement in such 
issues in order to escape humiliation.  
 
“Employees do have expectations from us but our involvement is very 
limited  in  that  area.  We  should  have  a  say  in  Human  Resource  (HR) 
practices in order to go one step further towards Shari’a compliance 
[objectives].” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
“Employees  and  customers  have  more  expectations  from  Shari’a 
scholars  but,  you  know…their  authority  is  limited.”  (Head  of 
Investments, Case III) 
Regulators have given Shari’a scholars full authority in other areas  e.g. product 
approval  which  can  be  capitalized  by  Shari’a  scholars  to  force  management  to 
ensure a considerable level of ‘Fairness and Justice’ with all stakeholders including 
employees.  
 
 “Regarding the expectations of depositors, customers and employees, I 
would say Shari’a advisors are not aware of the safeguards we have 
given them against the management. They have got powers but they 
may not know about it.” (Additional Director, Regulator) 
Though managers deal with employees’ issues, the formalized procedures reduce 
‘employees’ pressure’ on them and thus they are not much sensitive to it. At the 
end, employees’ pressure plays some role in promoting better Shari’a compliance 
within Islamic banks. 
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5.2.17  Internal Shari’a Scholars’ Pressure 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Internal Shari’a 
Scholars’ Pressure 
Intensity  High/Low 
Exposure  High/Low 
Reputation Risk  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Positive Impact  High/Low 
Negative Impact  High/Low 
 
Shari’a scholars that are associated with Islamic banking industry are categorized 
as internal for the purpose of this study. A number of Shari’a scholars work across 
different Islamic banks who share their developments at different forums, which 
increases  their  awareness  of  developments  taking  place  across  banks  and 
countries. Hence, Shari’a scholars are sensitive to the potential condemnation from 
other internal Shari’a scholars in case of compromises on Shari’a within their own 
banks.  As  a  result,  Shari’a  scholars  are  more  stringent  in  their  decisions  and 
scrutiny.  However,  the  relationship  between  internal  Shari’a  scholars  also  has  a 
different and a friendly face. They have a profound respect for their predecessors, 
teachers and colleagues. Thus, Shari’a verdicts issued by other Shari’a scholars are 
recognized as such even if one might not fully agree with them.  
 
Though there is only a medium-level intensity of this pressure on Shari’a scholars, 
the exposure is very high because they know about the developments taking place 
in  the  industry.  However,  the  potential  reputation  risk  is  not  extremely  high  as 
internal Shari’a scholars are not inclined to expose each other. Still the reputation 
risk  is  significant  and  there  is  a  significant  level  of  sensitivity  amongst  Shari’a 
scholars to this pressure. The positive impact of this pressure on Shari’a scholars 
is that it leads to better Shari’a compliance and harmonization across institutions 
and countries but the downside is that it increases stagnation in the industry by 
hindering new research and developments. 
 
“Peer pressure does exist but it is positive in the sense that a wrong 
decision  can  create  condemnation  from  other  peers  while  it  is 
negative  in  the  sense  that  the  Shari’a  scholars  often  do  not  reject 
their  teachers’  point  of  view  even  if  they  feel  it  is  wrong.  This  is 
because  of  the  tremendous  respect  Shari’a  scholars  have  for  their 
teachers.  This  aspect  hinders  innovation  and  research  in  the  field. 
However,  it  is  a  way  towards  greater  harmonization.”  (Shari’a 
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 “The issue of peer pressure is negative and positive at the same time. 
The Shari’a advisors are compelled to follow the big names (renowned 
Shari’a scholars). If their opinion is in line with the big names, they 
are happy but they are frustrated if this is not the case.” (Director 
and Joint Director, Regulator) 
Managers, on the contrary, are not exposed to this type of peer pressure. Thus, 
their reputation is not at stake, which lead to lesser sensitivity to this pressure. 
Therefore,  its  positive  and  negative  impacts  on  management  are  also  non-
significant.  Internal  Shari’a  scholars’  pressure  has  two  fold  effects.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  promotes  a  meticulous  approach  amongst  Shari’a  scholars  and  forces 
them  to  take  decisions  that  are  more  in  line  with  Shari’a  principles  but  on  the 
other hand, it promotes stagnation as the decisions of other Shari’a scholars are 
accepted  and  respected.  This  also  paves  the  way  for  Shari’a  scholars  to 
compromise on certain Shari’a issues under pressure from management. 
5.2.18 Shari’a Reputation Risk 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Shari’a Reputation Risk 
Intensity  High/Low 
Exposure  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Positive Impact  High/Low 
Negative Impact  High/Low 
 
The  flip-flop  technique  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990, 
Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998)  was  used  to  discover  and  saturate  this  code.  For 
example,  when  it  was  discovered  that  CEOs  were  willing  to  take  action  against 
managers,  on  the  recommendation  of  Shari’a  scholars,  who  were  found  non-
cooperative with Shari’a scholars, the researcher became sensitive to the existence 
of  a  reputation  risk  to  the  bank  in  case  action  was  not  taken  against  those 
accused.  Managers  use  different  strategies  to  influence  Shari’a  scholars  for  the 
maximization  of  their  ‘Business  Objectives’.  However,  if  a  violation  of  Shari’a 
principles leaks out to the pubIic, especially the depositors, the bank’s reputation 
will  be  affected  thereby  reducing  its  market  share.  This  issue  can  become  very 
serious  when  the  Shari’a  scholars  start  whistle-blowing  regarding  the  Shari’a-
repugnant  practices  of  their  own  banks.  Therefore,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
management not to force Shari’a scholars beyond a certain extent and thus save 
their  reputation.  Shari’a  scholars  can  also  write  a  negative  review  of  certain 
managerial  practices  and  thereby  damage  managers’  personal  reputation. Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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Exposure  to  reputation  risk  is  one  reason  why  Islamic  banks  try  to  have  high-
market-stature Shari’a scholars on their Shari’a boards. 
 
“Moreover the IFIs are exposed to reputation risk and therefore they 
will rely on renowned scholars. “ (Shari’a Advisor, Case I)) 
The overall intensity of reputation risk for Islamic banks is only moderate because 
of  the  moderate  exposure  to  this  risk.  The  exposure  is  moderate  because  the 
internal concerned parties i.e. Shari’a scholars, regulators and employees are less 
likely  to  expose  any  internal  Shari’a  compliance  issue  to  the  public.  However, 
management  is  extremely  sensitive  to  this  risk  because  of  its  extreme 
consequences once exposed. The positive impact of this potential risk is that it 
makes  management  more  submissive  to  Shari’a  scholars  and  thus  Shari’a 
compliance is improved. 
 
“Sponsors are often very cautious about Shari’a compliance because 
their reputation is at stake.” (Shari’a Advisor, CASE III) 
5.2.19 Organizational Legitimacy 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Organizational 
Legitimacy 
Shari'a Objectives  High/Low 
Profitability  High/Low 
Regulatory Pressure  High/Low 
Other Stakeholders' Pressure  High/Low 
 
When  it  was  starting  to  emerge  that  Shari’a  and  business  objectives  were 
potentially conflicting, the research became  more sensitive (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998)  to  find  whether 
managers took Shari’a scholars on board for seeking their genuine guidance on 
Shari’a  issues  or  just  for  seeking  legitimacy  for  their  banks.  It  was  found  that 
organizational legitimacy was a key factor for managers to have Shari’a scholars 
on board and accept their verdicts even if they were against business objectives at 
times.  
 
Islamic banks, as the name suggests, are financial institutions that are supposed 
to adhere to Shari’a principles in their operations. Therefore, Shari’a compliance is 
the  one  and  only  factor  that  gives  Islamic  banks  the  necessary  organizational 
legitimacy. Regulators exert a significant pressure on Islamic banks’ management 
to comply with the Shari’a requirements stipulated by Shari’a scholars in order to 
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extreme pressure for organizational legitimacy comes from other stakeholders i.e. 
external Shari’a scholars, depositors and the public. 
 
“The main reason for establishing an Islamic bank is to safeguard the 
Muslims  from  indulging  in  Shari’a-repugnant  transactions, 
particularly, in their financial arrangements.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case 
II) 
As  the  Shari’a  scholars  grant  organizational  legitimacy  to  Islamic  banks, 
management give the necessary weight to Shari’a scholars’ opinions and become 
submissive. However, managers are not concerned with actual Shari’a compliance 
of the bank. Rather they seek only a clearance from Shari’a scholars in order to 
legitimize  their  products  and  services.  Islamic  banks’  products  and  services  are 
considered  legitimate  so  long  as  Shari’a  scholars  approve  them.  Therefore, 
managers would even pressurize Shari’a scholars to get this clearance or Shari’a 
certification. 
 
“Shari’a noncompliance does not have direct financial consequences 
for the bank if it is approved by the Shari’a advisor. Therefore, the 
management is often in the struggle of convincing the Shari’a advisor 
to approve such proposals. The CEO often asks the Shari’a advisor to 
‘find ways’ to launch new products.” (Head of Risk Management, Case 
I) 
5.2.20  Firing Threat 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Firing Threat 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Protections  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Impact  High/Low 
 
This code emerged first in an interview with a Shari’a scholar. However, it is not 
in-vivo  code  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and 
Corbin,  1998)  as  the  exact  words  he  used  were  ‘they  even  threaten  our  jobs’. 
Therefore, the given name has been abstracted to make it concise.  
 
Managers  sometimes  become  furious  if  Shari’a  scholars  reject  their  proposals 
because  of  some  Shari’a  concerns.  In  this  scenario,  management  often  exert 
pressure on Shari’a scholars to make them lenient on Shari’a matters and approve 
their structures. Threatening to fire Shari’a scholars is one type of such pressures. 
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“They even threaten our jobs! Once the bank asked me to consider a 
structure, which I found repugnant to Shari’a, and I rejected it. Then I 
got a phone call from the president saying, ‘I need you to approve the 
structure. I will call you after 5 minutes and I need a positive answer 
otherwise  I  will  take  my  action.’  I  told  him,  ‘What  action  are  you 
taking  after  5  minutes?  You  can  take that  action  now  because  my 
answer will be the same after 5 minutes. Are you going to fire me? I 
have  got  offer  letters  from  other  banks  in  my  drawer.’”  (Shari’a 
Advisor, Case II) 
Though  the  firing  threat  is  quite  significant  but  Shari’a  scholars  are  highly 
protected by regulators and therefore, they are not very sensitive to this threat. 
The  regulatory  protections  include;  i)  a  fixed  term  of  appointment,  ii)  ability  to 
report  conflicts  to  regulators  and  iii)  a  serious  disciplinary  reason  provided  by 
management for firing Shari’a scholars. The sensitivity of Shari’a scholars to firing 
threat is also decreased by the fact that there is a scarcity of Shari’a scholars in the 
market.  Additionally,  management  is  aware  that  Shari’a  scholars  can  issue  a 
verdict against their banks if they are fired for their strict adherence to Shari’a. 
Such  a  verdict  can  result  in  a  complete  collapse  of  the  bank.  Thus  the 
management’ firing threat is not a very useful pressure tool to be used against 
Shari’a scholars.  
 
“……Shari’a  advisors’  term  of  appointment  is  at  least  three 
years……they  cannot  be  prosecuted  if  they  give  some  adverse 
ruling……they  are  also  authorized  to  make  complaints  to  the 
regulator.  So  we  provide  proper  protection  to  the  Shari’a  advisor 
otherwise they can be subject to management’s pressure.” (Additional 
Director, Regulator) 
However, some Shari’a scholars may still give up at times but the majority do not 
easily yield to this threat and deny approving structures that they think are against 
the Shari’a principles.  
5.2.21 Closure Threat 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Closure Threat 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Protections  High/Low 
Sensitivity  High/Low 
Impact  High/Low 
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This  code  is  also  in-vivo  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
In case of serious conflicts with Shari’a scholars, management can threaten to wind 
up the Islamic banking business. This threat is more serious in banks that are not 
fully  Islamic  but  operate  Islamic  banking  windows.  Such  banks  view  Islamic 
banking as a kind of investment project and would be ready to wind it up if it 
ceases to be profitable. 
  
“…they  [management]  sometimes  push  us  to  approve  certain 
structures. They even threaten to stop the Islamic banking operations 
of the bank.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
Shari’a scholars feel a moderate level of intensity of this threat but there are no 
regulatory protections to them in this case as the management are free to take the 
closure decision. However, it is less likely that management would actually close 
Islamic  banking  because  of  stringent  Shari’a  scholars  and  therefore,  Shari’a 
scholars are only moderately sensitive to this threat. Still Shari’a scholars want a 
sustainable  and  gradual  development  of  Islamic  banking;  they  may  sometimes 
yield  to  this  threat  and  approve  products  that  are  not  Shari’a  compliant.  Such 
products are mostly approved by a consensus amongst Shari’a scholars so there is 
little pressure from the internal community of Shari’a scholars. 
5.2.22  Appointment of Shari’a Scholars 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Appointment of Shari’a 
Scholars 
Role of Regulator or General Body  High/Low 
Role of Bankers  High/Low 
Role of Existing Shari'a Scholars  High/Low 
Overall Independence  High/Low 
 
This  code  emerged  through  constant  comparison  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In countries where there is a 
central  governance  mechanism  for  Islamic  banks,  the  regulators  lay  down  the 
procedures  for  the  appointment  of  Shari’a  scholars,  their  tenure  and  dismissal 
procedures.  For  example  in  Pakistan,  Shari’a  advisors  are  nominated  by  the 
management and then approved by the central bank. The approval by the central 
bank  is  to  ensure  Shari’a  scholars  meet  the  minimum  competence  and  are 
independent. In other countries where a central regulatory mechanism  is not in 
place, Shari’a  scholars are nominated  by the management and approved by  the 
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the  general  body.  This  appointment  procedure  enhances  Shari’a  scholars’ 
independence from the managers' undue influence.  
 
“As  part  of  our  regulatory  framework,  we  have  ensured  the 
independence  of  Shari’a  advisor.  For  example  his  term  of 
appointment is at least three years, he is appointed by the BoD after 
our approval.” (Additional Director, Regulator) 
“It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  BoD  nominates  Shari’a  board 
members and shareholders approve this nomination” (Head of Shari’a 
Dept., Case III) 
However, management can nominate the kind of person they would like to have 
and  get  him/her  approved  by  the  regulator  or  general  body.  Similarly,  in  non-
regulated countries e.g. UAE, it is not a requirement for banks to follow a certain 
procedure in appointing and dismissing Shari’a scholars.  
 
“…banks  would like to have lenient Shari’a  advisors at the time of 
appointment.” (Head of Islamic Banking Dept., Case II) 
“Fatwa  shopping  happens  when  there  is  no  centralized  system  of 
governance and the institutions appoint their Shari’a committees or 
appoint a Shari’a consultant. Then they get a fatwa which suits their 
interests.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case I)) 
In some constituencies, it is not compulsory on management to appoint full-time 
Shari’a  scholars.  In  that  case,  management  hires  the  services  of  Shari’a 
consultancies on case-to-case bases. Different Shari’a consultancies compete with 
each other for business objectives and it becomes much easier for management to 
shop around for a fatwa that meets their needs. Thus, management can nominate 
a Shari’a scholar who is lenient and does not create much trouble for them. 
  
“Fatwa  shopping  is  impossible  in  banks  where  there  is  a  full-time 
Shari’a  advisor;  however,  there  are  chances  of  fatwa  shopping  in 
banks  that  hire  the  services  of  Shari’a  advisory  firms.  Such  banks 
may look for lenient Shari’a advisors. Such banks also try to avoid 
Shari’a boards and Shari’a audits.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
Thus, regulators general bodies have a moderate role, if any, in the appointment 
of Shari’a scholars while the role of management is significant. However, a pre-
existing Shari’a department of Shari’a board always plays a significant role in the 
appointment of new Shari’a scholars and thereby balancing the management’ role. 
Overall, the independence of Shari’a scholars can be ranked as moderate due to 
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5.2.23 Avoiding Shari’a Board 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Avoiding Shari’a Board 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Requirement  High/Low 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a Advisors  High/Low 
Effect on Business Objectives  High/Low 
Effect on Legitimacy  High/Low 
 
This  is  an  important  code  but  the  concept  was  not  mentioned  directly  by  the 
respondents. Rather the discovery of this code was done looking at the language 
and  emotions  of  respondents  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008).  Shari’a  board  is  an 
independent body of Shari’a scholars that oversees Islamic banks’ operations and 
manage  their  Shari’a  departments.  Shari’a  scholars  use  the  Shari’a  board  as  an 
advantage  to  counter  managers’  pressure.  For  example,  he/she  can  forward 
certain  issues  to  the  Shari’a  board  in  case  of  pressure  from  management.  The 
decision  of  the  Shari’a  board  is  binding  on  management,  which  reduces  the 
tension  of  the  Shari’a  scholars.  Therefore,  some  banks  would  prefer  to  avoid 
having a Shari’a board in order to minimize Shari’a scholars’ influence.  
 
“Our Shari’a board is not the same [as strong as it was before]; it has 
been changed… Shari’a board is not compulsory for Islamic banks in 
our country that’s why banks are not interested in the formation of 
their own Shari’a boards.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Given  that  the  Shari’a  board  is  much  stronger  than  “other  types  of  supervision 
such  as  Shari’a  consulting  firms  and  Shari’a  advisors”  (Garas  and  Pierce,  2010, 
p.386) and that it is not a mandatory requirement on banks, management feels 
moderate  intensity  for  avoiding  it  because  the  Shari’a  board  increases  the 
legitimacy  and  credibility  of  the  banks  amongst  their  stakeholders  especially 
depositors. Therefore it is more likely for management, in our cases, to reduce the 
involvement of Shari’a board e.g. reduce the number of annual meetings rather 
than abandoning it. Management would also reduce Shari’a board’s influence by 
selecting lenient Shari’a scholars onto the board. 
 
Ultimately, managers’ have incentives in avoiding a powerful Shari’a board. It is the 
responsibility of regulators to make sure proper Shari’a supervisions are in place in 
every Islamic bank.  
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“This [avoiding  Shari’a  Board  (SB)]  is  happening  due to the  lack  or 
regulations that should be imposed by regulatory bodies.” (Head of 
Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.2.24  Authority of Shari’a Scholars 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Authority of Shari’a 
Scholars 
Product Approval  High/Low 
Employees' Issues  High/Low 
Depositors' Issues  High/Low 
Other areas  High/Low 
 
This code was also a result of the constant comparison tool (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998)  where  incidents  of 
Shari’a  scholars’  authority  in  different  areas  were  noted  and  saturated.  The 
purpose of Shari’a scholars’ appointment into the banks is to make them Shari’a 
compliant and achieve Shari’a objectives. However, Shari’a scholars are authorized 
only  to  approve  or  disapprove  products  from  the  Shari’a  point  of  view.  This 
authority  is  full  and  final  in  product  approval  but  it  does  not  extend  to  other 
matters of the bank. In some cases, Shari’a scholars are even not aware of how 
their approved products are actually implemented. Thus, Shari’a scholars are kept 
completely away from administrative and operational matters. However, they feel a 
sense of responsibility to protect depositors and employee interests and make all 
aspects of the banks Shari’a compliant in order to achieve Shari’a objectives but 
management and regulators argue that authorizing Shari’a scholars to have a say 
in all matters of the bank would distort the whole system.  
 
“…It  [regulator]  has  restricted  the  Shari’a  scholars’  role  in  the 
general affairs of the bank. For example, depositors and employees 
expect  us  to  protect  their  rights  but  we  are  not  allowed  to  get 
involved in such affairs. Shari’a advisors’ role is very limited while 
they need to get involved in each and every aspect of the organization 
in order to make it fully Shari’a compliant.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
“It  is  not  right  to  give  Shari’a  advisors  the  authority  to  deal  with 
employees’  issues  but  they  can  use  their  influence  if  they  want.” 
(Head of Islamic Banking, Case II) 
Thus, Shari’a scholars have ultimate authority in product approval but have only 
slight  informal  authority  in  areas  concerning  employees  and  depositors’  rights. 
Shari’a scholars are not authorized to have a say in all other administrative areas. 
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“Employees  and  customers  have  more  expectations  from  Shari’a 
scholars  while  their  authorities  are  limited.”  (Head  of  Investments, 
Case III) 
 “Our  Shari’a  board  is  completely  out  of  the  administrative 
matters…the  Terms  of  Reference  (TOR)  of  the  Shari’a  board  and 
Shari’a committee states that they will not have any involvement in 
administrative matters.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
This scenario gives management the advantage to use Shari’a scholars only as a 
Shari’a certification authority while maintaining a space for them in other areas; 
even in the operationalization of those Shari’a certifications. It appears as if the 
authority  of  Shari’a  scholars  is  systematically  reduced  despite  the  increasing 
regulations and standardization.  
 
“Earlier  Sharia  Boards  were  involved  in  all  matters  in  the  bank. 
Management  orientation  to  control  over  all  matters  besides  Sharia 
Boards’ vulnerability created the current situation.” (Head of Shari’a 
Dept., Case III) 
5.2.25  Involvement of Shari’a Scholars 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Involvement of Shari’a 
Scholars 
Product Approval  High/Low 
Employees' Issues  High/Low 
Depositors' Issues  High/Low 
Other areas  High/Low 
 
Saturated  through  constant  comparison,  involvement  of  Shari’a  scholars  is 
essentially an in-vivo (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss 
and  Corbin,  1998)  code  that  emerged  through  interviews  with  Shari’a  scholars, 
managers  and  regulators.  Besides  limiting  Shari’a  scholars’  authority  to  the 
product  approval  level  only,  management  also  tries  to  limit  their  level  of 
involvement in administrative matters of the banks where Shari’a scholars do not 
have descriptive authority but might be able to influence certain things. Therefore, 
much of the managerial aspects that might be conflicting with Shari’a objectives 
are not brought to the attention of Shari’a scholars.  
 
Because of their full authority in product approvals, Shari’a scholars’ involvement 
is very deep in this area. They can ask for any possible detail regard any product 
they  are  approving.  However,  managers  have  controlled  their  involvements  in 
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However, Shari’a scholars use their ultimate authority and involvement in product 
approvals to expand their involvement in other areas. 
 
“…we don’t have the powers and involvements to protect depositors’ 
rights…Employees have expectations from us but our involvement is 
very limited in that area. We should have a say in HR practices in 
order  to  go  one  step  further  towards  Shari’a  objectives.  ”  (Shari’a 
Advisor, Case II) 
“But  we  are  not  allowed  to  have  a  say  in  this  [profit  sharing  with 
depositors] because the perceived role a Shari’a committee is only the 
approval of products from a Shari’a point of view. They say that the 
profit-and-loss  distribution  is  a  management’  issue  and  is  not 
concerned  with  Shari’a  …I  think  this  is  also  the  responsibility  of 
Shari’a  advisors  and  Shari’a  boards  to  safeguard  the  customers 
whether depositors or clients…” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Consequently,  managers  predominantly  control  Shari’a  scholars’  involvement  in 
the banks collective affairs, which in turn makes it difficult for Shari’a scholars to 
achieve Shari’a objectives. 
5.2.26 Avoiding Shari’a Audit 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Avoiding Shari’a Audit 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Requirement for SA  High/Low 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a Advisors  High/Low 
Effect on Business Objectives  High/Low 
 
Shari’a  scholars  approve  new  structures  before  they  are  launched  and  bank’s 
compliance with the approved structures is later on verified through a Shari’a audit 
conducted by Shari’a scholars and regulators. Transactions that are found, during 
Shari’a audit, to be in violation of the initial approved structures are nullified and 
the corresponding profits given to charity. Because this hinders the achievement of 
business objectives, management is always keen on avoiding such circumstances. 
One way to escape from the nullification of transactions is to avoid Shari’a audit 
wherever possible.  
 
“Once  we  had  a  discussion  about  the  danger  surrounding  Islamic 
banking and finance industry and I was asked where the danger is? I 
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Shari’a  control  [Audit]  divisions;  they  want  some  space!”  (Head  of 
Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
Avoiding Shari’a audit moderately controls Shari’a scholars influence and leads to 
better achievement of business objectives, at least in the short run. Therefore, the 
management’s  tendency  to  avoid  Shari’a  audit  is  quite  intense.  However,  it  is 
relatively difficult in banks with formal regulatory controls and/or stronger Shari’a 
boards. Avoiding Shari’a audit is a sort of insulation of managerial practices from 
Shari’a  scholars.  If  management  succeeds  in  avoiding  a  formal  Shari’a  audit  of 
their transaction, they would save large sums of money from Shari’a-repugnant 
transactions that would otherwise have ended in charity funds.  
 
“Without Sharia Audit, Sharia Board will never know to which extend 
the  bank  is  following  their  resolutions.  This  is  the  Sharia  Board 
responsibility to compel the banks’ management to appoint a Sharia 
Controller, but some boards do not force that. If you look at the title 
of the Sharia Board “Fatwa and Sharia Supervisory Board” you find, 
its members are concerned about the fatwa part and supervising the 
implementation part. To conduct audits of their verdicts requires a 
resident controller and Sharia department that report to them, since 
the  board  is  a  consultancy  and  independent  body.  Sharia 
department’s reports give the Sharia Board the idea about to which 
extends the bank followed the Sharia principles and rules.” (Head of 
Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.2.27  Avoiding Full-time Shari’a Scholars 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Avoiding Full-time 
Shari’a Scholars 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Requirement  High/Low 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a Advisors  High/Low 
Effect on Business Objectives  High/Low 
 
This  code  was  discovered  by  constant  comparison  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998) of events for similarities and 
differences. The regulatory requirement on Islamic banks in some countries is to 
have at least one Shari’a scholar as an expert advisor. Though banks appoint a 
Shari’a scholar according to regulatory requirements, they give him/her liberty of 
choosing his/her time commitments. This gives Shari’a scholars the incentive to 
seek other engagements and enjoy their honorary positions in the banks. Some 
Shari’a scholars, therefore, visit the banks only once a week for just a few hours 
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managers  the  opportunity  to  misrepresent  some  information  and  avoid  strict 
Shari’a checks on their proposed investment structures.  
 
“One major issue is the time commitment by the Shari’a advisors to 
their banks. Most of them engage themselves side activities and are 
not giving full-time commitment to their banks. They are doing just a 
part-time job in the banks.” (Deputy Director, Regulator) 
“In [country], Shari’a advisors are not required to work full-time in 
the bank so they have other side jobs and come just once a week to 
the bank. It is completely impossible for a Shari’a advisor to read all 
the  documentation  during  this  time  commitment  and  there  are 
enormous  chances  that  they  will  just  sign  the  documents  without 
reading  them.  This  gives  management  the  opportunity  to 
misrepresent information.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
Because full-time commitment is not a regulatory requirement in some countries, 
managers are moderately inclined to give a freedom to Shari’a scholars to choose 
their working hours. It gives managers the opportunity to avoid strict checks and 
balances  from  Shari’a  scholars.  It  also  makes  misrepresentation  very  easy  for 
management to commit.  
 
Additionally, in countries, where having a Shari’a board/advisor is not a regulatory 
requirement, some Islamic banks are turning towards Shari’a consultancies to seek 
Shari’a certification for the products of their choice. This raises serious questions 
on the authenticity of those fatwas because Shari’a consultancy firms are business 
entities after all.  
 
“Worth mentioning the recent trend that some of the Sharia scholars 
are  establishing  their  own  firms  that  provide  Shari  consultancy. 
Seeking  more  lawful  income  is  Halal  but  this  leads  to  conflict  of 
interest in particular cases. I have some examples in this concern.” 
(Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.2.28  Fatwa Shopping 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Fatwa Shopping 
Intensity  High/Low 
Regulatory Requirement  High/Low 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a Advisors  High/Low 
Effect on Business Objectives  High/Low 
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Though fatwa shopping could be an effective tool for controlling Shari’a scholars 
and  achieving  business  objectives,  management  in  our  cases  does  not  feel  the 
need  for  shopping-around  for  it  because  of  having  own  Shari’a  boards  and 
departments. 
5.2.29  Punitive Actions against Management 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Punitive Actions 
Against Management 
Frequency  High/Low 
Regulatory Authority  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
Potential Effect  High/Low 
 
This code was discovered through constant comparison (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It is important for managers 
to get their proposed structures approved from Shari’a scholars quickly. In order 
to  avoid  undesirable  delay  and  possible  rejection  by  the  Shari’a  scholars,  some 
managers might technically twist some pieces of information and present them in 
a form that is more likely to be approved by the Shari’a scholars. Managers do so 
because  i)  they  have  business  targets  to  meet  and  ii)  they  are  not  spiritually 
committed  enough  to  Shari’a  compliance.  If  the  Shari’a  scholars  either  before 
approval  or  during  Shari’a  audits  trace  such  misrepresentation,  they  can 
recommend  punitive  actions  e.g.  stopping  promotion  or  even  dismissal  against 
those responsible. Though Shari’a scholars are not authorized to take such actions 
against  managers,  their  recommendations  are  mostly  implemented  in  order  to 
stop  them  from  taking  further  actions.  Therefore,  management  recognizes  this 
potential risk while dealing with Shari’a scholars.  
 
“I can’t give you examples but it happened in some institutions where 
individual  managers  intentionally  misrepresented  information  and 
the Shari’a board consequently asked the CEO to dismiss them. It did 
and will happen.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case I) 
Though the frequency of such punitive actions taken against management is low, 
their  implementation  is  significant  in  the  case  of  strong  recommendation  from 
Shari’a scholars. Therefore, managers consider it a potential threat to their career 
and are careful in committing any misrepresentation.  
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5.2.31  Complaints to Regulators/General Body 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Complaints to 
Regulators/General 
Body 
Frequency  High/Low 
Regulatory Authority  High/Low 
Implementation  High/Low 
Potential Effect  High/Low 
 
The discovery of this code was also done through constant comparison of similar 
events across a range or respondent interviews (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Shari’a scholars normally report to 
BoD,  thereby  bypassing  the  managers  with  whom  they  have  their  routine 
interactions. In some institutions, e.g. our Case I, the Shari’a board even bypasses 
the BoD and reports directly to the general body. However, in other institutions, 
like our Case II, the Shari’a board reports to both the BoD and the general body, as 
well as to the regulators. This peculiar reporting line gives extra power to Shari’a 
scholars.  They  can  report  on  the  management’s  behaviour  to  the  regulators, 
shareholders and even publish their concerns in the banks’ annual reports.  
 
“[Case I] is the first Islamic bank in the world and our Sharia board is 
very  strong…our  Shari’a  board  is  more  powerful  than  the  BoD.” 
(Head of CSR, Case I) 
“Shari’a advisors’ authority in Pakistani banks is more than that of 
management” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
“If any dispute arises between BoD and the Sharia board in terms of 
decisions or fatwas, an extraordinary general body meeting shall be 
called to settle it. So both boards are reporting to shareholder.” (Head 
of Shari’a Department, Case III) 
Though  Shari’a  scholars  have  full  authority  to  report  their  concerns  to  the 
regulators and shareholders, the actual frequency of such reporting is low. Still, 
this authority of Shari’a scholars is a strong force against managers. Therefore the 
resulting  impact  is  significant  in  favour  of  Shari’a  scholars  and  hence  Shari’a 
compliance. 
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the  frequency  and  intensity  of  their  reactive  approach  is  very  low.  Therefore, 
management moderately accommodates the reactive recommendations of Shari’a 
scholars.  
5.2.33  Excuse of Primitiveness 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Excuses of 
Primitiveness 
Frequency  High/Low 
Intensity  High/Low 
 
Incidents  and  events  noticed  in  interviews  with  Shari’a  scholars  lead  to  the 
development  of  this  code  through  constant  comparison  with  other  interviews 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
 
Some Shari’a scholars allow the banks to conduct Shari’a-repugnant practices on 
the  pretext  of  the  early  stage  of  Islamic  banking  industry  where  things  are 
expected to be imperfect. They argue  such practices would gradually  disappear 
and  the  industry  would  become  fully  Shari’a  compliant.  Though  some  of  the 
practices  have  gradually  been  minimized  with  the  passage  of  time  (e.g.  the 
elimination of Tawarruq in Pakistan), others have become the norm in the industry 
(e.g.  the predominant presence  of Murabahah).  These excuses are normally not 
used individually rather the whole Shari’a scholars’ community in a country allows 
such things to happen while the same excuse might not be acceptable in other 
jurisdictions. Individual Shari’a scholars under the management pressure also use 
the excuses on a small scale.  
 
“…You always have to keep in mind that IFIs are still in their early 
stage…they have not reached the level where they should be. There 
are many things that should be done but we are not doing them right 
now.” (Head of Islamic Banking, Case II) 
The  frequency  of  using  primitiveness  excuses  by  Shari’a  scholars  is  very  high 
though the intensity is very low because they themselves do not feel comfortable 
with such excuses. The excuses are predominantly used to absorb management 
pressure and resort to compromises on certain Shari’a aspects. 
 
“I believe the scholars shouldn’t allow any product that is repugnant 
to  Sharia  on  the  basis  of  primitiveness.  Some  scholars  find  ‘other 
ways’  to  approve  non-Sharia  complaint  product.”  (Head  of  Shari’a 
Dept., Case III) 
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5.2.34  Juristic Ruses and Fatwa Manufacturing 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Juristic Ruses and 
Fatwa Manufacturing 
Frequency  High/Low 
Level  High/Low 
 
The use of the term ‘Fatwa Manufacturing’ was first noticed in an informal talk 
with  a  researcher  in  the  field  of  Islamic  finance.  The  research  was  not  initially 
convinced  with  this  phenomenon.  However,  a  red  flag  was  waved  (Corbin  and 
Strauss, 2008)at this point because not doing so could bring in bias to the study. 
The  phenomenon  was  then  traced  in  the  following  interviews  through  constant 
comparison  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and 
Corbin, 1998) and it was found that fatwa manufacturing existed. However, the 
names used were different. So, in fact the code is in-vivo. It also triggered the 
identification of another code called fatwa shopping through the use of flip-flop 
technique  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and 
Corbin,  1998).  Islamic  banks’  managers  are  always  keen  on  issuing  banking 
products  competitive  with  the  conventional  industry.  Such  products  might  have 
minor  or  serious  Shari’a  compliance  issues.  Some  Shari’a  scholars  especially  in 
banks that hire Shari’a consultants might approve such products by finding ways 
through documentations or other means. This practice is referred to as the use of 
juristic ruses. In some cases, the juristic ruses can be justified from the Shari’a 
point of view but the scholars would have not used them had they been pressure-
free.  The  extreme  use  of  juristic  ruses  can  be  termed  as  fatwa  manufacturing 
where the fatwa is manufactured with least evidence from Shari’a sources. 
 
“I  have  not  observed  any  case  of  fatwa  manufacturing  over  the 
course of my employment but there might be some Shari’a scholars 
who are lenient in their approach. They may try to find Hillas [juristic 
ruses] for certain structures when under pressure from management. 
However,  this  situation  is  very  rare  and  those  less  concerned  with 
their eternal life may practice it.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
The frequency of using juristic ruses in Islamic banking is significant. However, 
some ruses are strongly supported by some form Shari’a sources or evidence from 
medieval  contract  forms  while  others  are  weakly  supported.  The  weaker  the 
support for a juristic ruse the nearer it becomes to fatwa manufacturing.  
 
“The  issue  of  fatwa  manufacturing  is  not  pure  manufacturing  but 
some  Shari’a  advisors  are  more  flexible  than  others.  Some  people 
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leniency does not mean that the limits of Shari’a are crossed. This 
means he/she finds ways (Hillas) in order to develop certain products 
that management want. There are certain conditions that need to be 
met to  find  Hillas.  If  these  conditions  are  not met, Hilla  cannot  be 
found.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
When  faced  with  pressure  from  management  for  approving  their  competitive 
products, Shari’a scholars often resort to the use of juristic ruses or even fatwa 
manufacturing and thereby compromising on Shari’a objectives. 
5.2.35  Shari’a Board 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Shari’a board 
Independence  High/Low 
Regulatory Requirement  High/Low 
Stature of Members  High/Low 
Compensation  High/Low 
Power  High/Low 
 
Reference to Shari’a board was noticed in a number of interviews with manager, 
Shari’a  scholars  and  regulators.  The  constant  comparison  of  these  incidents 
(Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin, 
1998)lead to the identification of Shari’a board as a key place of refuge for Shari’a 
scholars when facing pressure from management. Though not a legal requirement 
in some countries, banks appoint a few Shari’a scholars to work as members of the 
SB  or  Shari’a  Committee  (SC)  that  meets  a  few  times.  This  body  of  jurists  is 
comparatively more independent than the in-house Shari’a scholars because the 
members are highly renowned and some even do not claim compensation for their 
services.  SB  is  normally  an  external  monitoring  body  outside  the  organizational 
hierarchy and reporting directly to the general body. However, the in-house Shari’a 
departments, normally consisting of a single Shari’a advisor who is subject to the 
frequent  dealings  with  management  and  thereby  facing  pressure,  oversees  the 
routine  banking  operations.  In  case  of  conflicts  between  the  internal  Shari’a 
scholars and management, the issue is forwarded to the SB whose decision is final 
and  binding  on  both  parties.  Thus,  the  Shari’a  advisor  capitalizes  on  the  SB’s 
power and independence to relieve the pressure they get from the managers.  
 
“The Shari’a advisor is the bank’s employee who can be pushed for 
some but his pressure is released by the Shari’a committee, especially 
the  one  that  works  without  any  compensation  and  also  includes 
strong  external  scholars.  This  is  the  main  benefit  of  the  Shari’a 
committee”. (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
 
  99   
Though  having  a  SB  is  not  a  regulatory  requirement  on  Islamic  banks  in  many 
countries including the countries where the cases under consideration exist but 
banks are inclined to have it because of the increased legitimacy it brings with it. It 
is composed of Shari’a scholars of high-market-stature and repute. In most cases, 
Shari’a  board  members  are  given  significantly  high-level  of  monetary  and  non-
monetary  compensation  but  still  some  SB  members  work  without  any 
compensation. In any case, Shari’a board is much more independent and powerful 
than the in-house Shari’a scholars and thus SB’s decisions are respected. 
 
“…our  SB  is  more  powerful  than  the  BoD  and  our  BoD  also  wants 
Shari’a  compliance  so  they  support  the  decisions  of  the  Sharia 
board.” (Head of CSR, Case I) 
The in-house Shari’a scholars utilize the independence and power of SB to counter 
managers’ pressure and undue influence. The power vacuum is intensely felt by 
Shari’a scholars of Islamic banks that do not have SBs. One Shari’a advisor from a 
different case that does not have a SB put it this way: 
 
 “…the  pressure  is  more  on  a  single  Shari’a  advisor…  I  would  be 
much  relieved  if  there  was  a  SB  because  then  the  decision  will  be 
made by consensus and it will be difficult to convince three persons 
rather than one.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case III) 
5.2.36  Central Shari’a Board (CSB) 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Central Shari’a Board 
Stature of Members  High/Low 
Compensation  High/Low 
Independence  High/Low 
Power  High/Low 
Support to Shari'a Scholars  High/Low 
 
CSB  has  been  referred  to  by  respondents  using  different  names  e.g.  ‘central 
board’, ‘central Shari’a board’ and ‘central Shari’a committee’. These incidents and 
their use in proper context was used through constant comparison (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to identify CSB 
as a final place of refuge for Shari’a scholars when pressure from managers is very 
high.  
 
Some jurisdictions have CSBs at the central banks that set countrywide regulatory 
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5.2.37  Shari’a Advisory Forum 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Shari’a Advisory Forum 
Regulatory Support  High/Low 
Stature of Members  High/Low 
Compensation  High/Low 
Independence  High/Low 
Power  High/Low 
 
The use of Shari’a supervisory forum as a place for sharing ideas and diffusing 
managers’  pressure  by  Shari’a  scholars  was  identified  through  constant 
comparison  (Corbin  and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and 
Corbin, 1998). Shari’a scholars often set an informal Shari’a Advisory Forum (SAF), 
which is also supported and facilitated by the CSB in case it exists in the country. 
Emerging  issues  related  to  Shari’a  compliance  are  discussed  in  SAF  and 
recommendations given. Individual Shari’a scholars use the forum as a platform 
for  raising  conflicts  they  face  with  managers.  Though  its  decisions  and 
recommendations are not legally binding on Islamic banks, it is more likely they 
will be enforced by CSBs if strongly recommended by SAF. 
 
“I  would  say  Shari’a  advisors  are  not  aware  of  the  safeguards  we 
have  given  them  against  the  management  though  we  regularly 
interact with them via the SAF.” (Additional Director, Regulator)  
“…the  Shari’a  scholars  set  up  a  committee  where  they  meet  and 
discuss  certain  issues  and  then  send  their  recommendations  to  all 
Shari’a boards and the CEOs of the banks.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., 
Case I) 
The fact that SAF’s get significant support and facilitation from regulators and that 
the members do not receive any compensation from their banks for being part of 
such forums ensures the independence of the forum and induces a pressure-free 
environment  for  open  discussions  on  Shari’a  related  issues.  The  forum  is 
moderately empowered because of the probability that the recommendations can 
become regulatory standards and that such recommendations represent the voices 
of the whole Shari’a community that can build a strong pressure. Therefore, SAF is 
an important tool that can be used by Shari’a scholars to counter and balance the 
pressure they are facing from management. 
 
“…the standards are first reviewed by the Shari’a advisors’ forum, 
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finalized by the Shari’a board of the SBP and notified after approval.” 
(Additional Director, Regulator)  
5.2.38   Resignations 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Resignations 
Frequency  High/Low 
Eternal Sensitivity  High/Low 
 
This is an in-vivo (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998) code and the term was used by Shari’a scholars. The pressure 
Shari’a  scholars  face  from  management  for  approval  of  certain  structures  that 
Shari’a  scholars  are  not  comfortable  with  sometimes  becomes  very  intense  and 
forces  Shari’a  scholars  to  quit  their  jobs  rather  than  compromise  on  their 
principles. Some Shari’a scholars are naturally  stringent who strive to Islamize all 
aspects  of  their  banks  and  are  not  willing  to  compromise  on  issues  some  may 
consider  as  minor.  Such  Shari’a  scholars  are  highly  sensitive  to  the  eternal 
consequences  of  their  decisions  and  therefore  they  opt  to  resign  from  the 
organizations. However, there have been only a few instances of such resignations 
of Shari’a scholars. 
 
“The extreme action Shari’a advisors can take is to resign and this 
has  happened  in  some  banks.  Some  may  also  go  out  and  start 
whistle-blowing but this is rare because people will question his/her 
integrity.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
“…there are only two options in that case; either to quit or to obey. 
Some  Shari’a  advisors  quit  in  such  situations  and  there  have  been 
instances of resignations…” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case III) 
It  is  also  possible  that  those  who  resign  from  Islamic  banks  because  of  non-
supportive behaviour from management would go out and start whistle-blowing 
against the banks. However, it would be unlikely in cases where the scholar has 
served the bank for an extended period because it would question his/her own 
integrity. 
 
“…even in some cases, the Shari’a advisors have resigned because of 
this pressure.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
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5.2.39 Regulatory Framework 
Open Code  Properties  Dimensions 
Regulatory Framework 
Existence Central Shari'a Board  High/Low 
Enforcement of AAOIFI Standards  High/Low 
Shari'a Audit by Central Bank  High/Low 
Protection to Shari'a Scholars  High/Low 
Appointment Procedure of SCs  High/Low 
 
This code was discovered through constant comparison (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and noticing the language 
and emotions of respondents (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Banking is one of the 
highly  regulated  industries  in  any  country  because  of  its  risk  exposure  and  its 
potential impact on the economy. Islamic banks, proclaiming alignment of their 
operations with Shari’a principles, need a further layer of regulatory framework in 
addition to the one applicable to the banking sector in general. Such a framework 
for Islamic banks includes but not limited to the existence of a CSB, normally at 
the central bank, enforcement of AAOIFI standards, having a proper Shari’a audit 
and  control  mechanism,  protection  of  Shari’a  scholars  and  monitoring  their 
appointment and dismissal procedures. This assists Shari’a scholars in achieving 
deeper or at least minimum Shari’a compliance in their banks. Therefore, Shari’a 
scholars  of  banks  operating  in  countries  with  separate  Shari’a  regulatory 
frameworks feel safer and stronger. There are fewer chances of undue managerial 
pressures and fatwa shopping in such banks.  
 
“The  regulations  in  Pakistan  are  very  stringent  which  do  not  leave 
any room for fatwa shopping.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case III) 
“The regulations made in Pakistan are excellent, they are very good… 
very different from the outside world. Shari’a advisors' authority in 
Pakistani  banks’  is  more  than  that  of  management.  His  contact  is 
only with the BoD. Any conflict between a Shari’a advisor and BoD is 
forwarded to SBP and SBP’s Shari’a board will decide whether it’s in 
accordance with Shari’a or not.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
The regulatory frameworks for Islamic banking in Pakistan as well as Malaysia are 
well-developed but he also claims that the overall regulatory framework for IFIs in 
other  countries  is  severely  deficient.  IFIs’  managers  also  feel  the  pressure  of 
regulatory  framework.  In  turn,  they  use  soft  approaches  in  their  dealings  with 
Shari’a scholars. In other words,  managers in  such cases use less coercion and 
more avoidance and controlling when needed. The use of such strategies compels Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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Shari’a scholars not to  fully utilize their  powers granted through the regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
“If  you  look  at the  role  of  our  Shari’a  board  or  Shari’a  advisors,  I 
think the main role is theirs’. SBP has given lots of rights to them and 
has made them very empowered but exercising the power is also an 
issue.” (Head of Islamic Banking, Case II) 
The  existence  of  a  sound  regulatory  framework  also  enhances  stakeholders’ 
confidence especially depositors’ on the Islamic banking system. Thus banks can 
still maintain their legitimacy by meeting only the minimum Shari’a requirements 
e.g. having at least one Shari’a advisor. 
 
Interestingly, two of the cases analysed in this study are operating in a country 
with no such regulatory frameworks. They neither have a CSB nor a central Shari’a 
audit  system.  There  is  no  regulatory  protection  to  Shari’a  scholars  and  their 
appointment procedure is at the discretion of the banks themselves. In addition, 
the adoption of AAOIFI standards is not mandatory in these two cases. IFIs in such 
constituencies have been subject to a great deal of criticism e.g. the existence of 
fatwa shopping (Foster, 2009) in such countries. Therefore, individual banks use 
other means to enhance their legitimacy e.g. a more independent and powerful 
Shari’a board, internal Shari’a audit and control system etc. 
 
“We don’t have a central regulatory body in Dubai and every bank is 
independent. But if we do have such a system, the customers will feel 
more confident.” (Head of CSR, Case I) 
“The regulators have to come up with legislations to streamline the 
industry. We have many discrepancies amongst the Islamic banks in 
terms of Sharia resolutions and practices, which will not help in the 
industry’s  development.  We  have  to  have  a  supreme  Shari’a  board 
like  in  Sudan  in  each  country,  or  rather,  all  Islamic  banks  should 
agree on applying AAOIFI standards.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
Case II, however, is operating in a country with a sound regulatory framework for 
Islamic banks. Thus, Shari’a scholars have the backing of the CSB and the banks 
are subject to audit and inspection from the central bank. The Shari’a scholars are 
also well protected by the regulations and their appointment and dismissal is not 
at the discretion of management. However, such regulations are also sometimes 
considered restricting by Shari’a scholars themselves because they confine their 
authority  only  to  certain  areas  of  the  banks  e.g.  product  approval  while  Shari’a Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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banking  could  be  the  provision  of  Shari’a  compliant  banking  services  to  the 
community even if that comes at their economic cost at times. On the other hand, 
the  secular  sponsors’  prime  motive  is  tapping  the  emerging  Islamic  banking 
market  rather  than  their  commitment  to  Islamic  banking  itself.  Orientation  of 
sponsors  has  been  identified  by  the  respondents  as  a  very  important  factor  in 
determining the future and sustainability of Islamic banking industry. 
 
 “Basically the main issue with Islamic banks is the sponsors and BoD, 
their  role  is  crucial  and  their  approach  is  crucial.  If  Shari’a 
compliance is their prime intent, they will appoint Shari’a advisors of 
good repute but if their prime motive is profit, I think their Shari’a 
advisor  would  not  be  that  much  effective.  If  you  look  at  the 
multinational banks, they have high profile names on their Shari’a 
boards. But what support is provided to them to implement Shari’a 
compliance.  They  are  consulted  only  on  the  crucial  issues  at  the 
product development level but on an operational level, they are kept 
at  a  distance.  In  Pakistan,  they  have  not  even  defined  the  Shari’a 
advisors’ role clearly.” (Additional Director, Regulator) 
The sponsors of the cases under consideration are Muslims. In two of the cases 
the owners are having a personal interest in Shari’a compliance. Therefore, they 
have  given  sufficient  powers  the  Shari’a  scholars  for  directing  their  banks. 
However, the orientation of the sponsors of Case II is driven by economic motives 
rather than Shari’a compliance. It is clear from the fact that Islamic banking is only 
a subsidiary operation of this bank. The bulk of its business is coming from its 
long-established conventional banking. Shari’a scholars and regulators in general 
frequently complain from the orientation of sponsors claiming their only objective 
is the business objective, which has to be controlled. 
 
 “Islamic banks’ sponsors also have conventional banks so they don’t 
care if their profits from the Islamic banks are coming from interest 
or  other Haram sources.  They  just  need  profits.” (Shari’a  Research 
Officer, Case II) 
“I know a CEO of a big Islamic bank in the UAE who does not believe 
in  Islamic  banking  and  finance  and  he  does  not  disguise  that 
although he is a Muslim.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
5.3  Summary 
Open  coding  is  the  first  stage  in  the  GT  analysis.  It  starts  as  soon  as  the  first 
chunk of data is at hand. It is the process of analysing data for the identification of 
concepts  and  codes  that  are  important.  However,  one  is  not  sure  at  the  initial Shakir Ullah                                                                   Chapter 5: Open Coding 
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stages  of  which  emerging  codes  are  going  to  contribute  to  the  final  core 
phenomenon. Therefore, the number of open codes could be very high some of 
which  later  on  merge  together.  It  becomes  clear  at  the  later  stages  of  analysis 
which open codes will become part of the core category. This chapter focuses only 
on  those  relevant  codes  which  are  forty  in  total.  As  this  chapter  is  the  first  in 
writing GT analysis, the open codes do not really give a clear understanding to the 
reader of the core phenomenon and one has to go through the axial and selective 
coding in order to understand the emerging theory. Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 6: Axial Coding 
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6.2   Axial Codes 
A detailed description of the axial codes and their association with relevant open 
codes is presented below. 
6.2.1 Shari’a Objectives 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Shari’a Objectives 
Social Welfare 
Ethical Investments (EI) 
Fairness and Justice (F&J) 
Philanthropy 
Unity Principle 
 
Five  open  codes  namely  ‘Social  Welfare’,  ‘Ethical  Investments’,  ‘Fairness  and 
Justice’, ‘Philanthropy’ and ‘Unity Principle’ were identified to have similarities with 
each other based on their properties and dimensions. For example all the codes 
represent important aspects of Shari’a that emphasize public good over personal 
gains. It was also found that Shari’a scholars are always in a struggle to defend 
and  promote  these  values.  Therefore,  these  codes  have  been  combined  into  a 
higher level abstract axial code called ‘Shari’a objectives’.  
 
The  dimensional  analysis  of  these  open  codes  indicates  that  the  relevance  of 
‘Shari’a objectives’ is mainly recognized by Shari’a scholars and thus they attribute 
them a high-level importance while management recognizes a low level relevance 
and  importance  of  these  objectives.  The  responsibility  to  advance  Shari’a 
objectives  within  Islamic  banks  is  also  strongly  felt  by  Shari’a  scholars  while 
management  does  not  have  a  significant  sensitivity  to  them.  Therefore,  Shari’a 
scholars are seeking a wider coverage of ‘Social welfare’, ‘Fairness and Justice’, 
‘Philanthropy’ and ‘Unity Principle’ in all banking areas. They are also inclined to 
sacrifice  banks’  profits  for  Shari’a  objectives  if  possible.  Management,  on  the 
contrary, sticks to a narrow coverage of Shari’a objectives and tries to bring down 
Shari’a  scholars  to  or  below  the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  level  wherever 
possible. Thus, managers are not willing to sacrifice profits for Shari’a objectives 
wherever  and  whenever  possible.  Shari’a  scholars  are  able  to  convince 
management of this trade-off only on rare occasions depending on the powers of 
Shari’a  scholars  in  each  bank.  For  example  in  case  of  ‘Ethical  Investments  (EI)’, 
management  cannot  undertake  any  investment  project  without  the  approval  of 
Shari’a scholars. Shari’a scholars are also fairly stronger in ‘Philanthropy’ where 
they can support Shari’a objectives. However, Shari’a scholars have little influence 
in the other open codes where they do not have significant influence and authority.  
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“I  have  personal  reservations……  the  role  of  Shari’a  board  and 
Shari’a  advisors  should  not  be  restricted  to  just  giving  Shari’a 
clearance on products. It should also have the authority to look into 
all things e.g. how does the bank share its profits with the depositors? 
Is it fair and just from Shari’a point of view? However, we [Shari’a 
scholars] are not allowed to have a say in this because the concept of 
Shari’a committee is just to approve products from Shari’a point of 
view.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Therefore,  the  practical  implementation  of  Shari’a  objectives  varies  across  open 
codes. For example, the open codes ‘Ethical Investments’ and ‘Philanthropy’ are 
practically  implemented  to  considerable  levels  in  the  operations  of  IFIs  while 
‘Fairness  and  Justice’,  ‘Social  Welfare’  and  ‘Unity  Principle’  are  left  mainly  to  
managers’ discretion.  
 
In summary, Shari’a scholars strive to pursue Shari’a objectives to the maximum 
possible  extent.  However,  achievement  of  Shari’a  objectives  requires  some 
compromises on business objectives, which is not what managers would like to 
have because of their focus on business objectives. This creates a potential conflict 
and divergence of objectives between the two key parties within Islamic banks. 
6.2.2 Business Objectives 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Business Objectives 
Profit Maximization 
Secured Investments 
Islamization of Conventional Products 
 
There  are  three  open  codes  that  can  be  combined  together  based  on  their 
properties and dimensions to form a higher order abstract category named here as 
‘business  objectives’.  These  open  codes  are  ‘Profit  Maximization’,  ‘Secured 
Investments’ and ‘Islamization of Conventional Products’.  
 
The  clustering  of  these  open  codes  into  a  single  axial  category  is  justified  by 
looking  at  their  properties  and  dimensions  and  relating  them  through  the 
paradigm  model.  All  the  three  open  codes  are  highly  important  for  the 
management, the party keenly interested in achieving ‘business objectives’. This 
may  require  pushing  Shari’a  scholars  to  approve  what  achieves  business 
objectives.  Resistance  from  Shari’a  scholars  frustrates  management  personnel 
especially  when  Shari’a  scholars,  on  the  grounds  of  Shari’a-repugnance  issues, 
turn down highly profitable proposals.  
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Shari’a scholars work as an opposing force in these cases as they try to control 
management’s  extreme  struggle  for  ‘business  objectives’.  This  does  not  mean 
business objectives are  always against Shari’a principles. The reason for Shari’a 
scholars’  opposition  to  ‘business  objectives’  is  that  it  requires,  at  times,  the 
sacrifice of Shari’a Objectives for which Shari’a scholars are responsible to protect 
and promote. However, the powers of Shari’a scholars are restricted so they are 
unable to stand as a strong opposition to management except in areas where they 
have clearly prescribed authority. Shari’a scholars can use this authority to meet 
the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  requirements  of  the  banks  but  the  broader 
Shari’a objectives remain unattended. There is a deep sense of frustration amongst 
the Shari’a scholars for compromising on ‘Shari’a Objectives’. The gap between the 
stance of management and Shari’a scholars is wider in ‘Profit Maximization’ and 
‘Islamization of Conventional Products’ which leads to a divergence of priorities 
and increased conflicts. However, there is a narrow gap between the two parties on 
‘Secured Investments’, which makes it easy to seek consensus. 
 
“There is a huge pressure on Shari’a department to find alternatives 
to  conventional  products.  Shari’a  advisors  have  given  many 
relaxations in this regard which have even been objected upon. The 
Shari’a  advisors  give  relaxations  during  policymaking  but  once  the 
policies are made, they are followed strictly. The relaxation is in the 
sense that if something is not allowed in the Hanafi School of thought 
and there is a pressure from management, the Shari’a department 
may approve it on the basis that it is allowed in the Shafi’i school of 
thought.” (Credit Administration Officer, Case I) 
The power play gives an upper hand to managers over Shari’a scholars leading to a 
compromise on broader Shari’a objectives while business objectives often get first 
priority. However, management would not complain if business objectives could be 
met  in  a  Shari’a  compliant  way.  The  prolonged  continuation  of  the  pursuit  of 
business objectives at the cost of Shari’a objectives is a threat to the true essence 
of Islamic banking and an existential threat to the Islamic banking system itself. 
Regulators seem to be on neither side because they understand the interests of 
both  parties  are  important.  Thus,  regulators  make  the  necessary  regulation  to 
make  sure  that  only  the  minimum  Shari’a  requirements  are  met.  However,  the 
broader Shari’a objectives are neglected. 
 
“Shari’a  compliance  is  very  important  but  the  managers  are  not 
prepared  for  it.  They  see  Islamic  banking  as  a  new  business 
proposition and they want return on investment. Shari’a compliance 
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“The current system is not sustainable because it does not have its 
own  footings,  it  is  just  a  replica  of  the  conventional  system.  “ 
(Director, Regulator) 
6.2.3 Diverging Backgrounds 
Axial Category  Open Category 
Background Divergence 
‘Educational Disparity’ 
‘ Experience Disparity’ 
 
The open codes that can be grouped together to form this abstract axial code are 
‘Educational  Disparity’  and  ‘Experience  Disparity’.  These  open  codes  have 
similarities on the bases of their properties and dimensions. They are caused by 
some conditions and lead to certain consequences. Managers and Shari’a scholars 
subscribe to different types of credence built through diverging educational and 
work backgrounds. For example managers have higher degrees in secular business 
education. These degrees are earned in English, the business language of most 
Islamic  banks,  which  gives  them  upper  hand  to  have  better  business 
communications. Furthermore, the top management of Islamic banks is composed 
of professional management having years of experiences in conventional banks. 
Thus  the  only  system  they  trust  is  the  conventional  banking  in  which  they  are 
expert and have tested it for a long time. It changes their behaviour toward Islamic 
banking. So most of the top-level managers believe that Shari’a is obsolete and 
should not be used as a guiding yardstick for modern business operations. 
 
“The prime motive of the entrants to this market is to tap the market. 
Their  intention  is  not  Shari’a  compliance…thus;  we  check  the  past 
record  of  the  sponsors  and  ask  them  questions  to  evaluate  their 
commitment  to  the  industry.  However,  this  is  sometimes  very 
subjective because you never know others’ intentions and you can’t 
deny  somebody’s  legitimate  application  on  the  bases  of  his/her 
intentions.” (Director and Joint Director, Regulator) 
Most Shari’a scholars, on the contrary, have higher degrees in religious education 
with  some  also  having  some  level  of  secular  education.  They  are  good  in 
understanding  and  communicating  in  Arabic-  the  language  of  Shari’a-  but 
majority have problems with English, the business language of Islamic banks. The 
conviction of Shari’a scholars is thus more inclined toward the holistic approach to 
business where Shari’a objectives are given priority over business objectives. Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 6: Axial Coding 
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“There are two mindsets of people; one is that say Shari’a is obsolete 
and  they  totally  disregard  it  and  on  the  hand  some  people  are  so 
stringent on Shari’a that they don’t even want to revisit the verdicts 
of  the  previous  scholars  and  Imams.  They  don’t  understand  that 
when those verdicts were issued, those were according the practices 
of  that  time.  Today,  practices  have  changed  so  there  should  be 
changes in the verdicts.” (Shari’a Advisor, CASE III) 
Consequently, Shari’a scholars and managers are at the opposing extremes on the 
dimensions  of  the  properties  of  all  relevant  open  codes.  One  party  strives  for 
Shari’a  objectives  with  willingness  for  some  concessions  while  the  other  party 
focuses  on  business  objectives  even  at  the  expense  of  Shari’a  objectives  if 
possible. Some managers even consider Shari’a as obsolete. They think it should 
only  be  used  as  a  tag  to  capitalize  the  market,  while  Shari’a  scholars  believe 
Shari’a  is  a  set  of  divine  instructions,  and  should  be  used  as  a  guide  in  every 
aspect of the business. Thus, management tries to come up with products that are 
competitive  with  conventional  banks  in  the  market  but  wrapped  in  Shari’a 
packaging in order to sell them in the Islamic market. Conversely, Shari’a scholars 
try  to  make  the  products  essentially  Shari’a  compliant  and  achieve  Shari’a 
Objectives. However, a fair level of compromise on Shari’a objectives can be seen 
in  Islamic  banks  because  Shari’a  scholars  give  a  fair  level  of  importance  to 
business objectives and are ready for some sacrifice of broader Shari’a objectives 
if minimum Shari’a compliance is achieved. 
6.2.4 Cognitive Forces 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Cognitive Pressures 
Self-interest  
Eternal Reward/Punishment 
 
Shari’a  scholars  and  managers  are  subject  to  two  different  types  of  cognitive 
forces namely ‘ Self-interest ’ and ‘Eternal Reward/Punishment’. These forces have 
been integrated form an axial code, cognitive forces because they represent the 
internal strife the two parties are going through. The two pressures, though, affect 
Shari’a scholars and managers in the same directions; their intensity over the two 
parties is different. Moreover, the pressures act towards different ends; one leads 
to   Shari’a objectives while the other tilts more towards business objectives.  
 
Self-interest pressure is stronger on management because their financial and non-
financial  benefits  are  associated  with  business  targets.  Shari’a  scholars,  on  the 
other hand, do not have business targets to achieve. Additionally, the supply of Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 6: Axial Coding 
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Shari’a scholars in the market is very low currently so they can easily get jobs. 
Therefore, they are not much affected by the self-interest pressure. However, they 
receive attractive packages from the banks they work for. So, they are interested in 
the continuity of the system. Additionally, management can informally associate 
Shari’a  scholars’  benefits  with  their  leniency.  Thus,  self-interest  builds  a  slight 
pressure  on  some  Shari’a  scholars  and  they  may  thus  compromise  on  Shari’a 
objectives in rare cases. 
 
“One reason some Shari’a advisors are tempted to be lenient is that 
their  job,  compensation,  promotion  and  other  perks  which  are 
determined by the management. If they become very strict, there are 
chances  that  they  will  not  get  good  benefits.  But  the  thing  is  that 
there is a scarcity of Shari’a advisors in the market, if they are fired 
from one bank, they can easily get a good job at another bank. So the 
chances for temptations for monetary benefits are very small. Some 
Shari’a advisors who do not have a big name in the market may be 
influenced by monetary benefits.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case III) 
On  the  contrary,  Shari’a  scholars  are  subject  to  a  very  high-level  of  eternal 
reward/punishment because of their firm beliefs in the hereafter-accountability. 
This  belief  is  strongly  related  to  Shari’a  scholars’  religious  education  and 
background. In most cases, the eternal pressure is strong enough to override the 
self-interest  factor  completely  leading  to  their  resignations  from  Islamic  banks 
when  subject  to  management’s  undue  influence  to  compromise  on  Shari’a 
objectives.  Managers  are  also  subject  to  moderate  level  of  eternal 
reward/punishment  force  but  that  varies  from  individual  to  individual.  Those 
working in the high cadre of Islamic banks are not so sensitive to eternal force and 
are mainly led by their self-interest. Management may not be convinced with the 
idea of Islamic banking at all but is still present in the industry for profiteering, 
which creates an internal cognitive dissonance. 
 
“I personally think that the strongest force on a Muslim and a Shari’a 
scholar is the life hereafter”. (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Consequently, the high self-interest drive of management drives them to achieve 
business  objectives  as  much  as  they  can,  especially  in  the  absence  of  strong 
eternal pressure. Managers, who are subject to eternal pressure due their religious 
background, might be willing to submit to Shari’a scholars’ decisions and trade-
off  business  objectives  for  Shari’a  compliance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  high 
sensitivity  of  Shari’a  scholars  to  eternal  reward/punishment  drives  them  to 
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self-interest for many. However, there might be very few instances where Shari’a 
scholars trade-off Shari’a objectives purely for their self-interest. 
6.2.5 External Pressure 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
External Pressure 
External Shari’a Scholars’ Pressure 
Regulatory Controls 
Depositors’ Expectations 
 
There are three main pressure groups outside Islamic banks. The abstract axial 
code  used  to  represent  this  pressure  is  ‘external  pressure’.  The  powers  and 
influences of these pressure groups are strong enough to affect the behaviour of 
Shari’a scholars and managers. The open codes that lead to the development of 
external pressure are ‘ External Shari’a Scholars’ Pressure’, ‘ Regulatory  Controls’ 
and  ‘Depositors’  ’.  These  open  codes  represent  distinct  groups  of  stakeholders 
that  construct  varying  levels  of  pressure  on  Shari’a  scholars  and  managers  to 
induce  them  not  only  towards  the  achievement  of  minimum  Shari’a  compliance 
levels but also beyond it towards ‘Shari’a Objectives’. 
 
External Shari’a scholars form the strongest pressure because of their reservations 
on the current form of Islamic banking. They not only criticise Islamic banks but 
also  the  Shari’a  scholars  working  for  these  banks.  A  collective  rebutting  of  all 
external  Shari’a  scholars  of  the  current  Islamic  banking  system  can  lead  its 
collapse.  Therefore,  both  managers  and  Shari’a  scholars  are  sensitive  to  this 
pressure. They are in a struggle to overcome the objections put forth by external 
Shari’a scholars in order to avoid a full-scale tussle with them. It is noteworthy 
that this pressure is  much stronger on Shari’a scholars than  managers because 
they  are  responsible  for  the  banks’  Shari’a  compliance.  Regulatory  pressure  is 
predominantly against the management and in favour of Shari’a scholars ensuring 
minimum  Shari’a  compliance  in  Islamic  banks.  However,  Shari’a  scholars  still 
believe  regulators  are  restricting  their  involvement  in  the  banks  which  in  turn 
hinders  the  achievement  of  broader  Shari’a  objectives.  Regulatory  pressure  also 
works as a check and balance mechanism on Shari’a scholars to some extent. 
 
“Second  is  the  pressure  of  external  Shari’a  scholars,  third, 
regulators…depositors  do  not  have  a  direct  pressure  but  we  feel 
responsible  to  provide  them  Shari’a  compliant  services.”  (Shari’a 
Research Officer, Case II) 
“Depositors have great expectations from the Shari’a scholars. They 
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organizational legitimacy forces management to obey Shari’a scholars’ decisions 
and opinions. 
 
“Of  course  I  do  the  first  line  of  defence  and  don’t  undertake 
transactions  that  I  know  are  not  compliant  with  Shari’a.”  (Head  of 
Investments, Case III) 
“At  the  end  of  the  day,  when  it  [noncompliance  with  Shari’a]  is 
pointed out in the Shari’a audit, the profit goes to charity. Thus there 
will be no financial benefit for the bank and yet its reputation will be 
damaged.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
Consequently,  Shari’a  scholars  capitalize  on  managers’  need  for  legitimacy  and 
reputation to pursue their efforts for deeper Shari’a compliance in all areas of the 
banking  including  the  provision  of  F&J  to  depositors  and  employees.  However, 
managers  only  maintain  minimum  or  superficial  Shari’a  compliance  in  order  to 
maintain their legitimacy and avoid reputation risk. 
6.2.8  Coercion 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Coercion 
‘ Firing Threat’ 
‘Closure Threat’ 
 
There  are  two  open  codes  grouped  together  to  form  an  axial  category  called 
‘coercion’. The use of this abstract name is appropriate here because firing and 
closure both constitute threats that can be used as a strategic tool to force the 
other party for compliance with ones’ own terms.  
 
Coercion is used by management within Islamic banks for forcing Shari’a scholars 
to  become  lenient  on  Shari’a  objectives  and  yield  to  managers’  business 
objectives. Firing threat can be used as a convenient tool against Shari’a scholars 
where there is no or minimal regulatory protection for Shari’a scholars. It becomes 
a less useful tool in highly regulated countries. On the other hand, closure threat is 
a useful tool in banks where Islamic banking is in the form of window-operations 
while the rest of the bank is conventional. It is also used as a coercive strategy by 
management of the banks that run Islamic banks as subsidiaries. However, it is 
again less likely that management will actually exercise closure threat because of 
their huge investment at stake.  
 
In the cases under consideration in this study, the use of coercive pressure has 
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a big conventional bank. In the full-fledged Islamic banks, the respondents have 
not identified the use of coercive pressure as a potential threat. 
 
As  a  consequence  of  coercion,  some  Shari’a  scholars  may  become  cooperative 
while others become confrontational. Some Shari’a scholars may even opt to resign 
in such scenario. Cooperation of Shari’a scholars in the face of such coercion leads 
to  superficial  Shari’a  compliance  while  confrontation  ensures  at  least  minimum 
Shari’a  compliance.  Resignation  of  Shari’a  scholars  in  such  cases  may  give 
managers  the  option  to  hire  more  a  lenient  Shari’a  scholar  who  might  even 
approve superficial Shari’a compliance. 
 
“In  some  cases,  when  the  management  really  insists  us  not  to  do 
something, we become lenient because there are only two options in 
that case; either to quit or to obey. Some Shari’a advisors quit in such 
situations and there have been instances of resignations. But some 
still stay for the Maslihat that if they quit, the management will bring 
in someone else who will be lenient event more. So if a strict Shari’a 
advisor quits in such situations, it gives management the chance for 
fatwa shopping.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case III)  
6.2.9  Controlling 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Controlling  
‘Appointment of Shari’a Scholars’ 
‘Authority of Shari’a Scholars’ 
‘Involvement of Shari’a Scholars’ 
 
The open codes constituting ‘controlling strategies’ are ‘Appointment  of Shari’a 
Scholars’, ‘ Authority of Shari’a Scholars’ and ‘Involvement of Shari’a Scholars’. The 
grouping of these open codes into a higher order abstract category is that these 
are managers’ tactics to control Shari’a scholars. 
 
The controlling strategies start from the time of hiring of Shari’a scholars where 
management  prefers  to  hire  lenient  scholars.  Secondly,  their  authority  is  made 
limited to product approval only so that they do not become a hurdle in the way of 
business  objectives.  Shari’a  scholars  are  further  controlled  by  confining  their 
involvement  only  into  areas  where  they  have  authority  and  are  kept  away  from 
administrative matters. Thus, management achieves enough freedom to promote 
their business objectives under the Islamic name. 
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However, the managers’ controlling strategies are constrained by regulators who 
set the criteria for the appointment and independence of Shari’a scholars. Once 
nominated by the management, the Shari’a scholars have to be approved by the 
regulators. This restricts the managers’ freedom of choosing their Shari’a scholars. 
Additionally,  regulators  also  specify  the  authority  of  Shari’a  scholars  within  the 
banks.  Thus  banks  are  controlled  to  some  extent.  Though,  Shari’a  scholars’ 
authority is full and final in product approval, its range does not extend to other 
banking  areas  and  the  achievement  of  Shari’a  objectives  becomes  difficult. 
However,  Shari’a  scholars  can  use  their  ultimate  authority  in  certain  areas  to 
expand their involvement in other areas.  
 
Referring  to  the  frequent  use  of  controlling  strategies  over  internal  Shari’a 
scholars,  a  respondent  commented  in  the  following  words  after  he  read  the 
analysis. 
 
“In my humble opinion, the model of the internal Sharia Advisor is 
useless and does not achieve the purpose of Sharia controlling.” (Head 
of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
6.2.10 Avoidance 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Avoidance  
‘Avoiding Shari’a Board’ 
‘Avoiding Shari’a Audit’ 
‘Avoiding Full-time Shari’a Scholars’ 
‘Fatwa Shopping’ 
 
The  open  codes  collectively  forming  ‘Avoidance’  Strategies  are  ‘avoiding  Shari’a 
board’,  'Avoiding  Shari’a  Audit’,  'Avoiding  Full-time  Shari’a  Scholars’  and  ‘fatwa 
shopping’.  Managers  use  these  strategies  frequently  to  escape  Shari’a  scholars’ 
strict  supervision  and  reduce  their  involvement  in  the  affairs  of  the  banks  and 
thereby pursue their business objectives. 
 
Avoiding the Shari’a board may be desirable to management in order to reduce the 
powers of Shari’a advisors but still it is a tool for enhancing the legitimacy of the 
banks. Banks rather try to have the well-reputed names on their Shari’a boards to 
attract  greater  legitimacy.  Therefore,  all  the  cases  under  consideration  in  this 
study  have  their  own  Shari’a  boards  that  supplement  the  internal  Shari’a 
departments. However, one could argue that management would be inclined, in 
certain cases, to avoid the most stringent Shari’a scholars on their board in order 
to reduce Shari’a scholars’ influence in on the banks. Shakir Ullah                                                                     Chapter 6: Axial Coding 
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“Well, you have to choose prominent Shari’a scholars otherwise the 
people will not trust your business.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case I) 
Avoiding Shari’a audit, on the other hand, is more likely to be practiced by Islamic 
banks because most of the Shari’a-repugnant transactions are pointed out during 
such audits. This has great impacts on banks’ profitability and reputation in some 
cases.  However,  strict  regulatory  requirements  of  Shari’a  audits  in  some 
jurisdictions make it difficult for Islamic banks to avoid it. It is more likely to be 
exercised in areas where such audits are not regulatory requirements. Shari’a audit 
is  a  regulatory  requirement  in  the  jurisdictions  of  one  of  our  cases  while  the 
Shari’a boards of the other two cases are strong enough to enforce it to a great 
extent. Therefore, the chances are limited for management to escape Shari’a audit. 
 
In  some  jurisdictions  where  the  minimum  requirement  is  to  have  at  least  one 
Shari’a scholar as advisor in the bank and there is no requirement for him/her to 
be present full-time in the banks makes it attractive for the management to give a 
free hand to Shari’a scholars in terms of their working hours allocation. This paves 
the  way  for  management  to  misrepresent  some  pieces  of  information  and  get 
Shari’a scholars’ approval of his/her limited time on the banks.  
 
Fatwa shopping, again, is easy in areas with no regulatory controls where banks 
hire  the  services  of  Shari’a  consultancies  rather  than  having  their  own  Shari’a 
advisors.  Fatwa  shopping  in  its  literal  meaning,  however,  might  be  very  rarely 
observed in banks with their own Shari’a departments and Shari’a boards. 
 
As  a  consequence  of  the  use  of  avoidance  strategies,  Shari’a  scholars  are  kept 
away from some key issues where the business objectives are at risk. Excessive 
use of avoiding strategies leads to superficial Shari’a compliance.  
6.2.11  Confrontation 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Confrontation 
‘Punitive Actions Against management’ 
‘Nullification of Transactions’ 
‘Complaints to Regulators/General Body’ 
 
The open codes contributing to Shari’a scholars’ ‘confrontation’ with management 
are summarized above. These strategies give a levy to Shari’a scholars who can 
use  them  to  influence  management  not  only  to  maintain  minimum  Shari’a 
compliance but also achieve reasonable Shari’a compliance levels. 
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Though  Shari’a  scholars  do  not  resort  to  confrontation  very  often,  the  threat 
largely regulates managers’ behaviour. This is because of the potential impact on 
management  and  the  overall  institutions  in  case  confrontational  strategies  are 
exercised.  The  strategies  can  be  used  against  individual  bank  managers  or  the 
management as a whole depending on circumstances. However, punitive actions 
are particularly taken against individual managers. Therefore, managers try to be 
vigilant at individual levels. The second strategy can be used to cancel transactions 
after being executed. Thus the exercise of such strategies will most likely affect a 
group of managers e.g. a whole branch. Complaints to regulators or shareholders 
can  be  made  against  management  in  case  of  extensive  use  of  avoidance  and 
coercion against Shari’a scholars. However, only those Shari’a scholars can likely 
resort to confrontation who have a strong hierarchical support or have access to 
strong regulatory framework. 
 
The  probability  of  Shari’a  scholars  resorting  to  confrontation  makes  managers 
submit to Shari’a scholars’ authority leading to better Shari’a compliance levels. 
6.2.12  Compromising  
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Compromising  
‘Internal Shari’a Scholars’ Pressure’ 
‘Excuse of Primitiveness’ 
‘Juristic Ruses and Fatwa Manufacturing’ 
‘Reactive Approach of Shari’a Scholars’ 
 
Four  open  codes  that  can  be  combined  to  form  the  axial  category  named  as 
‘Compromising’.  These  open  codes  give  Shari’a  scholars  the  justification  to 
compromise on certain Shari’a compliance issues in order to maintain the status 
quo.  
 
Though the pressure from internal Shari’a scholars can be considered as a positive 
stimulus towards better Shari’a compliance, it is also a source for Shari’a scholars 
to compromise on issues they might not be quite comfortable with from Shari’a 
point  of  view.  Therefore,  Shari’a  scholars  rely  on  their  predecessors’  decisions 
when faced with pressure from management. In some instances, Shari’a scholars 
approve  and  defend  some  of  Islamic  banks’  Shari’a-repugnant  practices  by 
invoking the ruse of the young age of the industry. Shari’a scholars themselves do 
not feel comfortable with such practices of the banks, allowed by them, and are 
trying to gradually eliminate them. However, some of the practices are increasingly 
practiced by Islamic banks.  
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Shari’a scholars also resort to juristic ruses and even fatwa manufacturing, in rare 
instances, when facing intense pressure from management to get something done. 
This  happens  especially  when  banks  try  to  find  alternatives  for  all  conventional 
banking practices. Though pure fatwa manufacturing may be rare to observe, the 
use of juristic ruses is widely present. However, some juristic ruses are strongly 
supported by evidence from Shari’a sources while others are weak. 
Compromising  strategies  are  exercised  when  the  pressure  from  management  is 
high  and  unavoidable.  Different  compromising  strategies  are  used  in  different 
situations.  The  result  of  excessive  use  of  compromising  strategies  would  be 
superficial  Shari’a  compliance.  The  current  use  of  these  strategies  has  made 
Islamic  banking  oscillate  between  superficial  and  minimum-required  Shari’a 
compliance levels. 
 
A  respondent  who  kindly  agreed  to  comment  on  the  analysis  remarked  on  this 
issue in the following words. 
 
“Some Sharia scholars show some leniency at times to maintain good 
relationships with managements.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
6.2.13  Seeking Hierarchical Backing 
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Seeking Hierarchical  
Backing 
‘Shari’a Board’ 
‘Central Shari’a Board’ 
‘Shari’a Advisory Forum’ 
 
The open codes that form the axial category named ‘Seeking Hierarchical Baking’ 
are ‘Shari’a Board’, ‘Central Shari’a Board’ and ‘Shari’a Advisory Forum’. The codes 
provide  a  significantly  strong  backing  to  Shari’a  scholars  to  pawn  the  pressure 
they  are  facing  from  managers.  ‘Seeking  Hierarchical  Backing’  is  an  effective 
strategy to counter managers’ coercion and avoidance strategies. 
 
The banks’ own Shari’a boards are the first points of refuge for Shari’a scholars in 
the  case  of  undue  management  pressure.  Shari’a  boards  are  normally  more 
independent  and  hence  more  powerful  than  the  in-house  Shari’a  scholars. 
Therefore,  managers  feel  the  pressure  and  do  not  want  to  exert  pressure  on 
Shari’a scholars significant enough to force them on taking the issue to Shari’a 
board. A Shari’a board’s decision is binding on all parties and normally in favour of 
Shari’a  scholars.  It  relieves  Shari’a  scholars  even  if  its  decision  is  in  favour  of 
management because in the case of a decision of the Shari’a board on a certain 
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Shari’a advisors refer uncertain situations or instances where they are pushed by 
management to seek expert advice from the Shari’a board and counter managers’ 
pressure. 
 
If the conflict is not resolved by taking it to the Shari’a board, it is then forwarded 
to the CSB, if any. The CSB’s decision then becomes a regulatory standard binding 
on  all  parties.  However,  there  are  fewer  chances  of  a  conflict  between  Shari’a 
scholars and management being taken to the CSB because managers would not 
like to take an issue that far. This is a strong force against management and in 
favour of Shari’a scholars. The mere existence of the possibility of conflict being 
referred  to  the  CSB  compels  managers  to  cooperate  with  Shari’a  scholars  and 
become submissive to their verdicts. 
 
Though the recommendations of the SAF do not have binding status, regulators 
can  enforce  them  in  case  the  forum  is  facilitated  by  it.  Even  the  non-binding 
recommendations of SAF carry a significant weighting. Therefore, Shari’a scholars 
use  the  forum  to  balance  the  pressure  they  face  from  management  because 
managers do not want a situation where a conflict is referred to the forum.  
 
The existence of a strong hierarchical backing to Shari’a scholars empowers them 
to  encounter  managers’  pressure  and  avoid  Haram  transactions.  It  also  leads 
banks closer to deep Shari’a compliance and Shari’a objectives. 
6.2.14  Separation  
Axial Category  Open Codes 
Separation   ‘Resignations’ 
 
There is only one open category, ‘Resignations’ that makes up the axial category 
named here as ‘Separation’. Separation from the Islamic bank or even the Islamic 
banking  industry  is  the  last  option  Shari’a  scholars  have  in  case  they  are  not 
satisfied  with  the  banks  Shari'a  compliance.  There  have  been  instances  of  such 
separations. Some Shari’a scholars do not claim compensations from the Islamic 
banks they serve because they still feel their operations are un-Islamic but they 
continue to work with the banks in a hope to gradually Islamize it. 
 
“The extreme action Shari’a advisors can take is to resign and this 
has  happened  in  some  banks.  Some  may  also  go  out  and  start 
whistle-blowing but this is rare because people will question his/her 
integrity. “(Shari’a Advisor, Case II) Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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7  Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
7.1  Introduction 
The  previous  two  chapters  presented  the  first  two  stages  in  the  GT  analysis. 
However,  there  was  no  mention  of  the  central  phenomenon.  This  chapter 
accomplishes the identification of the core category, its integration with the open 
and  axial  codes  and  finally  validating  the  resulting  relationships  through  the 
process of selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
 
In the first step of selective coding, a story line was written that best described the 
core  phenomenon  under  consideration.  This  helped  to  condense  the  whole 
analysis  into  a  few  paragraphs  leading  to  the  identification  of  the  core 
phenomenon. Strauss and Corbin (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Strauss and Corbin, 
1990) point out that the story line may reveal the existence of more than one core 
category. However, they  emphasize the selection of one category as the core for 
the emergence of GT while systematically relating the other categories to the core. 
This study did not come up with multiple categories that could strongly compete 
for being the core. However, the identification of the single core category was a 
gradual  development  over  the  whole  length  of  analysis  involving  lots  of 
brainstorming  exercises.  In  fact,  the  identification  and  integration  of  the  core 
category passed through a number of developmental stages over a span of two 
and a half years of rigorous analysis. It also took a number of attempts on the 
story line and the paradigm model before the core category emerged.  
 
The core category was then related to the axial codes by means of the paradigm 
model (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Strauss and Corbin, 1990) - the key tool used 
for the integration process in this chapter. The researcher then visited the raw data 
repeatedly  to  seek  validation  for  the  relationships  established  through  the 
paradigm model. Repeat interviews with key respondents were also conducted to 
validate the core category and its relationship with the axial codes as established 
through the paradigm model. Finally, the conditional/consequential matrix (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008, pp 90-95) is used to put the whole phenomenon in macro and 
micro  contexts  and  to  elaborate  the  changing  nature  of  the  GT  with  changing 
macro  and  micro  factors.  The  following  headings  will  take  us  through  the 
significant steps of the selective coding journey. 
7.2 The Story Line 
Islamic  banks  are  business  entities  with  dual  objectives;  business  and  Shari’a. 
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circumstances, they might be conflicting at times leading to a sacrifice of one to 
achieve the other. Furthermore, the wardens of the two objectives are two different 
parties  i.e.  Shari’a  scholars  for  Shari’a  objectives  and  managers  for  business 
objectives.  Islamic  banks  though  focus  on  Shari’a  compliance  as  their  main 
advertising  theme;  the  prime  motive  of  sponsors  and  managers  is  to  tap  the 
market of the untapped religious Muslim clientele. The two parties have different 
backgrounds,  varying  and  different  degrees  of  eternal,  external  and  internal 
pressures.  These  differences  sometimes  cause  an  increase  in  the  divergence 
between  the  two  objectives  but  they  could  also  reduce  the  gap  at  times.  For 
instance, Shari’a scholars are exposed to a high degree of eternal pressure so they 
view  Shari’a  as  the  supreme  law  while  managers  do  not  feel  significant  eternal 
pressure and some may even consider Shari’a as obsolete. The background of the 
two  parties  further  strengthens  this  attitudinal  difference.  For  example,  Shari’a 
scholars  are  deeply  nurtured  in  Islamic  education,  studying  and  teaching,  while 
managers  are  conventionally  educated  possessing  extended  experience  in 
conventional banking. In addition, there are some external pressures e.g. pressure 
from  regulators,  depositors  and  external  Shari’a  scholars  which  force  the  two 
parties toward deeper Shari’a compliance. However, the two parties are subject to 
varying levels of external pressures. For example, regulatory pressure is normally 
against management and in favour of Shari’a scholars, thereby moving managers 
towards  Shari’a  objectives  along  the  continuum  and  providing  an  ‘anchor’  for 
Shari’a scholars to stick to higher levels of Shari’a compliance. On the other hand, 
depositors’  pressure  is  largely  on  Shari’a  scholars  forcing  them  to  struggle  for 
deeper Shari’a compliance. Similarly, the pressure from external Shari’a scholars 
also works mainly on internal Shari’a scholars forcing them to achieve higher levels 
of  Shari’a  compliance.  However,  it  also  forces  managers  to  partially  sacrifice 
business  objectives  and  cooperate  with  Shari’a  scholars  for  better  Shari’a 
compliance. Employees of non-managerial cadre and Shari’a scholars associated 
with  the  Islamic  banking  industry  build  an  internal  pressure  mainly  on  Shari’a 
scholars. For example, employees’ expectations of Shari’a scholars for being the 
guardians of justice and Shari’a scholars’ exposure to the scrutiny of other Shari’a 
scholars force them to be more meticulous in fatwas.  
 
There apparently are more forces on Shari’a scholars driving them towards deeper 
Shari’a compliance than the forces on  managers driving them towards  business 
objectives.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  pressures  drive  managers  towards  deeper 
Shari’a  compliance.  However,  managers’  overall  focus  on  business  objectives  is 
strong  enough  to  repel  all  these  pressures  and  compel  them  to  seek  business 
objectives  even  at  the  cost  of  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  whenever  possible. 
Therefore, the two parties are in a constant latent struggle for safeguarding their 
assigned objectives. Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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“The  Shari’a  job  is  often  conflicting  with  the  business  side  of  the 
bank.  It  is  the  same  as  the  risk  management.  The  business 
department  sends  us  proposals  but  we  reject  them  based  on  risk 
involved.  Similarly,  the  Shari’a  department  rejects  proposals  based 
on  Shari’a  issues.  However,  the  difference  is  that  if  a  business 
proposal  is  taken  forward  against  the  instructions  of  the  risk 
management department, there can be huge financial costs for the 
business at the end. On the other hand, Shari’a noncompliance does 
not  have  direct  financial  consequences  for  the  bank  if  the  Shari’a 
advisor  approves  it.  Therefore,  the  management  is  often  in  the 
struggle of convincing the Shari’a advisor to approve such proposals. 
The CEO often asks the Shari’a advisor to ‘find ways’ to launch new 
products.” (Head of Risk Management, Case I) 
The question is why managers of Islamic banks would like to have an opposing 
force  in  the  form  of  Shari’a  scholars  to  hinder  their  business  objectives?  The 
answer  is that  managers’  business objectives under the title  of Islamic banking 
cannot be easily achieved without certification from Shari’a scholars. The products 
and services of Islamic banks would have little legitimacy without the support of 
Shari’a  scholars  who  apparently  drive  the  public  opinion  in  religious  Muslim 
communities. Therefore, managers are willing to accommodate Shari’a  scholars’ 
opinion  and  their  nominal  supreme  authority  in  some  cases  to  ensure  their 
presence  and  support.  A  blatant  non-submissiveness  of  managers  to  Shari’a 
scholars’  supreme  authority  can  raise  a  serious  Shari’a  reputation  risk  for  the 
Islamic banks. These two forces i.e. the need for legitimacy and avoiding Shari’a 
reputation  risk  induce  managers  to  stay  back  from  their  pure  materialistic 
business objectives and move along the continuum towards the minimum Shari’a 
compliance levels, at least. The story does not stop there. Once Shari’a scholars 
agree on the minimum Shari’a compliance level, managers start their struggle to 
reverse the fatwa back towards the business objectives along the continuum. This 
struggle  could  either  be  in  the  form  of  financial  reengineering  of  fatwas  or 
noncompliance with Shari’a scholars’ instructions during actual implementation, or 
even  forcing  Shari’a  scholars  to  issue  rather  lenient  fatwas  for  the  smooth 
achievement of business objectives.  
 
On the other hand, Shari’a scholars apparently consider their jobs as a form of 
discharging a religious duty for they expect to be rewarded for it in the eternal life. 
Their  ultimate  desire  is  to  take  Shari’a  compliance  to  the  levels  of  Shari’a 
objectives. However, as discussed above, they compromise on Shari’a objectives 
agreeing with managers on the minimum or even superficial Shari’a compliance Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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levels  with  the  expectations  that  Islamic  banks  would  gradually  move  towards 
Shari’a  objectives  with  time.  The  self-interest  could  also  be  a  factor  for  some 
Shari’a scholars to stay on board with Islamic banks and earn repute/status and 
monetary incentives. Commenting on this particular issue, one respondent, who 
read the whole analysis, said that this is “true and it happens” (Head of Shari’a 
Dept., Case III). Therefore, Shari’a scholars are interested in the continuity of the 
industry,  which  at  times  requires  their  lenience  on  Shari’a  objectives  and 
principles.  However,  Shari’a  scholars  are  highly  sensitive  to  the  eternal  rewards 
and punishments in addition to the external and internal forces pushing them to 
achieve broader Shari’a objectives. Thus, they are in a continuous struggle not only 
to maintain minimum Shari’a compliance but also to take Shari’a scholars towards 
Shari’a objectives on the continuum. Shari’a scholars can also recall their fatwas, 
which managers used to engineer pure interest-based products. Therefore, there 
is a constant struggle to reposition fatwa’s already issued by Shari’a scholars.  
 
The  two  parties’  then  resort  to  different  strategies  to  reposition  the  fatwa’s 
towards their respective objectives along the continuum. Shari’a scholars having 
some  sort  of  conventional  background  and  rather  weak  sensitivity  to  eternal 
reward/punishment  might  be  inclined  to  compromise,  in  the  absence  of  weak 
internal, external and regulatory pressures, thereby adopting a lenient approach 
towards  Shari’a  compliance.  One  core  reason  for  adopting  compromising 
strategies  by  the  Shari’a  scholars  is  the  excuse  of  primitiveness.  They  approve 
some Shari’a-repugnant products with the expectations of rectifying them later. 
The  compromising  scenario  becomes  more  obvious  in  the  case  of  the  Islamic-
window  of  conventional  banks  where  managers’  backgrounds  are  significantly 
conventional  and  are  not  sensitive  to  eternal  reward/punishment.  In  such 
situations,  the  overall  Shari’a  compliance  becomes  superficial.  Other  Shari’a 
scholars with a strong religious background and strong eternal pressure resort to 
confrontation with management in the presence of a strong regulatory framework 
coupled with significant internal and external pressures. Such Shari’a scholars try 
to  ensure  the  achievement  of  minimum  Shari’a  compliance.  If  such  Shari’a 
scholars are reinforced with managers sensitive to eternal reward/punishment and 
having  significant  religious  backgrounds,  the  resultant  banking  could  be 
reasonably  Shari’a  compliant  in  the  context  of  a  strong  regulatory  framework 
and  religiously  oriented  sponsors.  In  the  absence  of  a  substantial  regulatory 
framework and the presence of strong eternal pressure coupled with internal and 
external pressures, some Shari’a scholars recourse to separation from the Islamic 
banks when management does not observe the minimum Shari’a compliance.  
 
In situations where internal and external pressures are non-significant and where 
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Table   7.1: Properties and Dimensions of the Core Category 
Properties  Dimensions 
Frequency  High/Low 
Intensity struggle by management  High/Low 
Intensity struggle by Shari’a scholars  High/Low 
Managers’ struggle  Overt/hidden 
Shari’a scholars’ struggle  Overt/hidden 
Struggle for control  High/Low 
 
The core category in this study, used to explain the key GT question of ‘what is 
going  on  here?’,  has  been  named  ‘Fatwa  Repositioning’.  Shari’a  scholars  and 
managers are in a constant struggle to position and reposition the fatwas in such 
ways  that  advocate  what  they  call  their  objectives  i.e.  Shari’a  and  business 
objectives respectively. As mentioned in the story line, managers would not have 
hesitated  to  exclude  Shari’a  scholars  from  the  governance  system  of  their 
institutions if they could achieve their business objectives without a certification 
from  Shari’a  scholars.  Thus,  managers  need  Shari’a  scholars  on  board  for  the 
necessary legitimacy and reputation. This induces  them to stay a little  bit  back 
from their pure materialistic business objectives and move along the continuum 
toward  at  least  the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  level-  a  point  where  Shari’a 
scholars will agree on the initial fatwa positioning. Once the initial positioning is 
done,  the  managers’  latent  struggle  for  repositioning  the  fatwa  back  toward 
business objectives begins. This could either be in the form of malpractices during 
the implementation of the fatwa’s or in the form of combining two or more issued 
fatwa’s  to  manufacture  a  desired  position.  Managers  can  also  use  a  number  of 
strategies e.g. avoidance, controlling and coercion to bring Shari’a scholars to a 
favourable position. On the other hand, the Shari’a scholars’ desired target is to 
achieve ultimate Shari’a objectives but they agree to move to the minimum Shari’a 
compliance levels on the excuse of primitiveness. Additionally, the remuneration, 
perquisites  and  status  of  Shari’a  scholars  are  associated  with  their  jobs  with 
Islamic banks tempting some of them to be lenient. However, they expect to take 
Shari’a compliance gradually towards Shari’a objectives. Once they issue fatwa’s 
that meet only the minimum Shari’a compliance levels, they start a struggle not 
only  to  move  it  towards  a  reasonable  level  but  also  onwards  to  a  deep  Shari’a 
compliance. This may need, at times, the recalling of a previously issued fatwa or 
restructuring it with more restrictions and contractual steps. Shari’a scholars are 
also in a constant overt struggle to prevent managers from repositioning the fatwa 
from  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  to  superficial  or  even  below.  This  may  need 
them to keep an eye on managers in the form or Shari’a audits and investigating 
dubious  transactions.  This  often  results  in  a  confrontation  with  managers.  For 
example,  Shari’a  scholars  can  recommend  punishment  for  the  responsible Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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Separation  and  Seeking  Hierarchical  Backing.  The  phenomenon  then  leads  to 
certain  consequences  based  on  the  intensity  of  the  causal  and  intervening 
conditions  and  the  use  of  the  action/interaction  strategies  by  different  parties. 
Thus,  the  consequent  Shari’a  compliance  is  deep,  minimum  or  superficial.  The 
consequence  of  the  balance  of  forces  in  their  current  form  reveals  that  Shari’a 
compliance dithers between superficial and minimum levels.  
Table   7.1: Positioning Codes on the Paradigm Model 
Axial Codes  Position on Paradigm Model 
Regulatory Framework 
Contextual Factors 
Sponsors’ Orientation 
Shari’a Objectives 
Causal Conditions 
Business Objectives 
Background Divergence 
Intervening Conditions 
Cognitive Pressures 
External Pressures 
Internal Pressures 
Avoidance 
Action/Interactional  Strategies  used  by 
Management 
Controlling 
Coercion 
Submission 
Compromising 
Action/Interactional  Strategies  used  by 
Shari’a Scholars 
Confrontation 
Separation 
Deep Shari’a Compliance 
Consequences  Minimum Shari’a Compliance 
Superficial Shari’a Compliance 
 
It is relevant here to mention that GT is a process (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) and 
not a static combination of variables that would always stay the same. Therefore, 
any change in the contextual factors would lead to a corresponding change in the 
causal  and  intervening  conditions,  action/interactional  strategies  and 
consequences.  This  change  can  start  from  any  point  i.e.  a  sudden  change  in 
intervening  conditions  would  change  strategies  and  consequences.  Thus,  the 
combination  and  intensity  of  causal  conditions  would  be  altered.  However,  the 
change in contextual factors, at least in this study, brings about an abrupt change 
in  the  whole  process.  This  process  dynamism  has  been  grasped  in  the  coming 
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7.4.1 Contextual Factors 
Strauss  and  Corbin  (1990,  p.101)  define  context  as  “the  particular  set  of 
conditions within which the action/interactional strategies are taken to manage, 
handle,  carry  out  and  respond  to  a  specific  phenomenon”.  The  phenomenon 
addressed in this study is taking place in the existence of two broad contextual 
factors. It is hard to separate the phenomenon and the integrated axial codes from 
the context as it is affecting every code from all angles. Though it can be claimed 
that the current form of the phenomenon is not directly affected by contextual 
factors because these factors are pre-set and do not change easily. However, any 
change  in  the  contextual  factors  would  greatly  alter  the  phenomenon  and  the 
integrated axial codes.  
 
The two contextual factors identified in this study are; regulatory framework and 
sponsors’  orientation.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  respondents,  especially  Shari’a 
scholars and regulators, view these factors as conflicting with each other. On the 
one hand, sponsors’ current orientation is seen highly opposing towards Shari’a 
objectives.  
 
“The prime motive of the entrants to this market is to tap the market. 
Their intention is not Shari’a compliance. Thus they obtain an Islamic 
tag from the regulator in the form of licence and from the Shari’a 
advisors in the form of a fatwa and  use these two tags to tap the 
market.” (Director, Regulator)  
On the other hand, Shari’a scholars view the existence of a country-level Shari’a 
regulatory  framework  as  a  highly  favourable  tool  for  controlling  managerial 
pressure. It also builds stakeholders’ confidence in this system. 
 
“…many people in the management are interested in fatwa shopping 
but  the  chances  are  very  limited  in  our  country  because  the 
regulations of central bank are very stringent in this matter.” (Shari’a 
Research Officer, Case II) 
It is important to note that contextual factors affect all the parts of the paradigm 
model starting from the causal conditions. For example if sponsors’ orientation is 
religious and a sound regulatory framework is in place, the fatwa’s are positioned 
more  towards  Shari’a  objectives.  The  religious  minded  sponsors  and  regulators 
would further affect the intervening variables in such a way as to make them more 
in favour of Shari’a compliance e.g. appointing religious minded people to the top 
management. On the contrary, secular minded sponsors would try to position the 
fatwa’s  towards  business  objectives,  in  the  absence  of  a  sound  regulatory 
framework.  If  the  Shari’a  scholars,  in  this  case,  are  highly  sensitive  to  eternal Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
 
  135   
cognitive pressure, the gap between the two objectives would be wider leading to 
confrontation  and  resignations.  A  third  scenario  would  be  the  combination  of 
religious  minded  sponsors in the absence of a regulatory framework.  In such a 
case,  the  balance  would  still  be  tilted  towards  Shari’a  objectives.  In  the  fourth 
scenario, where a sound regulatory framework is in place and sponsors are secular 
minded,  the  struggle  for  Fatwa  Repositioning  would  be  moderate.  The  use  of 
confrontation, avoidance and controlling strategies would be more in practice in 
such a case.  
 
It is interesting to note that the contextual conditions not only affect the causal 
conditions  but  they  also  affect  the  combination,  intensity  and  number  of 
intervening  variables,  action/interactional  strategies  and  the  resulting 
consequences, which range from deep to superficial Shari’a compliance. 
7.4.2 An Overview of the Causal Conditions 
Causal  conditions  are  the  “events  or  incidents  that  lead  to  the  occurrence  or 
development of a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 100). The fact that 
Islamic banks aim to achieve business objectives in a Shari’a-compliant way often 
leads  to  a  potential  conflict  between  Shari’a  scholars  and  managers.  This 
incompatibility of the two objectives makes up the necessary conditions to lead to 
a  situation  where  each  party  is  in  a  constant  hidden  struggle  for  positioning 
Shari’a compliance along the continuum as closer to their objectives as they can. 
 
“On the one side the Shari’a principles tell you to be equitable, fair 
and  transparent  and  sharing  risk  but  on  the  other  hand  we  have 
investors  who  are  looking  for  profits  and  protection  of  their 
investments.  So  obviously,  there  is  a  divergence.”  (Head  of 
Investments, Case III) 
However, the two objectives are essentially complementary to each other because 
one  cannot  be  achieved  without  the  other.  Managers,  interested  in  tapping  the 
Islamic  banking  market,  are  in  dire  need  of  legitimacy  for  their  products  and 
services. Shari’a scholars, who drive public opinion in Islamic communities, grant 
this legitimacy to the Islamic banks. Managers are willing to accommodate Shari’a 
scholars’ verdicts to get the Shari’a-compliance certification. Shari’a scholars on 
the  other  hand  want  the  continuity  of  the  system  hoping  for  its  convergence 
towards Shari’a objectives in the long run. This urge for continuity is reinforced by 
Shari’a scholars’ assorted self-interest. Therefore, they also willing to be lenient 
with  managers  and  allow  structures  and  instruments  that  might  be  merely 
stratagems.  Thus,  there  is  obviously  an  initial  movement  along  the  continuum Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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from  both  ends  towards  the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  level.  The  pursuit  of 
business and Shari’a objectives through the same organization by different parties 
make  the  necessary  conditions  for  a  wider  fatwa  repositioning  struggle.  Thus, 
from  the  very  start,  an  IFI  “ is  torn  between  the  market  success  of  emulating 
conventional structures and developing genuinely Islamic structures that reflect its 
spiritual ethos” (Agha, 2012). 
Figure   7.1: Causal Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.3 Intervening Conditions 
The  phenomenon  of  Fatwa  Repositioning  and  the  corresponding 
action/interactional  strategies  are  largely  affected  by  a  set  of  intervening 
conditions listed in Table 7.1. These conditions act to either facilitate or constrain 
the  action/interactional  strategies  taken  within  a  specific  context  (Strauss  and 
Corbin, 1990, p. 103). In our case, they affect the two parties i.e. Shari’a scholars 
and  managers  in  different  ways  and  thus  the  resulting  effect  is  either  an 
accelerated or decelerated struggle for Fatwa  Repositioning on the part of both 
managers  and  Shari’a  scholars.  They  then  adopt  necessary  action/interactional 
strategies  to  cope  with  the  situation.  For  example,  the  parties’  divergent 
backgrounds instil a belief that their assigned objectives are the only ends to be 
achieved through Islamic banking. Thus, Shari’a scholars, nurtured in a religious 
background, want to achieve deeper Shari’a compliance while managers, nurtured 
in a conventional banking background, try to maximize shareholders’ wealth. On 
the  other  hand,  eternal  pressures  work  both  ways  on  both  parties.  Though  the 
sensitivity  to  eternal  reward/punishment  is  much  stronger  for  Shari’a  scholars 
driving them toward deeper Shari’a compliance, it still exists to some extent in 
Muslim managers compelling them to cooperate with Shari’a scholars for better 
Shari’a compliance. However, managers are affected by this pressure to a much 
lesser degree as compared to the Shari’a scholars. At the same time, both parties 
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have  their  material  interests  attached  to  Islamic  banks  as  they  draw  attractive 
compensations  and  are  entitled  to  perquisites,  which  depend  on  the  financial 
performance of the banks.  
“Managers and the regulators are also sensitive to eternal forces but 
this might be the case that Shari’a advisors are more vocal on this 
issue. However, Shari’a advisors are well educated in this area and 
their awareness is better than others. Therefore, sensitivity to eternal 
force becomes a code of ethics for them. This also makes them more 
aware of the concept of self-accountability.” (Director, Regulator) 
The self-interest force is much stronger on managers whose material benefits are 
directly related to the financial performance of the banks. This may induce some 
managers  to  use  avoidance  and  coercive  strategies  to  achieve  the  financial 
objectives of the banks. Shari’a scholars, who are subject to a strong eternal force, 
claim to be unaffected by self-interest. However, self-interest still affects Shari’a 
scholars to some extent forcing them to resort to compromising strategies and 
help  managers  in  achieving  business  objectives.  External  Pressure  is 
predominantly on Shari’a scholars but also affect managers to some extent. This 
induces  managers  to  be  less  coercive  and  Shari’a  scholars  to  be  more 
confrontational. Nonetheless, the positive effect of external pressure helps in the 
repositioning  of  Shari’a  compliance  more  towards  Shari’a  objectives  on  the 
continuum. It forces the two parties to work more symbiotically to achieve better 
Shari’a  compliance.  Internal  pressures  predominantly  work  on  Shari’a  scholars 
forcing them to be more meticulous in their verdicts and work hard for deeper 
Shari’a compliance. 
7.4.4 Action/Interactional Strategies 
The two diverging objectives sought after in Islamic banks by two different parties, 
affected to different and varying levels by the intervening variables, result in the 
use  of  “purposeful  [and]  goal  oriented”  (Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  p.  104) 
action/interactional.  For  example,  some  Shari’a  scholars  with  a  secular 
background, less sensitive to eternal cognitive pressures would be more inclined 
to compromise on Shari’a objectives in the presence of weak external and internal 
pressures and secular minded managers.  
“They may try to find Hila’s [ruses] for certain structures when they 
are under pressure from management. However, this situation is very 
rare  and  those  who  are  less  concerned  with  their  eternal  life  may 
practice it.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
“One reason some Shari’a advisors are tempted to be lenient is that 
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by  the  management.  If  they  become  very  strict,  there  are  chances 
they will not get good benefits. “(Shari’a Research Officer, Case III) 
On the other hand, Shari’a scholars with a strong religious background and eternal 
cognitive  force,  strong  internal  and  external  pressures  and  having  strong 
hierarchical support would resort to confrontation if managers try to either avoid 
or control them. A Shari’a scholar told one best example of such confrontation: 
“…they [managers] sometimes push us to approve certain structures. 
They even threaten our jobs and even the Islamic banking operations 
of the bank. Once the CEO asked me to consider a structure, which I 
found repugnant to Shari’a, and I rejected it. Then I got a phone call 
from the president saying, ’I need you to approve the structure. I will 
call you after 5 minutes and I need a positive answer otherwise I will 
take  my  action’.  I  told  him,  ‘What  action  are  you  taking  after  5 
minutes? You can take that action now because my answer will be the 
same  after  5  minutes.  Are  you  going  to  fire  me?  I  have  got  offer 
letters from other banks in my drawer’.” (Shari’a Advisor, Case II) 
If  managers  also  use  coercion  in  addition  to  avoiding  and  controlling  Shari’a 
scholars, who have strong religious backgrounds, facing strong eternal cognitive 
force, strong internal and external pressures, weak hierarchical backing and weak 
regulatory framework,  can resort to separation from the particular bank or even 
quitting the Islamic banking industry. Resignation of Shari’a scholars from Islamic 
banks could also depend on how they view the bank before they join it and how 
they find it in practice after joining. 
“Even in some cases, the Shari’a advisors have resigned because of 
this pressure.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
Managers,  on  the  other  hand,  avoid,  control  or  coerce  the  confronting  Shari’a 
scholars,  sometimes  even  forcing  them  to  resign  (as  elaborated  in  the  above 
quotes). However, those managers that have some religious education background 
and  are  sensitive  to  the  eternal  cognitive  force  may  submit  to  the  majority  of 
Shari’a  scholars’  decisions,  especially  if  Shari’a  scholars  have  a  strong  religious 
background,  high  sensitivity  to  eternal  cognitive  pressures  and  have  strong 
hierarchical support within a sound regulatory framework. 
“Shari’a advisors' authority in Pakistani banks’ is more than that of 
management.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II)  
“Shari’a  advisors  are  not  aware  of  the  safeguards  we  have  given 
them  against  the  management  though  we  regularly  interact  with 
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may not know about it. Secondly, it depends on their own standing 
and stature within the industry.” (Additional Director, Regulator) 
7.4.5 Consequences 
The interplay between the strategies used by Shari’a scholars and managers, which 
is  moulded  by  the  combination  of  causal  and  intervening  conditions  in  the 
presence of contextual factors, leads to certain consequences of the phenomenon. 
This study identifies four possible consequences i.e. deep, reasonable, minimum 
and superficial Shari’a compliance. It also elaborates the consequence shaped by 
the current scenario. 
Deep  Shari’a  compliance  could  be  achieved  when  managers  are  submissive  to 
Shari’a scholars’ authority and Shari’a scholars are confrontational in the context 
of strong hierarchical backing and regulatory framework. It is an ideal state which 
could  be  achieved  when  the  ultimate  objective  of  all  stakeholders,  chiefly 
managers and sponsors, is the will of Allah. Hence one would be inclined to not 
only forgo his/her profits but also capital for the greater public benefit and social 
well-being. It, therefore, is very difficult to achieve in practice in the presence of 
profit-maximization as a key motivator for some stakeholders. 
“Unlike the conventional banks, Islamic banks have other objectives 
than  achieving  targets  and  making  profit.  Those  objectives  really 
depend  on  the  orientation  of  those  banks’  management;  if 
management  is  really  keen  in  those  objectives,  and  believe  in 
contributing  to  social  welfare,  Islamic  banks  will  be  contributing 
effectively.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
On the other extreme, Shari’a compliance is only superficial- only limited to the 
use  of  Arabic  names  for  conventional  products  in  some  extreme  cases-  when 
managers use avoidance, controlling and coercive strategies over compromising 
and cooperative Shari’a scholars. This scenario is more prominent where the banks 
are  not  fully  Islamic  and  there  is  little  or  no  hierarchical  backing  available  to 
Shari’a scholars. In such cases, sponsors and managers do not consider Islamic 
banking anything more than another profitable project that needs to be tapped 
before it dries out. Superficial Shari’a compliance is one of the two widely present 
outcomes  of  the  present-day  combination  of  all  the  variables,  strategies  and 
context. Shari’a compliance could be called superficial when conventional banking 
products  are  replicated  by  only  changing  the  terminology  to  Arabic.  Sometimes 
managers  manufacture  this  position  by  combining  two  fatwas  to  engineer  a 
conventional product that would otherwise have been rejected by Shari’a scholars 
in composite. For example, it is possible to combine two separate Salam contracts 
to manufacture a forward contract which is not allowed in Shari’a. Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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“The conventional banks that have started Islamic banking windows 
mostly just look for profits by tapping the Islamic banking market. 
They  form  a  Shari’a  board  but  do  not  have  a  Shari’a  audit  and 
control  system.  How  do  we  know  they  apply  the  structures  and 
agreements  correctly  without  violating  Sharia  standards?  They  get 
Shari’a certification from Shari’a advisory firms and then implement 
the structures as they want.” (Head of Shari’a Dept. Case III) 
The  third  consequence  which  is  also  widely  present  in  today’s  IFIs  is  minimum 
Shari’a compliance. This is the lowest level of Shari’a compliance that managers 
must agree on before they get Shari’a certification from Shari’a scholars. This is 
where  most  Shari’a  scholars  issue  Shari’a  compliance  certification  to  their 
respective instructions. As discussed above, managers can then reengineer these 
permissible positions to superficial Shari’a compliance if they need to. The present 
scenario in our cases is that Shari’a compliance wavers between superficial and 
minimum  levels.  Some  scholars  (El-Gamal,  2006)  claim  that  even  the  minimum 
Shari’a compliance position is in fact superficial because Shari’a scholars know the 
ultimate consequences  of those structures. They approve them with the excuse 
that they represent the form of medieval Islamic contracts. 
“I can say that 95% of the transactions are Shari’a compliant and the 
Shari’a advisors “find ways” for the remaining 5%. There are three 
levels, I can say; one is the desired which leads to the fulfilment of 
Shari’a objectives (Maqasid Al-Shari’a), second is the permitted (Jaiz) 
which  meets  the  minimum  Shari’a  requirements  and  the  third  is 
prohibited  (Haram).  We  are  currently  on  the  permitted  level  and 
sometimes  the  management  force  the  Shari’a  advisors  to  go  the 
prohibited area but this rarely happens.” (Shari’a Research Officer, 
Case III) 
The forth and in fact rarely occurring consequence of this interplay of variables 
and strategies is what has been termed as ‘reasonable Shari’a compliance’. This is 
one  step  above  the  minimum  Shari’a  compliance  on  the  continuum  which  is 
reached  when  Shari’a  scholars  are  assertive,  and  managers  and  sponsors  have 
somewhat religious backgrounds. In this case, the IFI’s focus could change from 
debt-like instruments towards PLS mechanisms. Shari’a scholars could also compel 
managers  to  issue  Qardh-i-Hasana  (interest-free  loans)  to  some  needy  people. 
Shari’a scholars are often in a struggle to move the Shari’a compliance level from 
superficial back to minimum and then further to reasonable in order to address 
the strong criticism they face from external Shari’a scholars and intellectuals. 
“Shari’a  compliance  is  good  in  our  bank  partly  due  to  the  market 
reputation and assertive nature of our Shari’a advisor. If there is a Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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On  the  contrary,  a  number  of  intervening  conditions  i.e.  internal  and  external 
pressures and sensitivity to eternal reward/punishment force Shari’a scholars to 
reposition fatwas from superficial Shari’a compliance to minimum, from minimum 
to reasonable and even deep Shari’a compliance levels. Shari’a scholars can resort 
to  a  number  of  strategies  e.g.  seeking  hierarchical  backing,  confrontation  with 
managers  or  even  separation  from  Islamic  banks  in  order  to  reposition  Shari’a 
compliance towards their favourable position along the continuum. Furthermore, 
background divergence is a strong intervening variable forcing Shari’a scholars to 
move back from superficial Shari’a compliance not only to minimum but also to 
reasonable  and  deep  Shari’a  compliance  levels.  For  managers,  it  is  mainly  the 
reputation risk of banks in addition to internal and external pressures which forces 
them to obey Shari’a scholars and reposition some fatwas towards deep Shari’a 
compliance. 
It is worth mentioning here that the repositioning of a fatwa towards a higher level 
of Shari’a compliance is relatively difficult because managers rush to normalize a 
lenient  fatwa  in  their  banks  once  issued.  It  becomes  a  precedent  in  the  whole 
industry  and  Shari’a  scholars  then  refer  to  such  lenient  fatwas  when  they  face 
pressure from managers. The bottom line is though, there is a struggle from the 
side  of  Shari’a  scholars  to  reposition  Shari’a  compliance  from  superficial  and 
minimum  levels  back  towards  reasonable  levels  but  that  struggle  is  hardly 
productive.  An  interviewee  in  the  validation  phase,  commented  on  this 
phenomenon in the following long quote. 
“I believe it is unexpected to change practices and products approved 
and  given  under  the  lenient  policy  adopted  by  some  scholars 
regardless of the reasons of this leniency (as may be adopted for the 
sake  of  the  industry’s  development),  where,  I  don’t  think  the 
managers will agree to change and/or stop applying any product that 
are once approved by the Sharia Board.  
For example, there was a product approved during the conversion of 
a conventional bank into Islamic bank. That product was approved by 
Sharia Board as a solution to transform some conventional deals into 
Islamic, and the product itself was not purely Sharia-compliant. Now 
some  years  since  the  conversion,  this  bank  still  uses  the  same 
product.  Their  excuse  is  like  ‘we  can’t  easily  stop  our  service  to 
customers’.  
Moreover,  I  have  seen  some  scholars  issue  some  resolutions  on  an 
exceptional  basis  for  specific  cases,  afterwards,  this  exceptional 
fatwa becomes a standard and not an exception.  Shakir Ullah                                                            Chapter 7: Selective Coding 
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I  believe  the  primitiveness  excuse  age  has  over.  Now  the  Islamic 
banks are robust entities. Shari’a boards should, accordingly, adopt a 
strict  policy  in  terms  of  products  and  services.”  (Head  of  Shari’a 
Dept., Case III) Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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model. However, the graphical illustration of the matrix clarifies the relationships. The 
international  macro  factors  relevant  to  our  phenomenon  are  the 
country/organization’s adoption of international Shari’a standards set by bodies like 
AAOIFI  and  IFSB.  Observation  of  these  standards  is  not  mandatory  for  countries  or 
individual banks. However, if a country adopts the standards, they become mandatory 
for individual banks. Other countries can either adopt the standards with amendments, 
as in Pakistan, while some leave it to the banks’ discretion. In a country where there is 
no Shari’a regulatory framework in place, the adoption of these standards becomes 
important as they increase legitimacy of the banks. All the three cases of this study 
have  adopted  AAOIFI  standards;  two  of  them  voluntarily  and  one  through  the 
enforcement  of  the  central  bank.  The  macro  factors  affect  the  contextual  factors, 
causal conditions and all other elements of the paradigm. The second macro element 
of the matrix is the national level existence of  a Shari’a regulatory framework.  The 
existence of this framework enhances stakeholders’ confidence by narrowing down the 
gap between Shari’a and business objectives. On the community level, it boils down to 
Shari’a scholars’ integrity, their school of thought and the resulting blind trust of the 
public on them.  
The existence of Shari’a board, audit system and other Shari’a compliance mechanisms 
are  the  organizational  level  factors  of  the  matrix.  The  group  dynamics  i.e.  Shari’a 
scholars  and  managers  work  on  the  sub-organizational  levels  which  leads  to 
interactions  between  the  two  parties.  The  final  specific  actions  are  the 
action/interactional strategies. 
7.6 Refining the Theory 
Refining the theory began soon after the its initially development. GT is refined by “a) 
reviewing the scheme for internal consistency and for gaps in logic, b) filling in poorly 
developed categories and trimming excess and c) validating the scheme” (Corbin and 
Strauss,  2008,  p.109).  The  internal  consistency  check  in  this  study  has  been  done 
repeatedly throughout the whole process of theory development by constantly going 
back to interviews and notes in order to remove any possible inconsistencies. Similarly, 
attention  was  paid  to  the  open  and  axial  codes  which  were  found  relevant  to  the 
emerging  theory  but  still  poorly  developed.  The  identified  gaps  were  filled  in  by 
revisiting the existing data and also collecting more data. An important open code, 
external Shari’a scholars’ pressure, which was identified by this method, was poorly 
developed and the researcher had to conduct a last minute telephonic interview to fill 
the  gap.  The  irrelevant  open  codes  were  also  dropped  out  of  the  emerging  theory. 
Validation was done by revisiting the existing data and including the relevant quotes in 
the selective coding and by conducting repeat interviews. Relevant supporting quotes 
from existing data and repeat interviews have been included in the above discussion in 
appropriate occasions. Once the three analysis chapters were completed, a copy of the Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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whole  analysis  was  sent  to  some  of  the  key  respondents  in  all  three  cases  for 
validation. The respondents agreed with the picture presented by the theory. Below are 
some quotes from those who responded: 
“I read through  the  analysis  and  the  paradigm  model  and  found  it 
extremely useful and according to my experience it reflects the ground 
realities.” (Shari’a Research Officer, Case II) 
“Your model is great. You are the first person looking at Islamic banks 
from this angle. Mr Ansari [referring to a critique of Islamic banking], 
from Ernst & Young, will be very pleased with your work because he is 
also  very  critical  on  some  of  the  practices  of  Islamic  banks.”  (Head  of 
Islamic Banking, Case II) 
“Your model is very right and I don’t have much to add. I feel this is what 
is happening in the whole industry.” (Head of Investments, Case III) 
7.7 Summary 
The story line puts the whole scenario in a summarized way, consolidating the whole 
scenario  into  a  few  paragraphs  which  helped  identify  the  core  category  i.e.  fatwa 
repositioning. After naming and explaining the core category, the paradigm model was 
used to establish relationships between the codes. The axial codes were thus grouped 
into  causal  conditions,  intervening  conditions,  action/interactional  strategies  and 
consequences.  The  conditional  consequential  matrix  was  then  used  to  explain  the 
phenomenon within the macro and micro context. Finally, the theory was refined by 
removing  inconsistencies,  filling  gaps  in  poorly  developed  categories  and  then 
validating the theory from some key respondents. Respondents who read the analysis 
and replied back to the researcher significantly agreed with the theory and testified to 
the existence of the phenomenon in the Islamic banking industry. Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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8  Chapter  8:  Positioning  the  Theory  in 
Literature 
8.1  Introduction: 
A  Literature  review  has  a  unique  place  in  GT  research.  As  against  other  research 
methodologies where a comprehensive literature review is conducted at  the beginning 
of  the  research  in  order  to  identify  key  variables  and  develop  a  research,  literature 
review, in GT, it is conducted after the analysis is completed and theory generated. The 
purpose of the literature review is to position the emergent GT in extant literature and 
to  show  whether  the  theory  is  supported  by  previous  research  and  to  what  extent. 
However,  Strauss  and  Corbin  (1990,  pp.  48-60)  point  out  to  different  types  of 
literature:  technical  i.e.  research  studies,  books,  professional  writings  etc.  and 
nontechnical i.e. biographies, diaries, records, catalogues etc. The authors also explain 
the  uses  of  both  literature  types  in  GT.  For  example,  they  consider  nontechnical 
literature  as  data  that  should  be  used  to  supplement  interviews  while  technical 
literature is used as “background material against which one compares findings from 
actual data gathered in GT studies” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.48). In a GT study the 
theory  is  explained  in  the  framework  that  actually  develops  during  the  research. 
Moreover, a comprehensive literature review cannot be conducted before analysis in 
the case of GT because the theory is led by the data and one does not know where the 
theory is going to end. Therefore, there is no way to identify the relevant literature in 
advance.  However,  one  “can  incorporate  seemingly  relevant  elements  of  previous 
theories but only as they prove themselves to be pertinent to the data gathered in the 
study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.50). This incorporation has been done in this study 
during  analysis  where  the  abstract  names  of  some  codes  have  been  picked  from 
literature. Thus, the purpose of literature is not the development of a framework but 
the  comparison  and  the  positioning  of  the  theory  developed  during  the  study  with 
existing  literature.  For  this  reason,  a  comprehensive  review  of  relevant  literature  is 
conducted only after the theory is developed. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the GT of Fatwa Repositioning with existing 
Islamic  banking  literature  relevant  to  Shari’a  compliance  and  the  role  of  Shari’a 
scholars, managers and regulators. Academic literature addressing the role of Shari’a 
scholars and their relationship with other stakeholders, however, is very limited. This 
chapter  also  tries  to  position  the  newly  developed  theory  in  organizational  control 
literature. The next section reviews the literature on Shari’a scholars’ dual impact on 
Islamic  banks  following  by  managers’  tendency  to  escape  strict  Shari’a  supervision. 
Section 8.4 then tweets literature managers’ quest for friendly fatwas. Possible conflict 
of interest on the parts of Shari’a scholars is then explored in the next section. Section Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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example  of  fatwa  shopping  because  the  banker  admits  offering  a  monetary 
compensation for a convenient fatwa that suits his/her needs. It apparently highlights 
the phenomenon of purchasing Shari’a compliance for a lump sum of money. Some 
scholars also assert that bankers do not select Shari’a scholars on the bases of their 
competence in Shari’a and banking fields but rather on the bases of their leniency in 
issuing fatwas. For example Al-Jarhi writes that “those [Shari’a scholars] who charge 
less for their services and are willing to provide more convenient opinions [fatwas], 
from the point of view of shareholders, will be chosen [by management] over the more 
knowledgeable” (as cited by Farook and Farook (2011, p.19)). There is ample evidence 
that Islamic bankers consider SSB as a formality rather than an active controlling body 
(Warde, 2000). The professional use of fatwa shopping for personal gains especially in 
the emerging field of Islamic finance has been lamented by some researchers (Farook 
and Farook, 2011). However, they believe the existence of fatwa shopping as portrayed 
by  (Foster,  2009)  is  an  exaggeration  of  the  phenomenon  but  still  agree  with  the 
perception and consider it as handicap for the industry in the long run. 
 
This study clearly supports existing literature on the existence of the phenomenon of 
fatwa shopping but it also comes up with interesting variations. The study suggests 
that fatwa shopping can be exercised by financial institutions that do not have their 
own dedicated Shari’a boards and appointed Shari’a advisors. In that case, managers 
are free to develop a product, shop for a fatwa, often from Shari’a consultancy firms, 
to  package  it  in  Shari’a  compliance  and  then  sell  it  in  the  market  with  that  Shari’a 
certification. On the other hand, banks with their own Shari’a boards/advisors cannot 
exercise fatwa shopping in the sense as portrayed in the above literature because of 
the requirement that products have to be approved by the institutions’ own Shari’a 
boards/advisors. In other words, banks with an internal Shari’a compliance system are 
less likely to get involved in fatwa shopping as compared to those who purchase it 
from the market. Therefore, this study agrees with Farook and Farook (2011) that the 
image of fatwa shopping portrayed by (Foster, 2009) is an exaggeration and does not 
represent a widespread phenomenon. This study also claims that managers can resort 
to other strategies e.g. avoiding, controlling or even coercing Shari’a scholars in order 
to get a fatwa that suits their needs. This is where the potential existence of fatwa 
manufacturing and use of juristic ruses starts to emerge. Though fatwa manufacturing 
and the use of juristic ruses has been identified as an important phenomenon in the 
Islamic banking industry, the literature is very scarce in this area. Therefore, it could 
be an interesting topic for researchers to investigate in the future.  
8.5   Conflict of Interest 
The job of Shari’a scholars is to issue independent Shari’a opinions on the products, 
services  and  other  operational  activities  of  IFIs.  However,  one  can  question  the 
independence  and  impartiality  of  such  opinions  when  Shari’a  scholars’  personal Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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calling it as a rather expensive copy of conventional banking. Perhaps the most vocal 
opponent of Islamic banking in this regard is El-Gamal who has written an article and a 
book on this topic (El-Gamal, 2006, El-Gamal, 2005). Muslims are often willing to pay 
a premium for these products if they are endorsed by Shari’a scholars (Lee and Ullah, 
2011, Gerrard and Cunningham, 1997). El-Gamal claims that Shari’a arbitrage takes 
place when SB approved Islamic banking products are sold at a premium to Muslims, 
who are willing to pay a premium, in a captive market  allowing Islamic banks to stay 
profitable despite additional legal and juristic costs (El-Gamal, 2005). This supports 
our  findings  that  customers,  especially,  depositors  have  a  blind  trust  in  Shari’a 
scholars. 
 
El-Gamal’s main assertion is that the current form of Islamic banking does not serve 
but rather violates the Islamic spirit because they only represent the forms of symbolic 
Islamic contracts. It adds inefficiencies to transactions and thereby increases costs. He 
further argues that the form-over-substance approach of Islamic banks and some of 
their assets-based products expose the industry to potential abuse. Thus, it accrues 
potential  religious  and  worldly  harm  rather  than  any  benefit.  He  suggests  that  the 
industry should be grounded in Islamic spirit in order to develop and deliver intrinsic 
benefits (El-Gamal, 2005). He even suggests the removal of the word “Islamic” from 
Islamic  finance  in  order  to  open  it  up  for  other  communities  and  prevent  the 
exploitation  of  the  captive  market  (El-Gamal,  2006).  Referring  to  Martin  Luther’s 
speech and a subsequent question by a cobbler, El-Gamal (2006, p.1), strongly asserts 
that Islamic banks must preserve the Islamic spirit by being efficient and fairly priced 
rather than costly by adding some unnecessary operational steps and purchasing an 
Islamic tag from Shari’a scholars. However, some authors argue that people call Islamic 
finance  as  a  “sham”  became  they  do  not  find  it  any  different  from  conventional 
banking  (Agha,  2012).  Further  arguing,  the  same  author  asserts  that  “some  of  this 
criticism is unfair and due to a lack of understanding of the difference in the actual 
risk  profiles  between  the  two  (e.g.  in  an  Islamic  Ijarah  project/property  finance 
transaction, the financier assumes the risk of loss of the asset, which is remarkably 
different from a conventional mortgage where the mortgagee (bank), as a lender rather 
than an owner, does not assume such risk of loss). However, in other products such 
criticism  is  warranted.”  However,  a  Shari’a  scholar  from  one  of  the  case  who  went 
through  all  the  analysis  after  it  was  completed  largely  agreed  that  Islamic  banks 
minimize  the  difference  between  Islamic  and  conventional  products,  especially  in 
dealing with depositors. 
 
“Sharia  Boards  should  protect  the  depositors’  rights,  which  are  in  the 
Islamic banks’ management’s hands. Simply the Islamic bank is giving a 
rate on deposit that revolves around the market prevailing rate and not 
based on the business yield.” (Head of Shari’a Dept. Case III)  Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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Though one may argue that El-Gamal is overly critical of Islamic banks but his claims 
and  assertions  significantly  coincide  with  the  findings  of  this  study.  After  the  core 
phenomenon is established, each of the two  party resorts to their overt and covert 
strategies to achieve their objectives. The balance of these strategies in the presence 
of  the  contextual  factors  and  intervening  conditions  then  determines  the  resulting 
Shari’a compliance levels. This study suggests that the present form of Islamic banking 
is still far from the Shari’a objectives (deep Shari’a compliance) fluctuating between 
superficial and minimum Shari’a compliance. El-Gamal (2006, p.2) calls this superficial 
Shari’a compliance as “form-above-substance” approach. In his first chapter El-Gamal 
(2006)  illustrates  how  easily  Islamic  bankers  get  approval  from  Shari’a  scholars  on 
components of their developed structures and reengineer them so as the make the 
composite a virtually conventional banking product with exactly the same returns. El-
Gamal (2006, p.87) graphically illustrates the reengineering process bankers adopt to 
manufacture  a  forward  contract  (prohibited  by  many  jurists)  from  the  permitted 
structure of Salam. He further explains that the only thing Shari’a scholars add to the 
structure is a bunch of unnecessary contracts that increase the transaction costs and 
decreases  efficiency.  In  fact,  the  many  complicated  steps  used  in  synthesizing  the 
forward contract from Salam are taken to satisfy the Shari’a scholars’ demands who 
would  otherwise  not  approve  a  simpler  and  more  efficient  conventional  forward 
contract. 
 
The central phenomenon in this study pretty much supports El-Gamal’s assertions. For 
example it reveals that Islamic banks’ managers intelligently manufacture conventional 
financial  structures  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  easy  for  them  to  get  a  Shari’a 
packaging from the jurists. In doing so, managers are willing to introduce additional 
steps  or  documentations  into  the  structure  so  as  to  meet  the  scholars’  objections. 
However,  their  main  concern  is  to  make  the  structure  as  similar  to  conventional 
products as possible in order to stay competitive and meet regulatory requirements.  
 
However, the literature is silent on how Shari’a scholars struggle to incorporate Shari’a 
objectives  into  the  core  of  newly  developed  products  and  existing  structures.  The 
central phenomenon of this study highlights this aspect in detail. What happens is that 
Shari’a scholars try to embed Shari’a objectives in the banking products and they do 
succeed in some instances. Still in most cases Shari’a scholars fail to package Shari’a 
objectives  in  banking  products  but  rather  help  managers  in  preparing  Shari’a 
packaging for conventional products. This is  because the proposals are initiated  by 
managers who start it essentially from a conventional product and ask Shari’a scholars 
to  find  their  Islamic  alternatives.  Shari’a  scholars  then  rush  to  either  find  a  Shari’a 
compliant  alternative  or  search  for  juristic  ruses  to  make  the  proposed  structures 
appear, at least mechanically, Shari’a compliant. Conversely, if the proposals are to be 
initiated by Shari’a scholars, would be grounded in Shari’a objectives. Those proposals Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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are then forwarded to  managers to find their  banking alternatives. In  that way,  the 
Shari’a objectives would become the core of products and Islamic banking would come 
closer  to  deeper  Shari’a  compliant.  Unfortunately,  this  is  not  what  is  ultimately 
happening in Islamic banking. 
8.9  The Gap between Theory and Practice 
A number of books have been written on the idea of Islamic banking and finance. Most 
of these books, especially the ones written by Shari’a scholars working in this industry, 
start with an offensive strategy attacking the drawbacks of the conventional banking 
system and propagating the benefits of an Islamic alternative (Ayub, 2007, Beekun, 
1997,  Chapra,  1985,  Chapra,  2000,  Haniffa,  2001,  Lahsasna,  2010,  Usmani,  1998, 
Usmani,  2002a,  Usmani,  2002b,  Usmani,  2009a).  For  example  one  author  who  is 
Shari’a advisor and SSB member of one of the leading Islamic banks in Pakistan writes 
in the very preface of his book that:  
 
“The  world  economic  system, that  is  based  on  interest,  has  resulted  in 
concentrating the wealth in the hands of selected few creating monopolies 
and widening the gap between the rich and the poor. In contrast, Islam 
encourages circulation of wealth and regards its role as important to an 
economy  as  the  flow  of  blood  to  our  human  body…economic  justice 
requires  a  viable  economic  system  supported  by  an  efficient  banking 
system. Interest-based banking has proved to be inefficient as it fails to 
equitably  distribute  wealth  which  is  necessary  for  the  well-being  of 
humankind. On the other hand, Islamic banking is efficient and ensures 
equitable distribution of wealth thus laying foundation for an inflation-
free economy and socially responsible banking (Usmani, 2002a). 
These authors primarily argue that Islamic banks are distinguished, and probably clean 
from  the  above-mentioned  drawbacks  associated  with  conventional  banking.  They 
claim that Islamic banks’ operations are free from interest and based on risk-sharing 
instruments,  Musharakah  and  Mudharabah  thereby  leading  to  more  equitable 
distribution of wealth. This claim, however, is far from reality in the practices of Islamic 
banks. The percentage of Islamic banks’ investments in Musharakah and Mudharabah 
instruments has not yet reached double digits globally. The bulk of the Islamic banks’ 
transactions  is  carried  out  in  debt-like-instruments  e.g.  Murabahah,  Salam,  Istisna, 
etc.  Chong  and  Liu  (2009)  conducted  an  empirical  study  comparing  Islamic  and 
conventional banks in Malaysia. They found that only an insignificant portion of Islamic 
banks’ investments was actually PLS-based and that their deposits were not free from 
interest.  Dar  and  Presley  (2000b,  p.1)  claim  that  “almost  all  theoretical  models  of 
Islamic banking are either based on Mudarabah or Musharakah or both, but to-date 
actual practice of Islamic banking is far from these models. Nearly all Islamic banks, Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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compliance oscillates between minimum and superficial levels. This study claims that 
managers  do  not  give  priority  to  Shari’a  objectives  over  shareholders’  wealth 
maximization and that Shari’a scholars do not push them hard in this area. Managers 
not only search for convenient fatwas but also distorts after they obtain it. (Dar, 2011, 
p.11) noted that “whilst procurement of fatwas on the structures of Islamic financial 
products is a relatively easier job for the institutions, the real tedious task is to ensure 
that  the  institutions  remain  Shari'a  compliant  in  their  operations  and  execution  of 
contracts”. In other words, managers are always in a struggle to first obtain a lenient 
fatwa then further reposition it to match their desired products. 
8.10   The  row  between  External  and  Internal  Shari’a 
Scholars 
The  criticism  of  external  Shari’a  scholars  is  a  strong  external  pressure  not  only  on 
internal Shari’a scholars but also on managers. Though, external Shari’a scholars had 
been  feeling  discomfort  with  the  Islamic  banking  system  for  a  long  time,  the  rift 
emerged when a fatwa against Islamic banking in Pakistan appeared in a newspaper 
(Jang, 2008). A detailed version of this fatwa was then published in the form of an 
article (JāmiɈa-Ulūm-Islāmiyya-Banūrī-Town, 2008) which touched almost all aspects 
of Islamic banking. The fatwa created rumours and suspicions regarding the industry 
especially  because  it  was  signed  by  some  renowned  Shari’a  scholars  in  the  country 
including Mawlana Salimullah Khan, one of the living teachers of Mufti Taqi Usmani- 
called  the  architect  of  Islamic  banking  in  this  fatwa.  Briefly,  the  fatwa  declared  the 
existing Islamic banking system as against Shari’a and even worse than conventional 
banking.  It  claimed  that  Islamic  bankers  had  not  only  deviated  largely  from  Islamic 
finance theory but also used Islamic contract forms inappropriately for achieving their 
business objectives. It also claimed that the proponents of Islamic banking e.g. Mufti 
Taqi  Usmani,  intellectuals  in  academia  and  even  some  bankers  themselves  had 
expressed  their  discomfort  with  the  existing  system.  It  strongly  criticised  the 
widespread  use  of  Murabahah  and  Ijarah-  the  debt-like  instruments-  in  Islamic 
banking by saying that these instruments were “merely stratagems” (Ghias, 2011, p.9). 
It even strongly urged the internal Shari’a scholars to withdraw their support from the 
system and acknowledge their mistakes. Agha (2012) also endorses this argument by 
saying  that  “Shari'a  scholars  have  largely  done  well  in  handling  the  inexorable 
demands placed on them and heavy pressure to yield to structures that are cleverly 
crafted to appear compliant but lack substantive compliance.” 
 
This  fatwa  shattered  stakeholders’  confidence  not  only  in  Pakistan  but  around  the 
world. People started to approach the internal Shari’a scholars asking for clarification 
on  this  issue.  Therefore,  the  internal  Shari’a  scholars,  especially  those  directly 
criticised in this fatwa, had to respond. Mufti Taqi Usmani even came up with a couple 
of books on the issue defending the Islamic banking industry (Usmani, 2009a, Usmani, Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
  162   
2009b). He clarified that his presence on the Shari’a boards of some Islamic banks was 
only advisory and did not represent his ownership interest in those entities. Usmani 
disagreed  with  the  collective  fatwa  on  the  grounds  that  he  was  not  consulted  with 
before issuing the fatwa. Furthermore, he claims that “ninety per cent of the objections 
[raised  in  the  collective  fatwa]  did  not  represent  the  reality  on  the  ground  i.e.  the 
subject of objection did not exist [translated from Urdu by the author of this research]” 
(Usmani, 2009b, p.33). It was because, Usmani claims, the issuers of the fatwa did not 
investigate  the  practices  of  Islamic  banking  thoroughly  before  issuing  the  fatwa. 
Though most part of the book tries to defend the current system, it agrees with some 
of the key objections e.g. the widespread use of Murabahah and Ijarah almost non-
existence of pure PLS mechanisms in Islamic banking. Though, Usmani admitted that 
the existing practices of Islamic banks could not achieve the objectives of an Islamic 
economic system, he asserted that the minimum Shari’a compliance was a success in 
itself.  He  states  that  “the  existing  practices  are  permissible  [in  Shari’a]  but  this  is 
neither  our  final  destination  nor  enough  for  reaping  the  benefits  of  an  Islamic 
economic system [translated by the author]” (Usmani, 2009b, p.36).  
 
These responding fatwas helped to calm down the situation but did not completely 
override  the  objections.  Nonetheless,  this  row  proved  to  be  a  positive  pressure  on 
managers and Shari’a scholars to enhance Shari’a compliance levels in their respective 
institutions.  It  was  after  this  row  that  Islamic  bankers  and  internal  Shari’a  scholars 
recognized  external  Shari’a  scholars  as  the  strongest  external  force.  Consequently, 
efforts  are  now  made  in  the  Islamic  banking  sector  to  move  its  practices  from 
superficial Shari’a compliance to at least minimum or even reasonable levels on the 
continuum of ‘Fatwa Repositioning’. 
8.11  Positioning  the  Theory  in  Organization  Control 
Literature 
An organization is the “collective bending of individual wills to a common purpose” 
(Clegg  et  al.,  2006,  p.2).  Thus,  it  operates  to  achieve  short-term  and  long-term 
objectives  which  are  used  as  yardsticks  for  measuring  organizational  performance. 
There is a need to have solid control measures to keep the organization progressing 
towards  its  goals.  Mullins  (2010)  says  that  an  integral  part  of  individual  and 
organizational  relationship  is  the  process  of  maintaining  order  and  control  for 
achieving  organizational  objectives.  The  author  further  specifies  five  stages  in 
organizational  control  namely  i)  setting  objectives  at  the  planning  stage,  ii) 
establishing  standards  for  performance,  iii)  monitoring  actual  performance,  iv) 
comparing the actual performance with standards and measuring the deviations and 
finally  v)  rectifying  the  deviations  by  taking  corrective  actions.  This  process  is 
straightforward  with  unipolar  organizations  i.e.  organizations  with  a  single  set  of 
coherent  and  converging  objectives  e.g.  shareholders’  wealth  maximization. Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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Table   8.1: The Paradox of Control in first line management 
"In control"  "Not in Control" 
Management Action is:  Management Action is: 
Intended/selected/designed  Evoked/provoked response 
Taken in relation to:  Taken in relation to: 
Known  Unknown 
Predictable/certain  Unpredictable/uncertain 
Stable  Unstable 
Regular  Irregular 
Involving:  Involving: 
Detecting/correcting deviations  Amplifying deviations 
Producing:  Producing: 
Conformity/consensus  Diversity/conflict 
Source: Streatfield (2001, p.24) 
 
If  the  controlling  powers  of  managers  and  Shari’a  scholars  are  measured  on  these 
yardsticks,  one  may  conclude  that  managers  have  more  control  on  the  process  of 
Shari’a compliance. For example, every new product/proposal is selected/designed by 
managers  while  Shari’a  scholars’  response  is  mostly  evoked/provoked  when  the 
proposal is submitted to them. Thus, managers know from the very start what they 
want  to  achieve  from  the  new  product/proposal.  Similarly,  managers  take  action  in 
relation to known/predictable outcomes while Shari’a scholars are not much aware of 
the exact consequences especially in the case of new products. Furthermore, managers 
correct  deviations,  sometimes  by  just  changing  the  terminology  to  Arabic,  in  the 
proposal after Shari’a scholars raise objections. On the other hand, Shari’a scholars 
detect  and  amplify  those  deviations.  The  ultimate  objective  of  managers  is  to  seek 
conformity  of  the  product/proposal  with  what  they  initially  developed  while  Shari’a 
scholars  introduce  some  changes  and  diversity  into  them.  Further  literature  on 
managerial  control  also  supports  these  claims.  Shari’a  scholars’  position  in  IFIs  is 
supervisory and they have legal control/power just like BoD but, as “most organization 
theorists  believe  that  the  BoD……are  dominated  by  management”  (Mizruchi,  1983, 
p.426), Shari’a scholars are also controlled by managers. In line with (Pfeffer, 1972, 
p.426) who claimed that BoD is a “management tool in running a business”, SSB can be 
yet another and more useful tool for management and even BoD- some researchers 
define management as the BoD and senior management (Berle and Means, 1968)- for 
achieving their business objectives through Shari’a tagging. Management sees SSB as a Shakir Ullah                                      Chapter 8: Positioning the Theory in Literature 
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mediating tool between the bank and society. Thus, despite Shari’a scholars’ legitimate 
power and authority, the effective control rests with management. 
8.11.2 Type of Power and Controls Used by Shari’a Scholars and Managers 
Buchanan and Huczynski (2010, p.694) define power as “the capacity of individuals to 
overcome resistance on the part of others, to exert their will, and to produce results 
consistent  with  their  interests  and  objectives”.  They  further  claim  that  the  use  of 
tactics  and  techniques  for  exercising  power  is  actually  politics.  Members  of  an 
organization  possess/exercise  different  types  of  powers.  Etzioni  (1975)  divides 
organizational power into three broad categories namely coercive, remunerative and 
normative. While coercive power relies on threats in order to control the behaviour of 
the  other  party,  remunerative  power  involves  material  rewards  e.g.  salaries  etc. 
Normative  power  depends  on  symbolic  rewards  e.g.  prestige.  Looking  back  at  the 
action/interaction  strategies  adopted  by  Shari’a  scholars  and  managers  in  order  to 
cope with the phenomenon of Fatwa Repositioning, one can deduce that all the three 
powers  are  possessed  and  exercised  mainly  by  managers.  For  example,  when 
managers  are  not  happy  with  certain  decisions  taken  by  Shari’a  scholars,  they  use 
coercion to threaten their jobs, promotions etc. Coercive powers can also be used by 
Shari’a  scholars  to  some  extent  when  they  threaten  to  report  managers’  non-
cooperation to the shareholders or regulators. However, Shari’a scholars face coercion 
more  frequently  than  they  exercise  it  themselves.  Similarly,  it  is  the  BoD/managers 
that decide Shari’a scholars’ remuneration and other benefits. Thus, managers can use 
it as leverage to somewhat control the process or Shari’a compliance. Shari’a scholars 
may  yield  to  this  power  because  of  their  self-interest  and  thereby  compromise  on 
some  aspects  of  Shari’a  objectives.  On  the  other  extreme,  Shari’a  scholars  possess 
significant normative powers because of their social status and integrity. This social 
prestige is a significant card Shari’a scholars can play to control the process of Shari’a 
compliance.  
 
A further detailed classification of power categorizes it into five categories i.e. reward, 
coercive,  referent,  legitimate  and  expert  (Buchanan  and  Huczynski,  2010,  p.696, 
Mullins,  2010,  p.678).  The  first  two  of  these  powers  are  possessed  primarily  by 
managers while the last three are mainly possessed by Shari’a scholars in the case of 
Shari’a compliance. Thus, Shari’a scholars possess substantial powers but they need to 
exercise them properly and to the full extent. It was mentioned by one respondent 
(manager) that Shari’a scholars lack the ability to exercise their powers.  
 
“The thing is that the holder of the power should have the capabilities to 
take the decisions and take them on time and then implement them. But 
this  remains  an  issue  here.  Because  the  Shari’a  advisors,  here,  are 
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decision-making...  this,  I  think,  is  an  issue.”  ((Head  of  Islamic  Banking, 
Case II) 
Thus, one can conclude that Shari’a scholars have sufficient powers when it comes to 
Shari’a compliance but managers are more political- they use the tactics to use their 
powers and overcome Shari’a scholars (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2010). Consequently, 
the  level  of  Shari’a  compliance  oscillates  between  superficial  and  minimum  levels 
which are closer to business objectives, pursued by managers, on the continuum of 
‘Fatwa Repositioning’. 
8.12   Summary 
The  theory  developed  in  this  study  draws  considerable  support  from  the  existing 
literature in the field of Islamic banking and finance. It is evident that the presence of 
Shari’a scholars on board with Islamic banks is mainly for legitimacy purposes and not 
for actually seeking their expert advice and opinions. Managers often struggle for a 
lenient fatwa and try to escape strict Shari’a supervision and audit. Shari’a scholars’ 
self-interest  could  motivate  Shari’a  scholars  at  times  to  exhibit  that  leniency  to 
managers.  The  present  Islamic  banking  industry  mostly  relies  on  medieval  contract 
forms  rather  than  their  essence  and  that  is  why  it  is  being  criticised  by  not  only 
intellectuals but also external Shari’a scholars.  Organizational control literature also 
fits into the phenomenon of fatwa repositioning. It reveals that though Shari’a scholars 
have  referent  and  legal  powers,  managers  are  more  political  in  their  approach  and 
consequently, the process of Shari’a compliance is controlled by managers. 
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9  Chapter  9:  Summary,  Conclusions, 
Recommendations and Contributions 
9.1  Introduction 
This  is  the  last  chapter  of  the  thesis  which  summarizes  the  key  findings  of  the 
research,  concludes  the  key  points,  gives  recommendations  and  presents  its 
theoretical and methodological contributions. The next section presents a summary of 
the  key  findings  followed  by  a  section  on  conclusions  and  recommendations. 
Theoretical contributions are then presented in section 9.4 which outlines the main 
contributions of the research to existing literature in Islamic finance in particular and 
extant literature in the area of organizational control in general. The methodological 
contributions  are  presented  in  section  9.5.  The  last  section  gives  suggestions  and 
recommendations for further research. 
9.2  Summary of the Key Findings 
When one hears about IFIs, it comes to mind that compliance with Shari’a principles is 
the foremost important thing for such institutions. Secondly, Shari’a compliance may 
be seen as a straightforward and an absolute mechanism in the presence of Shari’a 
scholars on board with IFIs. This research, however, reveals that the reality is much 
more complicated than what it appears to be from the outside. In fact, the level of 
Shari’a compliance is constantly positioned and repositioned depending on the causal 
and intervening conditions and contextual factors. The core category in this research 
i.e.  fatwa  repositioning  refers  to  this  phenomenon.  It  all  starts  with  two  conflicting 
objectives i.e. business and Shari’a objectives assigned to two different parties within 
IFIs.  This  makes  up  the  necessary  conditions  to  ignite  a  conflicting  struggle  for 
positioning  Shari’a  compliance.  Shari’a  scholars  would  ideally  want  to  achieve  the 
deepest levels of Shari’a compliance in the absence of any opposing force (posed by 
managers)  while  managers  would  strive  for  maximizing  business  interests  in  the 
absence of any restrictions (imposed by Shari’a scholars). However, neither of these 
positions is possible in practice and each party has to move along the continuum of 
fatwa  repositioning  to  a  point  where  they  reach  an  initial  consensus.  This  point  is 
somewhere between minimum and superficial Shari’a compliance. However, this is not 
the beginning of the end but rather the end of the beginning of a hidden struggle for 
Shari’a  compliance.  It  is  here  that  the  broader  contextual  factors  and  intervening 
conditions  start  to  play  their  role.  For  example  the  wider  the  educational  and 
experience disparity between the two parties, the stronger the struggle and vice versa. 
Similarly, an obvious existence of depositors’ and employees’ expectations, pressure 
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sensitivity  to  eternal  reward/punishment  pushes  Shari’a  scholars  to  increase  their 
struggle for repositioning Shari’a compliance from superficial to minimum and even 
reasonable levels. These forces also induce managers to some extent to move towards 
higher Shari’a compliance levels along the continuum. However, the most important 
intervening  variable  which  compels  managers  to  cooperate  with  Shari’a  scholars  is 
their need for legitimacy and avoiding Shari’a reputation risk. Managers cooperate with 
Shari’a  scholars  at  the  beginning  because  they  need  legitimacy.  They  continue  to 
cooperate with Shari’a scholars after the initial legitimacy is achieved because of the 
banks’ exposure to Shari’a reputation risk in case of non-cooperation. On the other 
hand,  the  intervening  variable  that  might  force  Shari’a  scholars  to  compromise  on 
Shari’a objectives is their self-interest drive which is also a key motivator for managers 
to move Shari’a compliance towards business objectives along the continuum.  
 
In  order  to  reposition  Shari’a  compliance  towards  their  favourable  levels  along  the 
continuum, Shari’a scholars and managers use a number of strategies to control each 
other.  For  example,  managers  can  use  avoidance,  controlling  and  even  coercive 
strategies to keep Shari’a compliance on a level favourable to their business objectives. 
When  managers  use  these  strategies  frequently,  Shari’a  scholars  may  either  resign 
from  the  banks  or  compromise  on  Shari’a  objectives.  They  also  seek  hierarchical 
backing or become confrontational when facing pressure from managers that they do 
not want to accommodate. 
 
Depending upon the combination of contextual factors, intervening conditions and the 
action/interactional  strategies,  the  consequent  Shari’a  compliance  could  either  be 
superficial, minimum, reasonable or deep. Though it seems somewhat unrealistic to 
achieve deep Shari’a compliance through the current Islamic banking system, it is even 
impossible  to  establish  an  IFI  with  no  Shari’a  compliance.  In  practice,  Shari’a 
compliance  moves  back  and  forth  between  superficial  and  minimum  levels  rarely 
reaching the reasonable level. 
9.3  Conclusions and Recommendations:  
9.3.1 A Complete Disconnect between Shari’a and Business Objectives 
At present, there seems to be a complete disconnect between management and Shari’a 
objectives. On the one extreme, the foremost objective of Islamic banks’ sponsors and 
managers  is  to  capitalize  on  the  banking  market  of  conservative  Muslim  customers 
who would otherwise not patronize conventional banks. They are not much interested 
in  Shari’a  compliance  but  still  need  a  Shari’a  certification  from  renowned  Shari’a 
scholars in order to attach the Islamic legitimacy to their products. On the other hand, 
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religious cause. Nearly all Shari’a scholars consider their jobs with Islamic banks as an 
act of worship for which they expect a reward in the eternal life. For that reason, their 
utmost struggle is to make Shari’a as the core of IFIs’ products so as to achieve Shari’a 
objectives.  Therefore,  there  is  obviously  a  clear  disconnect  between  managers  and 
Shari’a scholars on what Islamic banks should essentially stand for. 
 
This disconnect is the basic problem from which many other problems stem and grow. 
For example managers would not have to shop for a fatwa and Shari’a scholars would 
not have to manufacture it in the absence of this disconnect. Similarly, there would 
have been no need for coercion, avoidance, controlling, confrontation and resignations 
for either of the parties. In order to avoid this conflicting situation, there should be 
strict regulatory controls to make sure bankers do not exploit the essence of Shari’a 
compliance  for  their  material  gains  and  that  Shari’a  scholars  do  not  manufacture 
fatwas that suit bankers’ needs. The purpose of establishing IFIs should not be the 
achievement  of  business  objectives  through  Shari’a  compliance  but  rather  the 
achievement of Shari’a objectives through a just and equitable business proposition. 
9.3.2 Normalization  of  the  Debt-like  Instruments  and  IFIs’  Convergence  to 
Conventional System   
Given the fact that the managers’ focus is on business objectives, they want Shari’a 
scholars  to  produce  an  Islamic  alternative  for  each  and  every  conventional  banking 
product.  Shari’a  scholars  struggle  to  come  up  with  such  alternatives  because  they 
argue  that  Islam  has  a  solution/alternative  for  everything.  In  some  cases  the 
alternatives  are  quite  in  line  with  Shari’a  objectives  e.g.  the  Musharakah  and 
Mudharabah  based  investment  mechanisms.  However,  such  instruments  are  not 
managers’ favourites because of their inherent risk. Therefore, managers always force 
Shari’a scholars to endorse the debt-like Islamic contracts, Murabahah, Ijarah Salam, 
Tawarruq,  etc.,  which  produce  the  same  or  similar  results  as  conventional  loans. 
Managers  can  further  reengineer  such  instruments  to  manufacture  the  products  of 
their choice and make them as similar to conventional banking products as possible.  
 
Interestingly, most Shari’a scholars initially approved such products with the excuse of 
the primitive stage of the industry and with the expectations to gradually eliminate 
such mechanisms from IFIs’ practices (Ghias, 2011). While responding to objections 
from  external  Shari’a  scholars  Muhammad  Taqi  Usmani,  clearly  expressed  his 
discontent  with  the  prevailing  practices  of  Murabahah  in  Islamic  banking  (Usmani, 
2009a). He also emphasized that Musharakah and Mudharabah were the true Islamic 
products that could contribute to the Shari’a objectives. However, these true Islamic 
products  represent  not  more  than  a  few  percent  of  the  bulk  of  Islamic  banks’ 
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In fact the structures initially approved by Shari’a scholars with the expectations of 
gradually  replacing  them  with  other  products  closer  to  the  Shari’a  objectives,  have 
become  normalized  within  the  industry.  New  Shari’a  scholars  defend  such  products 
rather than questioning them. Shari’a scholars and managers are increasingly adopting 
them without any feeling that they do not represent the true Islamic banking products. 
This  trend  is  causing  the  Islamic  banking  industry  to  gradually  converge  to 
conventional  practices.  The  new-born  industry  is  thus  fighting  for  its  identity  and 
uniqueness at a very early age (Agha, 2012). 
 
Referring to the growing phenomenon of this normalization, a respondent commented 
in the following words after reading through the analysis. 
 
“Any exception and excuse are becoming a norm. I don’t think the secured 
products  (Murabahah  or  Ijarah)  application  will  be  minimized  in  the 
future. As long as the IFI managements have been given this advantage, 
they will never compromise on it.” (Head of Shari’a Dept., Case III) 
9.3.3 Seeking Historical Evidence Rather Than Rational Judgment 
Shari’a  has  been  subject  to  interpretations  (Ijtihad)  by  Shari’a  experts  for  the  past 
fourteen  hundred  years  (Al-Allaf,  2003).  The  interpretations  are  meant  to  find 
scholarly  solutions  for  emerging  issues  not  directly  addressed  in  the  Quran  and 
prophetic traditions. These interpretations or newly issued fatwas carry the limitations 
of the times they were interpreted in. However, it is a tradition in Shari’a scholarship 
that new fatwas are issued in line with those issued historically by previous Shari’a 
scholars even if they are contradictory to one’s own understanding and rationale.  
 
Islamic banking has ultimately adopted this approach of finding historical evidence for 
new emerging issues. Shari’a scholars try to bring Islamic banking in line with those 
historical  interpretations  and  fatwas  that  do  not  represent  the  practices  of  today. 
Consequently, Islamic banking has become a nexus of costly and inefficient contracts 
(El-Gamal,  2006).  More  importantly,  this  approach  normalizes  the  fatwas  issues  by 
Shari’a scholars during the early ages of modern Islamic banking with the intention to 
gradually  eliminate  them.  New  Shari’a  scholars  feel  safe  to  endorse  these  products 
with  little  or  no  feeling  of  guilt  or  wrong-doing.  The  ultimate  result  of  disconnect 
between  Shari’a  and  business  objectives,  the  unconscious  normalization  and 
convergence,  and  the  tendency  of  Shari’a  scholars  to  issue  new  fatwas  in  line  with 
historical evidence have led Islamic banking toward superficial Shari’a compliance. This 
means that contracts are Shari’a compliant at least in their form because they have 
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practices  would  ultimately  be  grounded  in  the  essence  of  Shari’a.  These  are  then 
forwarded to bankers to find banking alternatives for them. It would change the extant 
banking practices significantly and give birth to a new era of banking truly grounded in 
Islamic principles encompassing deeper Shari’a compliance. Given the fact that Shari’a 
may not have solutions for all prevailing banking practices, Islamic banking would take 
a whole new direction and redefine banking and finance under the Shari’a umbrella. In 
other  words,  the  Islamic  banking  industry  would  establish  and  strengthen  its  own 
unique identity. The industry would attract a whole new market of Muslim clientele 
who currently see no difference between Islamic and conventional banking. 
9.3.5 Harmonization and Standardization 
Shari’a compliance varies from country to country, institution to institution and even 
scholar  to  scholar.  The  country-wise  variations  are  due  to  the  fact  that  different 
countries adhere to different schools of thought even within the Sunni sect of Islam i.e. 
Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafii, Maliki (El-Hawary et al., 2007, Ghoul, 2008). Institution wise 
differences within countries are due to the group of Shari’a scholars associated with 
each institution. The orientation of sponsors is also a factor for the institution wise 
difference in Shari’a compliance across IFIs. Different Shari’a scholars have their own 
understanding and interpretations of Shari’a rules leading to variations across Shari’a 
scholars.  
 
This  lack  of  standardization  has  disadvantages.  Firstly,  it  increases  Shari’a  risk 
especially in the case of cross-country dealings because the products approved by the 
Shari’a scholars of one country might not be acceptable to those of the other country. 
In some cases, the products of one institution are not acceptable to another institution 
even within the same country belonging to the same school of thought. Therefore the 
variations  between  Shari’a  interpretations  pose  a  significant  Shari’a  risk  for  Islamic 
banks  and  customers  (Ghoul,  2008).  Secondly,  it  paves  way  for  fatwa  shopping. 
Managers  can  find  Shari’a  scholars  who  have  very  liberal  interpretations  of  Shari’a 
principles  making  it  easy  for  banks  to  find  a  fatwa  that  meets  their  needs  (Foster, 
2009).  Thirdly, it is a hurdle in creating trained HR  pool for Islamic banks because 
employees  have  to  learn  different  Shari’a  interpretations  when  they  move  across 
different  banks  and  countries.  This  also  leads  employees  and  managers  to  make 
unintentional  mistakes  while  implementing  Shari’a  rulings.  However,  bankers  and 
regulators insist the existence of internationally defined Shari’a standards to make the 
oversight easy and streamlined (Zaidi, 2008) and minimize Shari’a risk. 
 
Zaidi (2008) claims that Shari’a scholars’ stance on standardization is a bit different. 
Firstly, Shari’a scholars feel Shari’a standards cannot be internationally standardized 
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the role of Ijtihad (the practices of finding juristic solutions for emerging issues) which 
is the ultimate source of innovation in Islam. Some Shari’a scholars may also oppose 
the  move  towards  standardization  because  it  would  reduce  their  demand  thereby 
decreasing the earnings of the few scholars in the cartel (Wright, 2006). 
 
This  research  recommends  a  harmonized  and  standardized  approach  to  Shari’a 
compliance across institutions and countries in order to streamline the industry and 
overcome most of the criticism the Islamic finance industry faces today. Positive steps 
have already been taken in this regard by the establishment of AAOIFI and IFSB. These 
institutions  have  brought  in  jurists  from  different  schools  of  thought  together  with 
academicians and practitioners to develop international standards for the industry. The 
standards must then be made mandatory on all IFIs which, unfortunately, is not the 
case  presently.  The  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  structures  would  become 
grounded in Shari’a and intellectual grounds and bankers would have to mould their 
banking  according  to  the  structures.  It  would  overcome  the  currently  prevailing 
practices  where  structures  are  grounded  in  banking  and  Shari’a  scholars’  role  is  to 
provide a Shari’a coating for them. Rather it would be the opposite i.e. bankers would 
have to provide banking alternatives for structures grounded in Shari’a and intellectual 
expertise thereby bringing the Islamic finance industry closer to the Shari’a objectives. 
Additionally,  a  standardized  approach    to  Shari’a  compliance  would  automatically 
minimize  the  impact  of  the  perceived  shortage  problem  of  Shari’a  scholars  (Ghoul, 
2008). 
9.4  Theoretical Contributions  
The theoretical contributions of this research are two-fold. Firstly, it adds to the body 
of existing literature on Islamic finance. Secondly, it contributes to current literature on 
organizational  control  in  the  particular  context  of  IFIs.  These  contributions  are 
discussed below.  
9.4.1 Contributions to Islamic Finance Literature: 
This study is the first of its kind in the area of Islamic banking. It explores the hidden 
scuffle  for  Shari’a  compliance  between  Shari’a  scholars  and  managers  within  IFIs. 
Though  some  recent  studies  have  addressed  the  issue  of  Shari’a  supervision  and 
governance in Islamic banking (Baali, 2008, Al Sharif, 2008, Dar, 2011, Farah, 2008, 
Garas and Pierce, 2010, Singh, 2009, Sultan, 2007, Wislon, 2009, Wright, 2006, Zaidi, 
2008), there has been no empirical study addressing the relationship between Shari’a 
scholars and managers and the mechanics of Shari’a compliance. Therefore, this study 
is the only one addressing this particular phenomenon empirically. Furthermore, the 
methodology adopted in this research i.e. GT is particularly suited for this particular Shakir Ullah                                            Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions,                              
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9.5.2 Specific Contributions to GT Research Methodology 
 
Individual vs. Group Work on GT Study 
While  deeply  involved  in  axial  and  selective  coding,  the  researcher  realized  having 
enhanced  sensitivity  to  the  hundreds  of  open  codes  already  developed.  The  whole 
research context  i.e. the respondents, interview locations, emotions and cases were 
visualized during the constant comparison process (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Corbin 
and  Strauss,  2008,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1990,  Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998).  The 
researcher  then  imagined  a  scenario  and  its  potential  effect  on  the  constant 
comparison where the interviews had not been conducted by the researcher himself. It 
was concluded that much of the sensitivity and virtual engagement with the data and 
respondents could have been lost in that case. It would have a strong negative impact 
on the richness of analysis because of the disappearance of respondents’ emotions 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The engagement with data is reduced significantly even 
when only the transcription of interviews is not done by the researcher him/herself. In 
fact the transcription of only one interview, in this research, was outsourced by the 
researcher which brought about a substantial decrease in sensitivity. The impact was 
so crucial that the researcher had to re-transcribe the interview himself in order to find 
the missing links.  
 
This  raises  questions  about  the  possibility  of  doing  GT  research  in  a  group  where 
different  researchers  contribute  to  different  tasks  i.e.  interviews,  transcription, 
analysis, etc. This research claims that much of the actual groundedness would be lost 
if such an approach is adopted in GT research. It is natural that a transcriber-, who is a 
different  person  than  the  one  conducting  the  interviews,  would  slip  on  some  key 
concepts especially when the transcription is selective. Increasing groundedness would 
be lost when the further steps are done by yet even different individuals. Furthermore, 
same  data  have  different  meanings  for  different  people  leading  to  different  stories 
(Strauss  and  Corbin,  1998).  Therefore,  this  research  concludes  that  GT  research  is 
essentially a long-term one-to-one relationship that strengthens with the passage of 
time thereby increasing sensitivity, groundedness and richness. The central category 
developed  by  a  single  researcher  would  be  a  much  better  representation  of  the 
phenomenon  than  the  one  developed  by  a  group  of  researchers  each  engaged  in 
different steps in the study.  
 
However, this research proposes alternative techniques for transforming the negative 
impacts of group research into positive ones. If GT research has to be done in a group, 
the  interviews  must  be  video-recorded  and  transcribed  word-by-word.  The  coders 
must then watch the interviews a couple of times before embarking on coding. If the 
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interviews independent from each other and then cross-compare their work, pinpoint 
differences and resolve them. Though these measures can increase the robustness of 
the  research,  it  diminishes  the  benefits  of  team  work  where  the  task  is  done  by  a 
group of people in order to do it quickly. 
 
Snapshot Visualization 
It is natural in GT research that the three analytical steps i.e. open, axial and selective 
coding continue simultaneously where the researcher goes back and forth between all 
the  stages.  This  back  and  forth  movement  is  easy  in  the  beginning  because  of 
comparatively fewer open and selective codes.  However, as the research progresses 
and a considerable number of open codes emerge, it becomes hard to visualize the 
codes for constant comparison. For example more than350 open codes had emerged 
towards the end of this research and it was not possible to remember, visualize or 
summarize them on a sheet of paper which could have greatly facilitated the constant 
comparison. This was the most tedious and tiring time when the researcher was sitting 
in front of the computer screen and having all the codes printed on paper. Still, there 
was no way out of it. It all seemed like finding a needle in the haystack. This was the 
first of many times when the researcher was almost hanged and felt the real anxiety of 
doing  GT  research.  At  this  point,  an  emergency  meeting  was  arranged  with  his 
supervisor  which  turned  out  to  be  very  encouraging  and  a  huge  moral  support  by 
confirming  this  anxiety  as  a  natural  occurring  in  PhD  research  especially  for  those 
doing GT. Despite the revitalizing encouragement from supervisor, there was no magic 
to  overcome  that  pile  of  open  codes  and  dig  out  the  hidden  diamond  of  the  core 
phenomenon.  
 
Luckily, the researcher came up with an innovative idea of pasting all the open codes 
on  to  a  big  wall  (a  picture  has  been  given  in  Appendix  VI).  This  technique  was  an 
enormous help in making the comparison and arriving at the axial and selective codes. 
It was like a snapshot visualization of the whole universe of open codes. It became so 
easy to navigate through the open codes, identify the links between codes, change the 
existing links, develop new relationships and come up with a more robust set of axial 
codes. 
 
Therefore, this research strongly encourages the snapshot visualization of open codes 
for quick and effective comparisons. 
 
Use of Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
The recent  surge in technological development has also contributed to professional 
and academic analysis of qualitative data. Some of the commonly used software are 
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popular in academic research. This popularity can be predicted from the fact that even 
Corbin  and  Strauss  have  shifted  their  focus  from  manual  analysis  to  the  use  of 
CAQDAS in the latest edition of their book (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). However, the 
uses of  software and  manual methods have their own merits and  demerits.  As this 
research has been done by a combination of the two, it recommends ways of utilizing 
the better of the two approaches.  
 
This study concludes that though CAQDAS are very helpful in doing, managing and 
retrieval  of  open  codes,  memos  and  the  data  itself,  they  restrict  creativity  and 
sensitivity when the research proceeds towards axial and selective coding. It was very 
easy and manageable at the initial stages of the research when the researcher used 
QSR NVIVO for open coding, recording memos and even doing the initial comparisons. 
The researcher continued with using the software even when his supervisor used to 
gently recommend giving a try to manual analysis having bundles of papers in front. 
However, when the number of open codes went over 200 and the focus of analysis 
shifted more towards axial and selective coding, the use of software started to prove 
itself a burden. It significantly restricted creativity and conceptual development though 
it all went unrealized until the researcher got stuck a few times and was forced to shift 
the analysis to pen-and-paper from the computer screen. This opened new horizons 
for creative analysis e.g. the snapshot visualization making constant comparisons lot 
easier and productive. 
 
Therefore,  the  research  suggests  that  that  software  be  used  for  breaking  the  data 
down  to  open  codes,  recoding  memos,  managing  data  conducting  some  basic 
comparisons. However, one should shift to manual analysis when the focus shifts more 
towards axial and selective coding. It is still recommended that the actual codes and 
data be maintained and managed through the software which makes retrievals very 
convenient. 
9.6  Suggestions for Further Research 
The fact that this research is unique of its kind in this area, opens a wide range of 
areas  for  prospective  researchers.  Firstly,  as  this  research  concludes,  there  is 
considerable  application  of  juristic  ruses  in  the  field  of  Islamic  finance.  Therefore, 
there  is  a  need  for  extensive  research  on  how  Shari’a  scholars  use  juristic 
ruses/stratagems and to investigate the particular circumstances and context under 
which Islam allows the use of such stratagems. For example Agha (2012) asserts that 
the use of stratagems is allowed only in the situations of extreme necessity e.g. life 
and death. He laments the use of stratagems for business objectives. This area needs 
to  be  properly  investigated  to  clearly  identify  the  situations  where  stratagems  are 
permissible under Shari’a rules.  Shakir Ullah                                            Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions,                              
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Secondly, one can quantitatively investigate the relative importance of business and 
Shari’a objectives as seen by Shari’a scholars and managers. The research could be 
conducted by collecting survey data using the variables identified in this research. For 
example  the  importance  of  social  welfare,  ethical  investment,  fairness  and  justice, 
philanthropy  and  unity  principles  could  be  used  as  variables  to  measure  Shari’ 
objectives  and  profit  maximization,  secured  investment  and  Islamization  of 
conventional  products  could  be  used  as  variables  for  business  objectives.  One  can 
even  use  some  other  variables  from  other  theories  to  develop  a  better  theoretical 
framework.  This  can  either  prove  or  disprove  an  essential  portion  of  the  theory 
developed  in  this  study.  Similarly,  there  is  scope  to  investigate  the  intervening 
conditions and contextual factors in a similar manner.  
 
Thirdly, this  study suggests new research around the area of nominal and effective 
power and control of Shari’a scholars and  managers in the IFIs.  This area could be 
further  investigated  using  GT  because  it  is  deeply  entwined  in  social  intricacies. 
However, one could also conduct a cross-case analysis to measure the relative power 
and control scenarios across cases and even countries. A quantitative study would also 
be  plausible  to  further  explore  this  area.Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: List of Respondents 
S. 
No 
Respondent 
Number of 
Concepts 
Mentioned 
Total 
References 
Created On 
1  Customer  36  56  11/03/2010 15:13 
2  Customer  5  13  19/02/2010 07:56 
3  Customer  9  9  11/03/2010 15:13 
4  Customer  16  22  11/03/2010 15:13 
5  Customer   2  3  06/10/2010 13:32 
6  Customer   2  2  06/10/2010 13:32 
7  Customer   5  7  06/10/2010 13:32 
8  Customer   3  3  06/10/2010 13:32 
9  Manager  22  33  11/03/2010 15:13 
10  Manager  25  38  11/03/2010 15:13 
11  Manager  21  26  06/10/2010 13:32 
12  Manager  14  15  20/10/2010 15:57 
13  Manager  15  16  20/10/2010 15:57 
14  Manager  11  14  06/10/2010 13:32 
15  Manager  20  23  06/10/2010 13:32 
16  Manager  27  31  06/10/2010 13:32 
17  Manager  9  9  20/10/2010 15:57 
18  Manager  8  8  06/10/2010 13:32 
19  Manager  5  5  06/10/2010 13:32 
20  Manager  2  4  20/10/2010 16:00 
21  Manager  13  14  20/10/2010 15:57 
22  Manager  16  24  11/03/2010 15:13 
23  Manager  26  43  04/08/2009 11:26 
24  Manager- Repeat Interview  29  51  11/03/2010 15:13 
25  Regulator  20  27  06/10/2010 13:32 
26  Regulator  22  31  06/10/2010 13:32 
27  Regulator  6  6  20/10/2010 16:00 
28  Regulator  26  29  20/10/2010 16:00 
29  Regulator  9  9  30/03/2010 11:36 
30  Regulator  5  5  20/10/2010 16:00 
31  Regulators-  Group 
Interview 
47  53  20/10/2010 16:00 
32  Shari'a Scholar  36  50  06/10/2010 13:32 Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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33  Shari'a Scholar  52  103  20/09/2009 03:24 
34  Shari'a Scholar  73  107  05/10/2009 03:35 
35  Shari'a Scholar  39  97  11/03/2010 15:13 
36  Shari'a Scholar  38  56  20/10/2010 16:00 
37  Shari'a Scholar  15  20  30/04/2010 09:36 
38  Shari'a Scholar  30  40  05/10/2009 01:25 
39  Shari'a Scholar  16  22  04/05/2010 10:25 
40  Shari'a  Scholar-  Repeat 
Interview 
33  58  02/10/2009 23:48 
41  Shari'a  Scholar-  Repeat 
Interview 
4  4  16/06/2011 13:29 
42  Shari'a  Scholar-  Repeat 
Interview 
80  182  03/10/2009 22:04 
43  Shari'a  Scholar-  Repeat 
Interview 
8  14  20/10/2010 16:00 
44  Shari'a  Scholar-  Repeat 
Interview 
41  66  30/03/2010 12:07 
45  Shari'a  Scholars  -  Group 
Interview 
21  28  06/10/2010 13:32 
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Name: Customer  
Created On: 06/10/2010 13:32:11 
Created By: SU 
Modified On: 20/10/2010 17:13:47 
Modified By: SU 
Size: 2 KB 
 
I  have  come  to  this  bank  on  referral.  I  have  come  here  because  my  friend,  who  is 
working here, asked to open an account here. I have another interested-based account 
in another bank. I don’t care if the bank is Shari’a compliant. The staff is friendly here. 
It also gives me some satisfaction that this bank is Shari’a compliant. 
 
Name: Joint Director, Regulator 
Created On: 06/10/2010 13:32:11 
Created By: SU 
Modified On: 21/10/2010 12:12:26 
Modified By: SU 
Size: 3 KB 
 
The basic issue is the mind-set wither that of the banker or the customer. Until and 
unless their mind-set does not treat Islamic banking differently, the industry cannot 
reach its ultimate success. Both the parties need to understand that the Islamic modes 
of transactions are essentially different from the conventional modes. Currently, the 
bankers  and  the  customers  say  there  is  not  difference  between  the  Islamic  and 
conventional  modes  and  when  they  don’t  feel  the  difference,  they  don’t  care  of 
following the correct procedures.  
 
The mind-set of the Islamic bankers is not supportive of Islamic banking because most 
of the HR for Islamic banks come from conventional banks for better pay and perks. 
Thus there is a need to change their mind-set. 
 
This problem stems from the lack of awareness/training on the part of both customers 
and bankers. These people have lots of objections on Islamic banking but if you ask 
them to explain the concept of Murabah or Musharakah, they don’t know about it. 
 
Secondly,  the  problem  is  with  the  Shari’a  scholars;  they  often  don’t  know  about 
banking practices so this creates a gap.  This gap can be bridged  by training those 
Shari’a scholars that come from the Madrasas (Religious schools). Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Appendix III: List of Open Codes/Concepts 
Codes/Concepts 
Appointment of SB  Deep Rooted Problem 
Approval Process  Default Obligation Amount 
Assertiveness of SA  Demand Driven 
Availability of Sharia Board  Depositor as Primary Stakeholder 
Avoiding Shari'a Board  Depositors Bear More Loss but less 
Profit 
Awareness  Depositors Interests 
Background  Depositors' Protection is SB's 
Responsibility 
Belief in the System  Designation 
Big names  Development of the Industry 
Blacklisted Countries  Dharar 
Blind Objections  Difference behind the screen 
Blind Trust on SB by Depositors  Differences in People and Institutions 
BoD Superior to SB  Different Backgrounds lead to conflicts 
Bridging Shari'a and Management  Diluted CSR 
Business Targets  Discrimination is Sin 
Capacity Building  Dispute Resolution 
Central Control for better Shari'a 
Compliance 
Distribution of Wealth 
Central Shari'a Board  Distribution of Zakat 
Chances of Deception  Diversity in Regulations 
Charity  Diversity in SC Opinions 
Charity as Responsibility of Islamic banks  Driving Force 
Clients Bad CSR reputation affects Bank's 
reputation 
Dual Responsibilities- to God and to 
Others 
Comments on Model (Paradigm)  Due Diligence of SA 
Commitment- Management  Duties and Responsibilities 
Commitment to Other Stakeholders  Economic Migrants 
Commitments to God  Education- Management 
Community  Employees as Key Stakeholders 
Compensation of SB  Employees as Management Matter 
Competence of Management  Employees’ Expectations from Shari'a 
Scholars 
Confidence in Conventional System  Enforceability by Shari'a Board 
Confidentiality of Others activities  Environment 
Conflict of Interest  Equitable and Fair- Shari'a Principle Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Conflicts between Mgt. & SB  Equity Participation is more Profitable 
Consequences  Equity Participation 
Conspiracies  Equity Participation Avoided by Mgt. 
Constitutional Support  Escaping Environmental Issues 
Consultancy Services  Eternal Consequences 
Consumption of Natural Resources  Ethical 
Control Systems  Ethical Marketing 
Country-wise differences  Exclusion of SB from Important Issues 
Critiques on IF System  Expectations from Shari'a Board 
CSR as a Natural Expectation from IFIs  Expenses-Depositors 
CSR as a Subset of Shari'a  Experience 
CSR as an Externality of IFIs  External Shari'a Scholars' Pressure 
CSR audit depends on the nature of 
engagement of the bank with the company 
Fair Competition 
CSR Definition  Fair Treatment of Employees 
CSR is done under the supervisions of the 
Shari'a Department 
Faith-sensitive Customers 
CSR is Inherent  Fatwa Manufacturing 
CSR is Relative  Fatwa Manufacturing for Maslahah 
CSR is very important  Fatwa Shopping 
CSR Screening in Mudharabah and 
Musharakah 
Feel the difference 
Culture of Shari'a Compliance  Final Authority 
Customers Cheating  Finding Ways 
Damage to Basic Concept of Islamic 
Banking 
Fiqh Can be Developed further 
Firing Management Personnel for 
Misrepresentation 
Limited Authority 
Forfeited Profits  Limited Exposure to Environmental 
Issues 
Freedom of Choice  Limited Involvement 
Frustration of Management  Long Time Taken in Approval by Shari'a 
department 
Frustration of SB Members  Management Not Interested in Shari'a 
Full-fledged IBs Vs. Islamic-windows  Management's Pressure 
Gap- Knowledge  Mandatory and Discretionary CSR 
Gharrar and Qimar  Maqasid-i-Shari'a 
Gifts  Market Stature of SA 
Goal Divergence  Maslahah 
Goals of Islamic Economic System  Matter of Priorities Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Going against the Tide  Meeting Bare Minimum 
Govt. Responsible for CSR Standards  Meeting Minimum Legal Requirements 
Gradual Developments in Shari'a 
compliance 
Mgt. Not Bound to SB on every 
Recommendation 
Grey Area  Mind-set 
Grey Areas  Misrepresentation 
Grounded in Fiqh  Misuse of Fatwa 
Hierarchy of Shari'a Scholars  Monetary Interests of Shari'a Boards 
Holistic CSR  Moral and ethical 
How profit is generated  Need for CSR Rating Agency 
Huge gap in depositors’ side  Need for Expanding SB's involvement 
I am confused  Negative List of Industries 
Idealism Vs. Reality  Nepotism is Haram 
Independence of SB  New Shari'a Scholars prone to Fatwa 
Manufacturing 
Indifference because of no Difference  No Concern for Employees Issues 
Indiscriminate Help  No CSR Screening in Murabahah 
Individual Vs. Institutional Responsibility  No CSR Screening of Suppliers 
Individuals' Responsibility  No Difference bet Islamic and 
Conventional [Replica of Con] 
Infant Industry  No Equity Financing 
Innovation in Shari'a  No Exploitation 
Institutionalized Shari'a compliance  No Harm to Society 
Instrumental Use of CSR  No Involvement in Environmental Issues 
Intention  No Proactive Role in HR Matters 
Interest is harmful  No Shari'a Requirement for Others' 
Actions 
Investment Policy  Nominate Contracts 
Involvement in Mgt. Matters will lead to 
conflicts 
Objections on Islamic banking 
Involving from the Start  Organizational Legitimacy 
Islamic Code of Conduct for Employees  Orientation- Customers 
Islamic CSR Precepts are Wider than 
Western 
Orientation of the Management 
Islamic Outlook of the Bank  Own Grounds of IF 
Islamizing Conventional Banking  Paid Advisors are pushed by Mgt. 
Isolated IF System  Paper marriage 
Jo Creation  Peer Pressure 
Job Switching  Penalty for Misrepresentation 
Juristic Ruse (Hillah)  Perks Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Justice  Personal Vs. Institutional Priorities 
Khilapha  Policing Role of Shari'a 
Known cash flows  Power of SB 
Lack of Commitment of Management  Primitive Status of Industry 
Lack of Credibility  Priorities of SB 
Lack of Shari'a Scholars  Proactive Approach in Shari'a 
compliance issues 
Lack of Standardization  Profit Motive 
Lack of Trust in Management  Profit Subject to Restraints 
Language as a Problem  Prohibited Industries 
Limitations in Screening Suppliers  Proper Use of Charity 
Purification of Income  Shari'a Scholars as Guardians of CSR 
Qard Hasana  Shari'a Seen as an Obstacle 
Reaching to Deserving People  Silent Contributors 
Reactive Approach in CSR issues  Single Sharia Advisor 
Real Islamic Investment  Social Boycott 
Recommendation Vs. Enforcement  Social Impact of Investments 
Recommendations  Social Screening of Suppliers 
Regulator- Ex-ante controls  Sponsors are Cautious 
Regulators- CSR  SRI 
Regulators- Environment  SRI Screening is Impractical 
Regulators of IBs  SSB as CSR Governing Body 
Regulatory Pressure  SSB's Independence 
Regulatory Role of Sharia (Substantive CG)  Stakeholders 
Relieving Pressure from Management  Stringent Shari'a scholars 
The reputation of Shari'a scholars  Subset of Islamic Economic System 
Reputation Risk  Suppliers' CSR screening not a Shari'a 
obligation 
Resignation of Shari'a scholars  Suspicious Transactions 
Respect for the previous verdicts  Sustainability 
Responsibility of Investee companies  Taking into confidence 
Rich People get the direct benefit  The Danger 
Rigorous Product Approval Procedures  The Will of God 
Room for Development on HR issues  Thinking out of the box 
Routine Duties  Third Party Guarantee 
SA Assertiveness  Time Commitment by SA 
SA Market Stature  Tokenism 
Sacrifice for Shari'a compliance  Top-to-bottom Vs. Bottom-to-top 
Approach 
Safeguarding Outside Parties  Trusteeship Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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SB as Final Authority in HR Disputes  Underestimated Importance of Shari'a 
Compliance 
SB Own Vs. Rented  Undue Influence 
SB Should Pursue SRI  Unity Principle 
SB Superior to Management  Universities-Industry Linkage 
Scope of Shari'a Involvement  Vague Boundaries of Authorities 
Screening In Mudharabah and Musharakah  Vague Definition of CSR 
Screening Transactions for Shari'a 
Compliance 
Verification of Information 
Secured Investments  Vigilant Shari'a Dept. 
Selecting Suppliers  Voluntary Trade-off 
Self-interest of SA  Western CSR Precepts 
Self-review by SA  Will of God as the Goal of Islamic 
Economic System 
Sense of Responsibility for SRI  Working for Islamic Bank is Ibadah 
Serving Communities where IFIs don’t 
operate 
Zakat 
Shareholders as Primary Stakeholders    
Shareholders Equal to Depositors    
Shareholders Secondary Stakeholders    
Shari'a Advisors Full-Time    
Sharia advisory firms!! A profit-making 
organization! 
  
Shari'a Advisory Forum    
Shari'a Arbitrage    
Shari'a Audit    
Shari'a Audit External    
Sharia Audit Internal    
Shari'a Audit of CSR Activities    
Shari'a Benches (boards)    
Shari'a Board    
Shari'a Gurus    
Shari'a Objectives    
 Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
  192   
Appendix IV: The Coding Framework 
Axial Categories  Open Categories  Properties  Dimensions 
Shari'a 
Objectives 
Social Welfare 
Relevance  Low  /  High  
Importance  Low 
/ 
High  
Profitability Trade-off  Low  /  High  
Sense of Responsibility  Low  /  High  
Authority  Low 
/ 
High 
Implementation  Low  /  High  
 
 
Ethical 
Investment (EI) 
Relevance  Low 
/ 
High 
Coverage  Narrow  /  Wide 
Sense of Responsibility  Low  /  High  
Trading-off Profitability  Low 
/ 
High  
Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low  /  High  
 
 
Fairness and 
Justice (F&J) 
Relevance  Low  /  High 
Coverage  Narrow  /  Wide 
Importance  Low  /  high 
Feeling Responsibility  Low  /  High  
Trading-off Profitability  Low 
/ 
High  
Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low  /  High  
 
 
Philanthropy 
Relevance  Low  /  High 
Importance  Low  /  high 
Sense of Responsibility  Low 
/ 
High  
Profitability Trading-off  Low  /  High  
Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low  /  High  
Philanthropic Use  Low 
/ 
High 
Instrumental Use  Low  /  High 
 
 
Unity Principle 
Relevance  Low  /  High 
Importance  Low  /  high 
Coverage  Narrow 
/ 
Wide 
Feeling Responsibility  Low  /  High  
Trading-off Profitability  Low  /  High  
Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low 
/ 
High  
 
 
 
Business  Profit  Relevance  Low  
/ 
High Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Objectives  Maximization  Importance  Low  
/ 
High 
Trade-off of Shari'a  Low   /  High 
Frustration  Low   /  High 
Use of Covert Means by 
Management  Low  
/ 
High 
Ex-ante Regulatory Controls  Low  
/ 
High 
Ex-post Regulatory Controls  Low  
/ 
High 
Implementation   Low   /  high 
 
 
 
Secured 
Investments 
Relevance  Low   /  High 
Importance  Low   /  High 
Feeling Responsibility  Low   /  High 
Trade-off of Shari'a  Low   /  High 
Frustration  Low   /  High 
Regulatory Controls  Low   /  High 
Implementation   Low  
/ 
High 
 
 
Islamization of 
Conventional 
Products 
Relevance  Low   /  High 
Importance  Low   /  High 
Feeling Responsibility  Low   /  High 
Trade-off of Shari'a  Low   /  High 
Use of Covert Means  Low  
/ 
High 
Frustration  Low   /  High 
Regulatory Controls  Low   /  High 
Implementation   Low   /  High 
 
 
 
Background 
Divergence 
Educational 
Disparity 
Religious Education  Low   /  High 
Conventional Education  Low   /  High 
Arabic Fluency  Low   /  High 
English Fluency  Low  /  High 
Mentality-Secular  Low   /  High 
Mentality-Religious  Low   /  High 
Frustration  Low   /  High 
 
 
Experience 
Disparity 
Religious Exposure  Low  
/ 
High 
Business Exposure  Low   /  High 
Mentality-Secular  Low   /  High 
Mentality-Religious  Low   /  High 
   
 
Cognitive Force  Self-interest 
Monetary Incentives for 
Joining Islamic bank  Low 
/ 
High 
Value of Incentives  Small  /  Big 
Based on Business Targets  Low  /  High Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Determines Behaviour  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Eternal 
Reward/Punishm
ent 
Reason for Joining the Bank  Small  /  Big 
Level of Spiritual Commitment  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Adherence  Low 
/ 
High 
 
External Pressure 
External Shari'a 
Scholars' Pressure 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Reputation Risk  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Positive Impact  Low 
/ 
High 
Negative Impact  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Regulatory 
Controls 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Reputation Risk  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Positive Impact  Low 
/ 
High 
Negative Impact  Low  /  High 
 
Depositors' 
Expectations 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Reputation Risk  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low 
/ 
High 
Positive Impact  Low  /  High 
Negative Impact  Low  /  High 
   
Internal Pressure 
Employees' 
Expectations 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Reputation Risk  Low 
/ 
High 
Sensitivity  Low 
/ 
High 
Positive Impact  Low  /  High 
Negative Impact  Low  /  High 
 
Internal Shari'a 
Scholars' Pressure 
Intensity  Low 
/ 
High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Reputation Risk  Low 
/ 
High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Positive Impact  Low  /  High 
Negative Impact  Low 
/ 
High 
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Compliance Force 
Shari'a 
Reputation Risk 
Intensity  Low 
/ 
High 
Exposure  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Positive Impact  Low  /  High 
Negative Impact  Low  /  High 
 
 
Organizational 
Legitimacy 
Shari'a Objectives  Low 
/ 
High 
Profitability  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Pressure  Low  /  High 
Other Stakeholders' Pressure  Low  /  High 
 
 
 
Coercive 
Strategies of 
Management 
Firing Threat 
Intensity  Low 
/ 
High 
Regulatory Protections  Low 
/ 
High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Impact  Low  /  High 
 
Closure Threat 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Protections  Low  /  High 
Sensitivity  Low 
/ 
High 
Impact  Low  /  High 
   
Controlling 
Strategies 
Appointment of 
Shari'a Scholars 
Role of Regulator or General 
Body  Low 
/ 
High 
Role of Bankers  Low  /  High 
Role of Existing Shari'a 
Scholars  Low 
/ 
High 
Overall Independence  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Authority of 
Shari'a Scholars 
Product Approval  Low  /  High 
Employees' Issues  Low  /  High 
Depositors' Issues  Low  /  High 
Other areas  Low  /  High 
 
Involvement of 
Shari'a Scholars 
Product Approval  Low  /  High 
Employees' Issues  Low  /  High 
Depositors' Issues  Low  /  High 
Other areas  Low  /  High 
 
Avoidance 
Strategies 
Avoiding Shari'a 
Board 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Requirement  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a 
Advisors  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Business Objectives  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Legitimacy  Low 
/ 
High Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Avoiding Shari'a 
Audit 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Requirement for SA  Low  /  High 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a 
Advisors  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Business Objectives  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Avoiding Full-
time Shari'a 
Advisors 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Requirement  Low  /  High 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a 
Advisors  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Business Objectives  Low  /  High 
 
Fatwa Shopping 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Requirement  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Controlling Shari'a 
Advisors  Low 
/ 
High 
Effect on Business Objectives  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Confrontational 
Strategies 
Punitive Actions 
Against 
Management 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Authority  Low 
/ 
High 
Implementation  Low  /  High 
Potential Effect  Low  /  High 
 
Nullification of 
Transactions 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low 
/ 
High 
Potential Effect  Low  /  High 
 
Complaints to 
Regulators/ 
General Body 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Regulatory Authority  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low  /  High 
Potential Effect  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Compromising 
Strategies 
Reactive 
Approach of 
Shari'a Scholars 
Authority  Low  /  High 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
Implementation  Low 
/ 
High 
Potential Effect  Low  /  High 
 
Excuse of 
Primitiveness 
Frequency  Low 
/ 
High 
Intensity  Low  /  High 
 
Juristic Ruses and  Frequency  Low  /  High Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Fatwa 
Manufacturing  Level  Low 
/ 
High 
 
Internal Shari'a 
Scholars' Pressure 
Intensity  Low 
/ 
High 
Exposure  Low 
/ 
High 
Reputation Risk  Low 
/ 
High 
Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
Positive Impact  Low  /  High 
Negative Impact  Low  /  High 
 
Seeking 
Hierarchical 
Backing 
Shari'a Board 
Independence  Low 
/ 
High 
Regulatory Requirement  Low 
/ 
High 
Stature of Members  Low  /  High 
Compensation  Low  /  High 
Power  Low  /  High 
 
Central Shari'a 
Board 
Stature of Members  Low  /  High 
Compensation  Low  /  High 
Independence  Low  /  High 
Power  Low  /  High 
Support to Shari'a Scholars  Low  /  High 
 
 
Shari'a Advisor 
Forum 
Regulatory Support  Low  /  High 
Stature of Members  Low  /  High 
Compensation  Low  /  High 
Independence  Low  /  High 
Power  Low  /  High 
 
Separation 
Strategies  Resignations 
Frequency  Low  /  High 
Eternal Sensitivity  Low  /  High 
 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Existence Central Shari'a 
Board  On 
/ 
Off 
Enforcement of AAOIFI 
Standards  On 
/ 
Off 
Shari'a Audit by Central Bank  On  /  Off 
Protection to Shari'a Scholars  On 
/ 
Off 
Appointment Procedure of SCs  On  /  Off 
 
Sponsors' 
Orientation 
Sponsors' 
Orientation  
Muslims  On  /  Off 
Religiousness  Low  /  High 
Secularism  Low 
/ 
High 
Religious Motives for IB  Low 
/ 
High 
Material Motives for IB  Low 
/ 
High Shakir Ullah                                               Appendices 
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Appendix V: Snapshot of the Open Codes 
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